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Abstract 
 
What happens when feminist body theory and reductionist theories of biological 
sex difference are brought together? In this work I take as my starting point the 
increasing  ubiquity  of  appeals  to  biology  as  an  explanation  for  ‘human’  and 
‘woman’s’ nature on the one hand, and the reactive and reflexive distancing of 
biology within feminist body theory on the other, to begin to question the middle 
ground. I aim to constructively dissent from taking up either of these positions in 
order  to  confront  the  question:  what  if  the  reductionists  prove  to  be,  even 
partially,  right?  In  acknowledging  that  possibility,  I  am  interested  in 
whether/where there is potential for feminist theory to be more relaxed about 
biologically sex differentiated attributes. 
 
I position myself as a women’s studies scholar taking a walk across the campus 
to see what evidence is being produced by ‘the opposition’. To place my walk in 
context,  I  first  briefly  explore  various  feminist  approaches  to  the  problem  of 
biological sex differences, and the continuing difficulties surrounding binaries 
and binary thinking. Next, in the main part of the thesis, I review the historical 
and contemporary reasoning and claims made within three areas of reductionist 
science  that  are  aligning  at  this  time,  and  which  have  been  reproached  for 
promoting a return to a more biologically determinist social environment. I then 
take a brief excursion off campus to demonstrate the dangerous aspects of these 
scientific  enterprises  when  their  interpretation  into  popular  culture  is  not 
carefully monitored. Finally, I return again to my own side of the campus to look 
at  some  of  the  ways  feminists  have  already  begun  the  work  of  overturning   v
outworn and contested conventional theories about biology and human nature in 
conversation with reductionist theory.   
 
Having done this, was it worth the walk? My assessment is that while, in some 
cases, feminism’s defensive antiessentialism is warranted, there is work being 
undertaken within these reductionist sciences that is less rigid and reactionary 
than some critical interpretation would suggest. I conclude that there is a certain 
futility  in  feminist  body  theory’s  oppositional  stance  to  biology,  and  that  its 
utility is put at risk by a continued investment in one side of a binary. Further, 
my  walk  across  the  campus  leads  me  to  believe  that,  while  perhaps  not 
imminent,  there  is  every  reason  to  expect  that  the  scientific  pursuit  of  an 
unequivocal genetic basis for specific sex differentiated behaviours will succeed. 
That  being  so,  there  are  spaces  where  the  insights  of  both  sides  might  be 
productively brought together so as to avoid the worst excesses of biological 
determinism    and,  at  the  same  time,  loosen  the  grip  of  binary  thinking  on 
approaches to biology and the body. 
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Introduction 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
[C]ulture and hence the unique qualities of the human species will make complete sense 
only when linked in causal explanation to the natural sciences. Biology in particular is the 
most  proximate  and  hence  relevant  of  the  scientific  disciplines.  I  know  that  such 
reductionism is not popular outside the natural sciences. To many scholars in the social 
sciences and humanities it is a vampire in the sacristy. 
Edward O. Wilson (1999, p. 292) 
 
 
What  are  the  virtualities,  the  potentialities,  within  biological  existence  that  enable 
cultural, social and historical forces to work with and actively transform that existence? 
How does biology – the structure and organisation of living systems – facilitate and make 
possible cultural existence and social change? 
Elizabeth Grosz (1999, p. 32) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That old lemon, that mystical dichotomy, the nature-nurture problem, needs to 
be reconsidered. It seems to have more reality in the minds of men (sic) than in 
the world they see around them. 
Glen McBride (1971, p. 37) 
 
Rather  than  accusing  science  of  essentialism  and  rejecting  the  role  of  the 
biological  outright,  it  may  prove  more  fruitful  for  feminism  to  theorize  the 
“interimplication” of the biological and the social in attempts to understand sex 
differences in behavior. 
Celia Roberts (2000, p. 1) 
 
 
 
Reconsiderations  of  the  nature/nurture  problem  have  continued  sporadically 
over  the  last  four  decades,  but  increased  attention  to  genetic  and  other  new 
technologies has provoked, since the early 1990s, a more sustained interest in  the 
debate. Arguments about whether humans are primarily framed and motivated 
by biology or by culture, or by some (generally unequal) intermingling of the 
two, regularly appear in scholarly books and articles, and in the popular media. 
These arguments are themselves intricately tied to theories and beliefs about sex 
difference that, in turn, exert a timeless fascination, and continue to fuel opposing 
theories about the human body. 
 
Body theory is a vigorously contested site, and sex difference has been variously 
conceptualised – often at one and the same time – as self-evident or mysterious, 
confronting  or  comforting,  complex  or  simple,  accepted  or  disputed,   3
acknowledged  or silenced. Sex difference is a problem; and the many theories 
about  how  and  why  the  sexes  differ  in  their  character  and  behaviour  pose 
particular dilemmas for feminist theorists, because ‘the problem’ is most often 
framed in terms of women’s difference from men. This, as has been pointed out 
so many times, immediately places woman in the subordinate position within a 
dualistic framework, situating her as ‘other’ to man’s ‘subject’.1  
 
Whether dualistic thinking comes ‘naturally’, or is culturally imposed (a question 
which is itself an expression of dualistic thinking), it is intrinsic to the way we 
view the world. We tend to think, for example, that either it is dark, or it is light; 
either it is hot, or it is cold. For the most part, it seems unproblematic to think in 
this way, and it matters relatively little to our everyday lives that things are not 
usually so clearcut – that,  for example, light seeps into the darkness, or a cool 
wind wafts through a hot day – since, individual preferences aside, neither pole 
of the (supposed) dualism is infused with any notion of a priori superiority over 
the other.  
 
The  biosocial  politics  of  difference,  however,  is  bedevilled  by  the  seemingly 
intractable  problem  of  the  dualistic  framework  within  which  it  is  inevitably 
situated, because here we are most often confronted by two phenomena not, as it 
were, side by side, but in an hierarchical arrangement which eventually works to 
                                                 
1   As Simone de Beauvoir puts it: “She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not 
he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the 
Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other” (1988, first published 1949, p. 16). For an extended 
argument  on  the  essentialism/social  construction  dualism,  see  Diana  Fuss,  Essentially  Speaking 
(1989). Ecofeminist Val Plumwood also discusses the nature of dualisms at length in Feminism and 
the mastery of nature (1993), in particular chapters 2 & 5.   4
constrain any interrogation.2 Thus, where the everyday terms within a dualism 
are  constructed  as  either  male  or  female  (as,  for  example,  in  Aristotle’s 
philosophy the capacity to generate greater heat is characterised as a superior, 
male,  ability),  then  those  terms  associated  with  ‘female’  are  invariably  also 
constructed as inferior to those associated with ‘male’ (see Cixous, 1986; Gatens, 
1996,  p.  61),  and  this  has  a  material  effect  on  our  lives.  Simone  de  Beauvoir 
recognised this constraint when she noted that “The real problem is precisely to 
find  out  why  woman  should  be  defined  with  relation  to  man”  (1988,  first 
published  1949,  p.  25).  In  turn,  the  positioning  of  women  in  this  way,  as 
‘different’ to men, leads to the struggle to resolve the binary thinking inherent 
within the problem itself, since the concept of ‘difference’ necessarily invokes one 
or more ‘Others’.   
 
As a result, feminism historically has had a very tense relationship with biology 
and with the disadvantageous implications of notions of biological difference for 
women. Despite the ‘post-feminist’ tenor of the times,3 and despite the many 
astute  and  creative  ways  in  which  feminists  have  theorised  the  body,  the 
literature  demonstrates  how  easily  unpalatable  (and  at  times  unintended) 
political, social, and/or  biological implications can attach to every approach. This 
has led, inevitably and understandably, to a feminist literature on biology and 
the body which, in general, tends to minimise or deny a role for biology in our 
                                                 
2  Especially, though not exclusively, of biology. Biology, of course, is not the only place where 
hierarchies  within  dualistic  thinking  are  problematic;  we  need  only  think,  for  example,  of  the 
different values given to science/social science, empirical/theoretical, quantitative/qualitative work 
within the academy and in the wider society. 
3   I place quotation marks around ‘post-feminist’ since, as much of the material in this thesis makes 
very clear, despite many gains – to borrow from and paraphrase a feminist slogan – we are not yet 
living  in  a  post-patriarchy,  and  therefore  the  notion  that  a  post-feminist  society  is  possible  is 
premature.    5
understanding of sex difference. In particular, feminist interaction with theories 
of the body that foreground the impact of biology on social and psychological 
manifestations of sex difference has been conflicted and often antagonistic. 
 
In part, this is also an outcome of how, over time, when we look at the history of 
feminist  engagement  with  questions  of  biology  and  sex  difference,  the  same 
themes recur. Essentially the same arguments need to be brought to bear again 
and again in response to ‘new’ challenges. In her classic text Biological Politics 
(1982), Janet Sayers concludes by saying: 
Capitalism, despite its liberal protestations, has had to be fought every inch of the 
way to get it to concede equal rights to women … This fight has meant, among 
other  things,  that  feminists  have  repeatedly  had  to  address  the  biological 
arguments adduced by the ideologues of capitalism. They have repeatedly had to 
confront  and  criticize  the  many  biologically  phrased  arguments  designed  to 
defend  existing  sexual  inequalities  in  society.  As  I  have  demonstrated  in  this 
book,  these  arguments  are  still  being  advanced  today.  The  struggle  is  by  no 
means  over:  even  the  limited  victories  that  have  been  secured  in  regard  to 
women’s biological function in the area of abortion, for instance, are now under 
threat (1982, p. 201). 
 
It is discouraging to realise that the ‘today’ to which Sayers refers was over 25 
years ago, and yet her statement could, with equal truth, apply to ‘today’ as I 
write this, in early 2009. Four decades after Kate Millett (1971) alerted us to the 
invisible  and  naturalising  assumptions  and  attitudes  entrenched  within 
traditionally  patriarchal  institutions,  what  is  now  at  risk  of  becoming  (some 
feminists  would  perhaps  say  has  already  become)  so  naturalised  as  to  be 
accepted without question, is a notion of a universal human/female nature that is 
encoded in our genes. This reinscription of ‘our nature’ in our genes returns us 
back  to  the  same  old  set  of  assumptions  in  which  women’s  biology  is  again 
recruited to put us back in our place. Clearly, there is something wrong here, not   6
only with the tenor and content of some of the biological arguments advanced by 
‘the other side’, but with the ways in which we, as feminists, respond to them.   
 
 
This thesis is about biological sex difference, about ‘human nature’ if you will, 
and the strained relationship between feminism and science on this issue. It takes 
as its starting point my unease with the ways in which feminist theory deals with 
the reality of biology – the whole corporeal package, the substance that is me.  My 
interest in this question began some years ago when I read a comment made by 
Elizabeth  Grosz  in  Volatile  Bodies,  to  the  effect  that  the  project  of  correlating 
neurological function (biology) with ideas and mental processes (culture) seemed 
doomed to failure (1994, p. 7). This statement both puzzled and irritated me, and 
my attempts to think through just why it did so lent me a different perspective 
on  feminist  literature  on  the  body.  Again  and  again,  I  was  returned  to  my 
perception of Grosz’s statement as an almost throw-away line that, nevertheless, 
works to shut down that particular field of inquiry. Why would she want to do 
this, if indeed this was her intention and not merely my interpretation?  
 
As I became more deeply immersed in the wider literature on sex difference and 
the  body,  the  ubiquity  of  appeals  to  biology  as  an  explanation  for 
human/woman’s ‘nature’, and the reflexive distancing of biology within feminist 
body theory, increased my exasperation. The more I read, the clearer it became 
that I was far from alone in struggling with these problems, and that the struggle 
to deal with the dialectic between feminism and biology was taking place on both 
sides of the campus; as long ago as 1986, for example, feminist biologist Lynda   7
Birke was calling for feminists to rethink biology. Although I was somewhat 
comforted by the insights to be found in the feminist literature, I was less than 
satisfied with the answers, or lack of answers, to my ‘dumb’ questions: If, as an 
outcome of being conceived with an XX combination of chromosomes, I am a 
particular sexed body (a female body), why do we draw the line at my also 
being/having a  particular sexed brain? What do we make of that? Why don’t we 
make  something  of  that?  How  can  we  overcome  the  mind/body  and 
nature/nurture  splits  by  theorising  a  biologically  sexed  body  and  not  a 
biologically sexed mind? Why does it seem as though we have largely abdicated 
this theoretical space to the ‘other’ side? 4 
 
Edward  O.  Wilson’s  description  of  the  reductionist  nature  of  biology  as  a 
vampire in the sacristy of the social sciences, resonates with my understanding of 
the way many feminists still ‘read’ and react to socio/biological research. Since I 
began  thinking  through  this  thesis,  there  have  been  calls  for  a  more  open 
relationship between feminism and Darwinism (see, for example, Grosz, 1999, 
2004,  2005);5  feminist  interventions  into  neurobiological  readings  of  the  body 
(Wilson, 1998, 2004); some optimistic approaches to new genetic research (Keller, 
2000), and to neo-Darwinian sociobiological readings of the body (Richards, 1982, 
2004; Vandermassen, 2005). Nevertheless, feminist body theory for the most part 
still fails to positively connect with the reductionist theories that, in one way or 
                                                 
4  Vicki Kirby talks about her own capacity for asking ‘improper’ questions, and of how certain 
‘dumb questions’ asked of her, although irritating, lingered in the mind and forced her to think 
more carefully about them. She says the ‘dumb question’ is one which “seems naïve and quite 
ignorant  about  the  discursive  protocols  that  would  rule  it  out  of  order  …  Yet  inasmuch  as  a 
prohibition is also an enticement, the ‘dumb question’ remains irrepressible” (1997, pp. 1-2). 
5   Darwinism, as distinct from the neo-Darwinism that is dealt with in this thesis, and that is most 
prevalent today, however.    8
another,  support  the  notion  of  essential  sex  differences.  How  then  do  we 
positively  reanimate  what  has  been  for  too  long  a  polarised,  unproductive 
conversation?  
 
In asking this, I am influenced by Celia Roberts’ call for “more specific attention” 
to be paid to “the positive theorization of the role of biology in the production of 
behavior” (2000, p. 1, my emphasis). I suggest that there has been very little 
positive theorisation of biology’s influence on behaviour from either side of the 
debate. That is to say, on the feminist side there is a tendency to defer or deny the 
question; while, in the reductionist literature, even where the intended aim is 
said to be the acquisition of neutral (or even positive) knowledge, the social and 
political  effect  of  assigning  behaviour to biology has been almost universally 
negative for women.  
 
Banu Subramaniam comments that “most women’s studies scholars engage with 
the sciences through [feminist critique] rather than walking across campus to see 
what work happens in these fields today” (2003, p. 929). But why might we want 
to do that?  For me, the answer is a simple one: I am not going to begin to find the 
answers to my ‘dumb questions’ by remaining on my own side of the campus or 
by simply reading others’ accounts of reductionist theory. In the 15 years since I 
first  read  Volatile  Bodies,  there  has  been  a  clear  social  shift  away  from  an 
explanatory  reliance  on  ‘nurture’  back  towards  explanations  from  ‘nature’.  I 
believe that this shift has been facilitated by an evident alignment between the 
separate  but  inter-related  fields  of  genetics,  sociobiology,  and  sex  difference   9
research since the early 1990s. That is, a greater willingness to entertain biology 
as an explanation for everything from sexuality to susceptibility to faith can, in 
some measure, be attributed to the undertaking to map and sequence the human 
genome  and,  in  so  doing,  to  reveal  “nature’s  complete  genetic  blueprint  for 
building a human being” (NHGRI, n.d.-a, para 1).6 In turn, I contend that the 
work  of  academic  sociobiologists  and  sex  difference  researchers  has  been 
reinvigorated by the  intellectual comfort to be found within this endeavour and 
in post-genome studies.  Finally, there is a continuing proliferation of vulgar 
reductionist texts that purport to ‘explain’ the sexes to each other by recourse to 
the ‘naturalness’ of sexually differentiated roles and behaviours. The popularity 
of these texts – the appeal of their over-simplified and distorted re/presentation 
of the academic research, and the ease with which they are presumed both valid 
and  authoritative  –  is  the  best  evidence  of  an  increasing  return  to  the  social 
acceptance of a more biologically determinist environment over the past two 
decades. 
  
So, what if biology does have a greater influence on our behavioural phenotype7 
than  feminist  body  theory  currently  allows?  I  suggest  that  the  need  to 
reconceptualise the ways in which we theorise bodies has become ever more 
urgent as the science of biology embeds itself deeper into the social and cultural 
fabric  of  everyday  life.  With  the  flood  of  new  information  spilling  out  from 
                                                 
6  NHGRI is the National Human Genome Research Institute.  
7  Richard  Lewontin  defines  the  distinction  between  the  genotype  and  the  phenotype  as:  “The 
genotype is the descriptor of the genome which is the set of physical DNA molecules inherited from 
the  organism’s  parents.  The  phenotype  is  the  descriptor  of  the  phenome,  the  manifest  physical 
properties of the organism, its physiology, morphology and behavior” (2004, para 2). 
    10
genetic,  neurological  and other technologies (complicating existing notions of 
how our biological being-in-the-world interacts with and intervenes in our social 
being-in-the-world), biology is once again a very large ‘elephant in the room’. 
There is a need for feminist body theory to revisit the fact of difference. 
  
In this thesis, then, I position myself as a women’s studies scholar taking a walk 
across the campus to see what is going on in the three fields of reductionist 
science  that  most  often  inform  popular,  vulgar  reductionism.  This  research 
impacts on the lives of all of us, but most particularly on the lives of women.  
Although I take embodiment as my starting point, I do not attempt to resolve 
debate over the actual differences between men and women. Nor do I attempt to 
decide between the opposing positions of nature or nurture. Rather, my aim is to 
constructively dissent from taking up either position in order to ask: what if?  
 
As far as possible, I undertake this journey with an open mind, not intent on 
critique  but,  as  a  non-scientist,  on  understanding.    I  take  with  me  just  two 
fundamental assumptions:  first, that biology cannot be left out of any account of 
how  we  negotiate  our  way  in  the  world  as  sexed  beings;  and  second,  that 
believing this need not inevitably (although quite clearly it too often does) lead 
us into determinism.  In walking across the campus, I hope to find potentially 
useful synergies between the two ‘sides’ that might work to ameliorate the more 
usually  adversarial  relationship.  The  walk  will  be  worth  it  if  finding  such 
synergies allows for the prospect of a more positive theorisation of biology and 
the body. The risk, in taking the walk, is the possibility of disappointment – of   11
not finding, in colleagues or the other side, the same willingness to ask improper, 
dumb questions.  
 
The thesis is organised in three parts. Part One (Skirting Difference) contains one 
chapter providing an overview of the ways in which the problem of biology and 
sexual  difference  has  been  dealt  with  by  different  schools  of  thought  within 
feminist body theory. The chapter briefly describes how feminism has negotiated 
the essentialist/constructionist and mind/body splits, how we theorise bodies, 
and how we respond to biology and to the science of sex differences. This chapter 
places my walk across the campus within the context of feminism’s historical and 
necessary concern with questions of biology, and the difficulties that continue to 
exist  around  shifting  the  binaries,  escaping  binary  thinking,  and  countering 
damaging reductionist readings of the body. 
 
In Part Two of the thesis (The Vampires in the Sacristy), I turn my attention to 
some of the ways in which reductionist science constructs and theorises bodies. 
Following feminist philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards, I proceed from a belief 
that, if “we really want to make society as well suited to people’s natures as 
possible, we cannot afford to ignore any evidence; not even when it is produced 
by the opposition” (1982, p. 27). The four chapters in this section each represent a 
discrete, yet related, biological ‘vampire’ for feminism. They are linked together 
by  their  reliance  on  biological  processes  to  support  their  hypotheses  and 
conclusions. Perhaps more importantly for my purposes, they are also strongly 
connected by their focus on and differential treatment of bodies. That is to say,   12
there is a thread running through and connecting the three fields of scientific 
endeavour with each other and with the way they have been popularly rendered. 
I move from genetics, where the interest is in discovering what is ‘human’ nature; 
to  sex  difference  research,  where  the  interest  is  very  clearly  upon  women’s 
difference from men; to sociobiology, which hypothesises about both ‘human’ 
nature and sex differences to draw conclusions about ‘women’s nature’ that are 
often detrimental to women. Finally, vulgar reductionism draws upon all three of 
these  academic  enterprises  to  present  a  story  to  the  wider  public  about  the 
natures  of  women  and  men  that  I  believe  is,  in  many  ways,  profoundly 
disrespectful of and damaging for both sexes, but which, because it so effectively 
supports the status quo, is especially harmful for women. 
 
The four chapters in this section of the thesis are, then, a look at the arguments 
and evidence being produced in three areas of reductionist science that are most 
closely tied to research into and beliefs about biological sex difference: genetics, 
sex  difference,  and  sociobiology.  In  Chapter  Two  (Genetics,  genomes,  and 
control: biology’s Holy Grail), I look at the science of genetics through the lens of 
the Human Genome Project, its search for the biological basis of ‘human nature’, 
and its attempts to meet the significant ethical, legal, and social issues arising 
from  this  new  knowledge.  In  Chapter  Three  (The  bent  twig:  cognitive  sex 
difference), my focus shifts to the field of sex difference research and reveals how 
this research, historically and still today, foregrounds the ‘nature of’ ‘woman’ 
within  its  investigations  of  ‘difference’.  Chapter  Four  (‘Just  so’  stories?: 
sociobiology  as  persistent  paradigm)  is  concerned  with  how  academic   13
sociobiology  brings  together  hypotheses  about  ‘human’  and  ‘woman’s’  (and 
‘man’s’) natures and proposes evolutionary mechanisms for sexed behaviours. In 
each of these chapters, my aim is to explore the work being undertaken in these 
fields, and to review what practitioners working within them have said about 
human sex difference. It is not my purpose to subject them to critique (although 
some critique will inevitably occur), since this has been exhaustively undertaken 
by others. Rather, I am interested to see where/whether there are spaces in which 
the familiar social body of feminist theory might, without harm, take up and take 
on  some  of  the  biological  attributes  described  by  these  sciences.  Finally,  in 
Chapter Five (‘Lunch-chasers and nest-defenders’: vulgar reductionism), I step 
outside of the academy, and down from the fence, to explicitly critique the vulgar 
reductionism  so  endemic  in  popular  culture,  so  explicit  in  popularisations  of 
these fields of research, and so secure because of the complacency with which the 
research is undertaken.  
 
In Part Three (‘The organism is predecessor to our theories about it’), I complete 
the circle by returning to my ‘own’ side of the campus to outline some feminist 
work that attempts to move towards a more positive engagement with some 
elements of reductionist theory. These are those feminists who theorise  the body 
through its various biological processes, and the sociobiologist feminists, who 
have shifted conventional malestream conversations about sex difference from 
within.  As well, I look briefly at those feminists who weave their philosophies 
around  a  favourable  view  of  evolutionary  psychology,  a  more  recent 
manifestation  of  sex  difference  and  sociobiological  research.  I  conclude  this   14
chapter by expressing some views about a way forward for feminists on each 
side of the nature/nurture divide. 
 
Finally,  within  a  brief  summary  of  my  thesis  journey,  I  revisit  the  potential 
synergies  that  exist  between  feminist  theory  and  the  reductionist  sciences 
examined  here,  and  offer  some  thoughts  on  the  possibilities  for  a  more 
productive conversation between them. 
   15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part one : Skirting difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No science or discipline can peel off layers of culture and learning and find an untouched 
core  of  biological  nature.  Rather  than  biology  acting  to  constrain  and  limit  our 
potentialities,  it  is,  in  fact,  the  supreme  irony  that  our  magnificent  brains,  with  their 
nearly limitless structural and functional potentiality for learning, flexibility, and choice-
making, have produced cultures that constrain and limit those potentialities. 
Ruth Bleier (1984, p. 7)  
 
 
We were the “cultural animal” all right, but stress was entirely on the cultural while the 
animal was relegated to a few odd things like blinking, sucking, feeling hungry, and 
copulating. Ninety-nine percent of our behavior, it was held, was “learned” and hence 
cultural. And what was more there was no limit to what could be learned. 
Robin Fox (1971, p. 280) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   16
 
 
 
One 
Embracing nurture : the biosocial politics of difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[T]he subject of women’s biology is profoundly political.  
Ruth Hubbard (1990, p. 2)  
 
[P]artisans  of  the  Standard  Social  Science  Model  insist  on  the  Cartesian 
distinction  between  the  material  world  of  anatomy  and  physiology  and  the 
mental  world  of  psychology,  vigorously  resisting  attempts  to  see  them  as 
different  descriptions  of  the  same  integrated  system,  subject  to  the  same 
organizing principles. 
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides (1995, p. 57) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Historically,  both  academic  and  grassroots  feminists  have  focused  on  the 
fundamental importance of our bodies: the meanings given to them, the social 
roles prescribed for them, and the injustices visited upon them. Whatever else it 
may be and however variously we may define and describe it, by its very nature 
feminism  is  deeply  invested  in  the  physicality  of  women.  This  investment 
informs  much  of  the  resistance  to  and  interpretation  of  sociobiological  and 
genetic research as saying that our bodies are only ours in theory; that is, that in 
reality  they  belong  to  ‘the  gene’,  and  the  gene,  in  turn,  now  belongs  to 
(predominantly male) science.   
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Feminist  theorists  occupy  various  positions  on  the  continuum  between 
essentialism and social constructionism in their approaches to such reductionist 
paradigms. I am principally interested in two groups of theorists who might be 
said to occupy the middle ground, and whose work most clearly struggles with 
the problem our biology poses. The first of these are feminist approaches that, 
despite acknowledging the body, work to defer the problem of sex difference by 
dealing with an ‘imaginary’, discursive, legislative, fragmented, or social body 
(for example, Butler, 1990; Diprose, 1994; Gallop, 1988; Gatens, 1996; Grosz, 1994; 
Kirby,  1997).  The  second  approach  are  those  feminists  who,  in  one  way  or 
another,  challenge  the  science  that  has  the  effect  of,  or  explicitly  seeks  to, 
establish a biological foundation for an essential female (or male) behavioural 
pattern  (including  Bleier,  1984;  Fausto-Sterling,  1985,  2000c;  Hubbard,  1990; 
Keller, 1985; Keller & Longino, 1996; Oakley, 1972; Rogers, 2000; Sayers, 1982; 
Spanier,  1995).8  It  is  within  these  two  approaches  that,  for  my  purposes,  the 
struggle over biological sex difference is largely played out.  
 
In general, I dislike taxonomies for their tendency to attach a singular label to 
individuals  who  may,  and  usually  do,  belong  to  disparate  groups,  espouse 
complex  and  nuanced  positions,  and  subscribe  simultaneously  to  a  range  of 
views  that  may  well  cut  across  taxonomic  groups,  dependent  upon 
circumstances. Nevertheless, in an attempt to negotiate a conversation with the 
“difficult child” that is the study of sex differences, and with its “thoroughly 
                                                 
8   As distinct from those feminists (for example, Sandra Harding) whose focus is on the position of 
women in science.   18
mixed-up”  feminist  parents  (Foreword,  Oakley,  1985),9  in  this  chapter,  I  will 
position the two groups I am most interested in within a loose taxonomy of five 
primary approaches to the problem of biology, adopted by feminist writers on 
sex  difference  and  the  body.10  A  sixth  position,  where  I  see  feminist  and 
reductionist approaches beginning to come together, is dealt with in the final 
chapter of the thesis. This taxonomy also allows me to discern the directions of 
the conversations that are already in play around these questions between the 
various parties: Who is talking to whom? Which groups are not talking to each 
other? On what terms are conversations being conducted? Who is walking across 
the campus and who is not?   
 
Two poles 
The  first  two  of  these  positions,  the  essentialist  and  the  explicitly 
postmodernist/poststructuralist positions, will be dealt with only briefly since 
their shortcomings and difficulties are well understood. The third position, the 
metatheoretical approach, is dealt with in slightly more depth, since it really sits 
to  the  side  of,  and  is  in  conversation  with,  the  range  of  other  approaches. 
Theorists within this group deal not with biology per se, but with an interrogation 
of dualistic thought and how this has circumscribed the routes feminists are able 
to take through this difficult theoretical terrain. Nonetheless, they set a broader 
context for the final two positions – sexual difference feminism, and feminist 
engagements with science – which I take up in much more detail because they 
                                                 
9    As,  indeed,  in  later  chapters,  I  somewhat  artificially  segregate  its  thoroughly  mixed-up 
reductionist parents within particular paradigms when in fact many of those working and writing 
in these fields cross and re-cross taxonomic borders. 
10  While making no claim that this is an exhaustive list of feminists writing in any of these areas.   19
are both more closely aligned to debates around biology and the body. I begin 
with the two positions at either end of my taxonomy, since these very polarised 
positions have, in their different ways, always already effectively eliminated the 
questions with which I am concerned in this thesis.  
  
In the strong essentialist position, often associated with eco-feminism and with 
some cultural feminist work, differences carry implications not only for physical 
characteristics  but  also  for  gendered  behaviours  (for  example,  masculine 
characteristics  of  aggression,  competitiveness,  emotional  disconnectedness; 
feminine characteristics of consultation, caring and peacemaking).11 This model, 
sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, accepts the notion that there are 
important and influential sex differences in the brain, but redefines and reverses 
the  judgments  attached  to  sex-linked  traits  so  that  the  (usually)  negatively-
valued, so-called female traits are instead valorised (see, for example, Gilligan, 
1982; Griffin, 1984; Kreiger, 1987; Merchant, 1982; Plumwood, 1993; Warren & 
Erkal, 1997).   
 
While we may applaud any emphasis placed upon a positive valuation of so-
called women’s traits, this manoeuvre effectively, and simply, inverts one of the 
least acceptable outcomes of malestream thinking – the preferential valuing of 
behavioural traits associated with men. It thereby ultimately risks more firmly 
embedding the same essentialist notions that have worked so effectively against 
                                                 
11  Although this is an approach most closely associated with ecofeminism, it is important to note 
that many ecofeminists argue that women are best fitted for certain tasks not by nature, but as a 
result of sex differentiated nurturing. Chris Cuomo (1998) and Janet Biehl (1991) both argue against 
the ‘essentialist’ frame of much eco-feminist thought.    20
the best interests of women. Indeed, this is an approach that has been actively 
pursued by some sociobiologists, and writers of vulgar popularisations of sex 
difference science, who appear to suppose that writing ‘woman’ and some (still 
biologically derived) ‘feminine’ traits as superior and/or beneficial to women will 
somehow make the underlying determinism more palatable.12  
 
As I make clear throughout the thesis, I am not averse to the notion of biology as 
a player in the formation of sex-differentiated psychological characteristics per se. 
On the contrary, my openness to this as a probability was a major precipitating 
factor for undertaking this research. Yet, accepting this probability is not the same 
as accepting that either sex is best fitted by nature for anything (with the obvious 
exceptions of those few elements of reproductive process biologically tied to one 
sex or the other; that is, insemination, gestation, parturition, and lactation). If we 
are to reject the idea that women are fitted by nature for a particular sexually 
differentiated (subordinate) social niche, then I suggest we must also reject the 
notion that we are better fitted by nature than are men for the (superior) niche 
that they have historically occupied. 
 
At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum  lies  the  explicitly 
postmodernist/poststructuralist  turn  to  an  approach  that  questions  the  very 
existence of ‘woman’ outside of social discursive practice (a shift that itself raises 
a whole new set of ‘improper’ or ‘dumb’ questions for me that cannot be dealt 
with here). Denise Riley, for example, states that “‘The body’ is not, for all its 
                                                 
12  See, for example, Helen Fisher’s The first sex (1999), and any number of popular texts of the ‘Why 
men don’t iron’ variety.   21
corporeality, an originating point nor yet a terminus; it is a result or an effect” 
(1988, p. 102), and that she: 
would not seek the freshly conceived creature, the revelatory Woman we have 
not yet heard. She is an old enough project, whose repeated failures testify to the 
impossibility of carving out a truly radical space; the damage flows from the very 
categorisation ‘woman’ which is and has always been circumscribed in advance 
from some quarter or other  (1988, p. 107). 
 
 
Other  feminists  writing  in  this  vein  see  questions  of  biology  as  theoretically 
irrelevant.  Christine  Delphy  comments  that,  “the  vast  majority  [of  feminists] 
continue to think that ‘we mustn’t ignore biology’. But why not exactly?” (1984, 
p.  23).  This  most  extreme  version  of  the  social  constructionist  model  of  sex 
difference  allows  only  that  women  and  men  (may)  have  differing  physical 
characteristics  as  a  result  of  their  biological  sex,13  maintaining  that  all  other 
differences,  and  the  significance  accorded  to  any  difference,  are  produced 
discursively by/within our historical and social location. Where the body is a true 
tabula  rasa,  an  undifferentiated  lump  of  human  clay  within  and  upon  which 
cultural constructions of ‘woman’ are inscribed, the whole issue of biological sex 
difference becomes redundant.  
 
These two approaches do not walk across the campus and they are, effectively, in 
conversation only with each other. In seeking to deal with the dualism by either 
adopting or denying it, they are not particularly useful to the questions I seek to 
interrogate. At best, they allow us to clearly see the difficulties associated with 
taking a very polarised approach to the problem of biology, and in this sense, 
                                                 
13   Again, Delphy argues that gender “created anatomical sex” (1984, p. 144).   22
they have been useful to my third category: what I have called the metatheory on 
feminist  approaches  to  biology.  These  feminists  focus  on the ramifications of 
thinking about the body dualistically. They explore the various ways in which 
essentialist thought and attributions of sameness and equality have played off 
against notions of difference, the effects of this on women historically, and how 
this  way  of  approaching  the  problem  of  biology  has  constrained  feminist 
theorists in their responses to it. Theorists engaged in untangling and making 
clear the problem of binary thinking are also largely involved in conversations 
with  other  feminists,  and  not  with  the  reductionist  science  that  underwrites 
theories of sameness/difference and essentialist/social constructionist thought. 
 
Metatheoretical approaches 
 
In this section, I discuss the work of two feminist theorists, to illustrate the kind 
of metatheoretical approach that comments upon the tensions within feminism 
struggling  with  dualistic  thinking.  Carol  Bacchi,  in  conversation  with 
essentialist/social  constructionist  feminists,  allows  us  to  see  very  clearly  the 
problem of essentialism for feminism; and Diana Fuss, primarily in conversation 
with the postmodern/poststructural and sexual difference feminists, reveals the 
problems  with  postmodernism.  Bacchi  and  Fuss  are  less  concerned  with  the 
dualisms  they  use  to  illustrate  their  work  than  with  the  more  fundamental 
problem of dualistic thinking itself. 
 
In Same Difference (1990), Carol Bacchi explores the ways in which feminism has 
engaged with questions of sexual sameness/difference within the context of our   23
temporal and cultural locations. In comparing and contrasting historical debates 
and  contemporary  Australian,  British  and  American  approaches  to  sexual 
difference framed within positions on equal rights, special treatment, protective 
legislation,  the  sexuality  debates  (pornography  and  sexuality),  and  the 
construction of ‘woman’, Bacchi allows us to see why the question of biology has 
been confronted and denied in the ways that it has: 
‘Sameness’ and ‘difference’ became catch-cries, precluding more thoughtful 
discussion of the social structures which made it necessary for women to 
advocate one of these alternatives (1990, p. 49).  
 
Concluding that American feminism is predominantly equal rights (which she 
roughly approximates to socialisation theory); British feminism is predominantly 
welfare-oriented; and Australian feminism is a combination of both (which she 
calls ‘reform’ feminism), Bacchi makes it clear that each approach carries with it 
the potential for inequity for some group of women. ‘Equal treatment’ (sameness) 
theorists, for example: 
… will wait and fight for laws that ‘accommodate the needs of all workers’, even 
if this results in ‘immediate losses for some women’ who might have taken 
maternity leave (1990, p. 119),  
 
while ‘special treatment’ (difference) theorists, 
 
… portray equal treatment as part of classic liberalism which ‘dissociates the 
individual person from any context of family, religion or class’. In contrast to an 
analysis of abstracted individuals, they say that they are willing to identify the 
needs of women as a group, and to suggest that the goal ought to be ‘equality of 
effect’ rather than ‘equal treatment’ (1990, p. 119). 
 
Interestingly  –  and  in  a  reflection  of  and  response  to  a  primary 
sameness/difference concern within reductionist theory, when discussing ‘equal’ 
versus ‘special’ treatment – the only biological sex difference that is canvassed in 
any  detail  is  pregnancy  (that  is,  female  reproductive  function).  Bacchi’s   24
fundamental  point,  however,  is  that  the  argument  between  the 
sameness/difference alternatives has become a focus because of social realities 
and structures. Noting that “the sameness/difference framework is a limited way 
of conceptualising social problems” (1990, p. 107), she concludes that framing the 
argument in these ways averts “necessary social change” (1990, p. 157).  She says:  
The  ‘sameness’  alternative  is  insufficiently  critical  of  the  status  quo.  The 
‘difference’  option  is  critical  of  the  status  quo,  but  seems  to  conjecture  that 
women can exist in some sort of separate world. Seeing women as the ‘same’ as 
men  prevents  us  challenging  the  model  against  which  women  are  being 
compared; seeing women as ‘different’ prevents us changing it. Talking in terms 
of ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ skirts the issue, rather than confronting it (1990, p. 
262). 
 
Like  Simone  de  Beauvoir,  Bacchi  locates  the  central  issue  of  the 
sameness/difference question in the identification of women in relation to men, 
proposing instead that we need to get beyond this formulation to one where 
political  change  allows  “people  to  live  fully  human  lives”  (1990,  p.  265,  my 
emphasis). Her focus is, then, not on the fact of difference itself, but rather on the 
social  and  political  implications  that  have  followed  from  situating  (each 
individual) woman as ‘different from’ men, rather than as having a “differential 
social location” (1990, p. 167) to men.  
 
Diana Fuss also confronts the problem of thinking dualistically about the body in 
her  important  text,  Essentially  Speaking  (1989),  in  which  she  argues  that 
“essentialism is essential to social constructionism”, and aims to “break or in 
some way to weaken the hold which the essentialist/constructionist binarism has 
on feminist theory” (1989, p. 1).14 As Fuss notes, the weaknesses of essentialism 
                                                 
14  It is interesting to note how the feminist location of essentialism appears to slip from the classic 
definition of  ‘essence’ – “that which is most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a   25
are well known; perhaps not so well recognised are the problems of the social 
constructionist reliance upon concepts and categories which are still essentially 
implicated in essentialism. Thus, for example, the constructionist manoeuvre of 
pluralising to mark difference itself relies on a ‘linguistic unity’ – women – which 
“semantically marks a collectivity” (1989, p. 4).  
 
Most relevantly, Fuss elaborates on the essentialist basis of the deconstructionist 
phrase  ‘always  already’,  so  broadly  in  use  within  postmodernist  circles.  The 
danger, she says, lies in “the temptation to rely upon the ‘always already’ self-
evident ‘nature’ of  ‘always already’”: 
The danger (and the usefulness) of “always already” is that it implies essence, it 
hints at an irreducible core that requires no further investigation. In so doing, it 
frequently  puts  a  stop  to  analysis,  often  at  an  argument’s  most  crucial  point 
(1989, p. 17). 
 
In short, while social construction and essentialism are organised dualistically 
and  are  necessarily  implicated  in  each  other,  Fuss  argues  that  social 
constructionism constantly defers its engagement with essentialism rather than 
confront  its  dependence  upon  it.  Recognising  this  allows  Fuss  to  question 
whether (and how) we might begin to think of essentialism in terms of flux and 
change and, in this way, to trouble the diametric opposition between the two 
terms. If essence is indeed a “slippery and elusive category” (1989, p. 20), then 
logically it is not fixed.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
given person or thing” – to an “‘original femininity’, women’s oppression, and women’s unity” 
(Fuss, 1989, p. 2, my emphasis), as though men are not also embodied and therefore also potentially 
have an ‘essence’.    26
These metatheories make clear that it is not easy to escape dualistic thinking, 
even where one is concerned to ‘trouble’ a specific dualism. Further, they provide 
a background against which to read those feminist theorists, writing within and 
across  diverse  disciplinary  boundaries,  who  acknowledge  the  fundamental 
importance  of  biology  and  have  taken  up  the  challenge  of  dealing  with  the 
problems it poses in their work. This struggle is most evident in the final two 
approaches to be discussed here:  those I described as occupying what can be 
called loosely the ‘middle ground’, although they are in fact both much closer to 
the social construction end of the continuum.  
 
Sexual difference feminism – the ‘corporeal turn’ 
 
I have borrowed the designation “sexual difference” feminism from Elizabeth 
Grosz  (1994,  p.  17).  She  used  it  to  categorise  a  diverse  group  of  feminists 
historically  situated  within  the  1980s  and  1990s,  who  employed  various 
approaches  to  grapple  with  ‘the  problem  of’  the  body.15  Situated  within  this 
broader  field,  is  the  body  of  theory  labelled  the  ‘corporeal  turn’.  Produced 
primarily  in  the  1990s  by  Grosz  and  other  Australian  feminist  philosophers 
Moira Gatens and Rosalyn Diprose, and social scientist Vicki Kirby, this work 
provides a useful site to explore sex difference feminism, because these theorists 
specifically attempt to confront and include biological process in their meditations 
on the body. In the end, however, I would argue that despite their best efforts, 
                                                 
15  In her list of ‘sexual difference’ feminists, Grosz includes “Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Gayatri 
Spivak, Jane Gallop, Judith Butler, Naomi Schor, Monique Wittig and many others” (1994, p. 17).    27
these theorists deal with the question of sex differences and the biological body 
by not dealing with it.16 
 
Elizabeth Grosz, internationally recognised for her work in philosophies of the 
body,  is  perhaps  the  most prominent of the corporeal feminists. Early in the 
‘Introduction’ to her most well-known text, Volatile Bodies (1994), she says that 
feminist  theory  has  generally  remained  “uninterested  or  unconvinced  about 
focusing on bodies” (1994, p. vii).17 For someone interested in finding synergies 
specifically  between  biological  and  feminist  theories  of  the  body,  Grosz’s 
identification and portrayal of ‘sexual difference’ feminists initially strikes some 
encouraging notes. In cataloguing the several beliefs and concerns that this group 
of feminist theorists have in common, she includes a “refusal or transgression of 
the  mind/body  dualism”,  a  suspicion  of  the  sex/gender  distinction,  and  “a 
commitment to a notion of the fundamental, irreducible differences between the 
sexes” (1994, p. 18). There are early indications, however, that these statements 
are not to be read in any straightforward or uncomplicated way. Grosz attempts, 
in this book, to redress the wider disinterest in bodies by “using corporeality as 
the framework for explaining effects of subjectivity”, which, she then says, “has 
the added bonus of inevitably raising the question of sexual difference in a way 
that mind does not” (1994, p. vii, my emphasis). While this appears to promote the 
body  over  the  mind  –  ‘mind’  is here placed in the curious position of being 
                                                 
16  Although the arguments deployed by these theorists are, of course, considerably more intricate 
and extensive than is reflected here, and I am conscious that I am far from doing justice to their 
complexity within this restricted frame.   
17   In her later texts, Grosz herself has shifted away from a specific focus on the body to an interest 
in the philosophies of time, which necessarily includes some engagement with evolutionary and 
Darwinian theory (see Grosz, 2004, 2005).   28
treated  both  as  inconsequential  to  questions  of  sex  difference,  and  as 
extracorporeal – this is not her intent.  She says: 
The body cannot be understood as a neutral screen, a biological tabula rasa onto 
which masculine or feminine could be indifferently projected. Instead of seeing 
sex as an essentialist and gender as a constructionist category, [sexual difference 
feminists] are concerned to undermine the dichotomy (1994, p. 18). 
 
Grosz utilises concepts of corporeality and body image to frame her resistance to 
the body/mind and sex/gender dualisms, and deploys Lacan’s metaphor of the 
Mobius strip18 to sustain an argument that mind and body are neither one, nor 
two, but something in between: 
Bodies and minds are not two distinct substances or two kinds of attributes of a 
single substance but somewhere in between these two alternatives. The Mobius 
strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body and body 
into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side 
becomes another (1994, p. xii). 
 
This  model  is  said  to  circumvent  both  dualist  and  reductionist  models  of 
mind/body biology by positing a theory of continual flow between the inside and 
the outside, the mind and the body. Grosz’s arguments, and the book itself, are 
organised around her concern to show the need to “work both surfaces [that is] 
from the outside in and inside out … the way in which the outside of our bodies 
is  lived  on  the  interior  …  [and]  how  the  psyche  itself  is  a  development  or 
resolution of the body’s outer surface” (Best, 1994, para 6).  
 
Our  physical  and  psychological  materialities  become,  then,  an  outcome  of 
experience,  experience  that  is  mediated  by  our  distinctive  internalised  body 
images, which are in turn mediated by our social and discursive inscriptions as 
                                                 
18  An inverted three-dimensional figure eight.   29
sexed bodies.  Where is the biological body here? How do we get from a position 
that says: 
I am reluctant to claim that sexual difference is purely a matter of the inscription 
and  codification  of  somehow  uncoded,  absolutely  raw  material,  as  if  these 
materials  exert  no  resistance  or  recalcitrance  to  the  processes  of  cultural 
inscription  …  On  the other hand, the opposite extreme also seems untenable. 
Bodies are not fixed, inert, purely genetically or biologically programmed entities 
that function in their particular ways and in their determinate forms independent 
of their cultural milieu and value (Grosz, 1994, p. 190), 
 
to one that can claim, about the same text: 
Volatile Bodies demonstrates that the sexually specific body is socially constructed: 
biology or nature is inherently social and has no pure or natural “origin” outside 
culture. Being the raw material of social and cultural organization, it is subject to 
the endless rewriting and inscription that constitute all sign systems (Publisher's 
blurb, 1994, back cover).19 
 
This shift from a view of sex difference as potentially prior to, or at least outside 
of, cultural inscription, to a view of biology as ‘inherently social’, demonstrates 
the slipperiness of the task of resisting the biology/culture split and, further, that 
engaging with the dualism does not necessarily allow one to escape dualistic 
thinking. For example, and as others have noted, the Mobius strip is itself binary 
in  its  two-sidedness  at  any  particular  location,  as  is  Grosz’s  framework  of  a 
“psychical interiority and a corporeal exteriority” (Richardson, 2003, p. 99). 
 
In any event, in this text, for the most part, Grosz concentrates her attention not 
on sexed bodies, but rather, on “apparently ‘neutral’ presentations of the ‘human’ 
body” (Grosz, 1994, p. 188). She is “concerned with the ways in which a corporeal 
‘universal’ has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and projection of a 
masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm”, and with the ways in 
                                                 
19  I make the assumption that, if Grosz has not written the blurb herself, she has at the very least 
approved this description of her overall meaning in the text.   30
which the specificities of the female body have been subsumed, “reduced to the 
role  of  modifications  or  variations  of  the  (implicitly  white,  male,  youthful, 
heterosexual, middle-class) human body” (1994, p. 188). 
 
Constrained,  however,  by  the  agenda  within  which  she  is  working  –  the 
interrogation  of  male  theorists’  theorising  about  the  ‘human’  body  –  Grosz 
herself never really gets to the specificities of the female body in this work. There 
are no biological sex differences to be found here – only in the final section do we 
find  ‘sexed bodies’, and even here, the only detailed discussion of a biological 
function specific to women is of menstruation, which is placed in opposition, as it 
were, to semen, the only specifically male flow. Together with the fact that she is 
in dialogue with male theorists, within whose work she argues there simply is no 
female  body,  the  need  to  set  up  these  kinds  of  oppositions  between 
interior/exterior and male/female bodies means that Grosz is herself forced back 
into  (or  never  escapes  from)  a  dualistic  framework,  in  which  the  exterior 
constructs the interior; the interior is cast as subjectivity not biology; and male 
bodies are presumed normative (if not by Grosz, then by her sources).  
 
In common with Grosz, Moira Gatens is concerned to subvert dualisms. In a 
series of essays written over a span of 11 years, framed by a preoccupation “with 
the question of how to theorize human embodiment without losing the sexual, 
political or ethical particularity of different bodies” (1996, p. vii), she deploys the 
notion of the body image (the ‘imaginary’) to challenge familiar constructions of 
the body. As she explains, in an interview with Emile Sherman:   31
I  use  the  notion  of  the  imaginary  body  to  posit  an  understanding  of  sexual 
difference  that  isn’t  caught  up  in  a  series  of dualisms which have dominated 
Western  thought  …  The  imaginary  body  cannot  be  reduced  to  either  gender 
identity or biology. Rather it is a term that straddles both those conceptions and 
is  linked  to  a  range  of  social  and  political  practices  and  institutions  which 
generate specific social imaginaries (Sherman, 1996, p. 11). 
 
In her critique of the sex/gender distinction Gatens challenges – rightly, in my 
view  –  the  usefulness  of  the  concept  of  gender  for  feminism,  noting  its 
‘questionable’  theoretical  ground  and  its  tendency  to  treat  the  body  “as  sex-
neutral and consciousness as a passive tabula rasa” (Gatens, 1996, p. 16).  She says: 
In addition to the neutralization of sexual difference, the sex/gender distinction 
lends  itself  to  those  groups  or  individuals  whose  analyses  reveal  a  desire  to 
ignore sexual difference and prioritize ‘class’, ‘discourse’, ‘power’ or some other 
‘hobby-horse’. Their accounts attempt to co-opt or trivialize feminist struggles 
and  feminist  theory,  reducing  sexual  politics  to  gender  difference  …  as  if 
women’s bodies and the representation and control of women’s bodies were not a 
crucial stake in these struggles (1996, p. 17).  
 
It is important to note here, though, that while the bodies Gatens is talking about 
are ‘biological’ bodies, the significance accorded their sexual differentiation is 
accomplished in/by the social imaginary: 
The very same behaviours (whether they be masculine or feminine) have quite 
different personal and social significances when acted out by the male subject on 
the  one  hand  and  the  female  subject  on  the  other.  Identical  social  ‘training’, 
attitudes  or,  if  you  will,  conditioning  acquire  different  significances  when 
applied to male or female subjects (1996, p. 9).  
 
Arguing  against  an  “arbitrary  connection  between  femininity  and  the  female 
body,  masculinity  and  the  male  body”  (1996,  p.  4,  my  emphasis),  then,  she 
concludes that feminine behaviours “are manifestations of and reactions to the 
(conscious and unconscious) ideas which we share about our biology” (1996, p. 
14). Significantly, although the connection between sex and gender is drawn tight 
here (as indeed Grosz does in her discussion of the inability of male transsexuals 
to  truly  experience  what  it  is  like  to  live  as  a  woman  (1994,  pp.  207-208)),   32
gendered behaviours are still not grounded in biology as such, but are necessarily 
mediated  by  our  social  being-in-the-world.  That  is  to  say,  in  attempting  to 
overcome  the  sex/gender  distinction,  Gatens  lapses  back  into  the  mind/body 
split.  It  is  how  we  think  about  our  bodies,  not  our  body’s  biology,  which 
produces sexual culture. 
 
The  last  of  my  three  Australian  feminist  philosophers,  Rosalyn  Diprose,  also 
refuses the idea of any ‘natural’ pre-social identity, although, unlike Grosz and 
Gatens, she explicitly attempts to work outside the frame of the nature/culture 
distinction.  Diprose interrogates and attempts to overcome the operation of the 
mind/body dualism through a focus on contractual responses to pregnant bodies, 
and asks why it is that contractarian ethics “cannot fairly accommodate women’s 
specific modes of embodiment” (1994, p. viii). That it cannot is made clear by her 
careful analysis of its application in surrogacy contracts. Diprose concludes that 
the difficulty lies within the Cartesian approach, which leads to an objectification 
of  the  body  and  an  inability  to  allow  for  sexual  difference,  resulting  in  the 
exclusion of the female body from the social contract. She contends that the very 
foundation of ethics rests on an acceptance of the mind/body split, where the 
mind is understood to be distinct from, uninfluenced by, and in control of the 
object that is the body. This understanding of the body does not hold in the case 
of a pregnant body, where the notion of a self-present individual, unaffected by 
corporeal  change,  and  with  a  mind  that  is  distinct  from  and  emotionally 
uninvolved with the labour of the body, cannot be sustained.   33
Thus,  Diprose  rejects  the  liberal/contractarian  assumption  of  an  autonomous, 
self-present individual and, following Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), argues that 
the body is the “self-expressed” (1994, p. 109). That is, we do not have a body, we 
are a body, and that body is the sum of the socially constructed and differentiated 
self.20  Individual  identity  and  difference,  then,  come  from,  not  before,  social 
relationships: 
Merleau-Ponty … claim[s] that the lived body is constituted by its dwelling in the 
world. That is, the capacities and habits, and therefore the interests, of any body 
do not arise separately from its engagement with others nor from the discourses 
and practices which make up the world in which it dwells. For Merleau-Ponty, 
your  corporeal  schema  is  never  individual:  it is fundamentally intersubjective 
and specific to your social and familial situation (1994, p. 119).  
 
Diprose continues: 
…  the  limits  to  your  potential  modes  of  being  will  vary  depending  on  with 
whom you associate and under what circumstances. Presumably then, insofar as 
social  discourses  expect  and  encourage  differences  in  male  and  female 
comportment, these differences will be incorporated into the corporeal schemas 
of children (1994, p. 121). 
 
For Diprose, there simply is no ‘natural’ (sexed, biological) body, only different 
bodies that take up positions as subject or object within the (social) construction 
of  the  self.  Her  effort  to  ‘work  outside’  the  nature/culture  split  leaves  the 
differentiated  body’s  biology  ambiguously  poised  and,  for  the  most  part, 
meaningful only in an act of social construction. 
  
Within  each  of  these  accounts,  although  the  biological  body  is  present  and 
acknowledged,  it  is  nevertheless  inexorably  overshadowed  by  the  social.  It 
remains  a  construct  of our ideas, our experiences, our situatedness within the 
social  world.  There  is  a  kind  of  double-movement  going  on  here  that 
                                                 
20  Diprose quotes Merleau-Ponty: “This body is not something I have, it is what I am and its motility 
is how I have a world” (1994, p. 106).   34
simultaneously  entertains  and  rejects  any  notion  of  agency  on  the  part  of  a 
biology operating independent of culture, which means that the particularities of 
sexed bodies that are foregrounded are still those that are necessarily constructed 
within the social and temporal realms within which they exist and interact.  And 
so,  despite  an  avowed  interest  in  engaging  with  the  body,  the  conversation 
within  corporeal  theory  is  here  confined  to  one  side  of  the  campus,  and  the 
question of biological differentiation remains unapproachable, untheorised and 
thus  unable  to  deal  with  contrary  claims  from  the other side of the campus. 
Moira Gatens has said:   
We live in a Cartesian present. Our ‘common sense’ conceptions of human being 
are Cartesian (quoted in Sherman, 1996, p. 14). 
 
The flow from the outside/in - from culture to nature – is evident within these 
philosophies of corporeality, but I suggest that the flow from the inside/out, the 
flow from body (biology) to mind, remains obscured. And in the end, we still live 
in a Cartesian present.  
  
Social scientist Vicki Kirby is also interested in interrogating the operation of the 
nature/culture dualism and its effect on the meanings ascribed to bodies. Kirby, 
however, situates her inquiry somewhat differently: while acknowledging the 
interventions  of  many  of  the  male  theorists  with  whom  Grosz,  Gatens  and 
Diprose  are  in  conversation,  her  scrutiny  is  primarily  directed  to  and  in 
conversation with the work of other feminists, in particular with postmodernist 
and poststructuralist approaches to biology and the body. Although still confined 
to one side of the campus in her conversations, Kirby is thus simultaneously 
positioned as an ‘insider’ – a corporeal feminist who is seeking a way out of the   35
nature/culture dualism – and an ‘outsider’, a metatheorist casting a critical eye 
over the problematic effects of dualistic thinking within feminism itself.   
 
Kirby’s  careful  critique  of  the  postmodern  turn  to  metaphors  of  inscription 
illustrates both its failure to recognise the possibility that “nature scribbles or that 
flesh reads” (1997, p. 127), and the inherently dualistic nature of its own thinking 
about biological agency. Her challenge to the postmodern approach is, although 
complex in its full account, also elegantly simple: if culture writes, upon what 
does  it  write?  As  she  so  evocatively  demonstrates  in  her  recount  of  the 
conference speaker who, pinching herself, declares that she is not referring to 
“this [biological] body”: if not ‘this body’, which body are we talking about, and 
where is it located (1997, p. 70)? She says: 
And  is  our  reluctance  to  address  the  question  of  ‘flesh  and  bone’  a  silent 
acknowledgment  that  the  sense  of  ‘risk’  is  warranted,  that  the  substance  of 
biology will inevitably thwart our puny efforts with the force of its reality? (1997, 
p. 76). 
 
The questions Kirby poses, the flaws she exposes in postmodernist approaches, 
and most particularly her cogent insight into the problem of the terms upon 
which we can come to grips with ‘the substance of biology’, all bring us closer to 
engaging meaningfully with ‘this’ biological body, and with its representation 
within reductionist theory. In her work, “anatomy’s dermal veil” (1997, p. 77) has 
begun to lift, revealing tantalising glimpses of the flesh and bone behind it. As 
valuable  as  her  challenge  is,  though,  seeing  the  problem  is  not  the  same  as 
solving the problem, and Kirby’s own efforts to find a way out of the dilemma 
circle back into it. In struggling with the complexities involved in coming to grips 
with the divide between notions of embodiment and the “site of self” (1997, p.   36
73), Kirby begins to approach the question of biology by positioning  anatomy as 
embracing both essentialism and non-essentialism, and biology as the “mutable 
intertexture” that rewrites itself (1997, p. 78). However, in then subsuming both 
within morphology, Kirby returns to a concept of inscription, where “‘becoming 
woman’ is written in the spacing of a corporeography from which nothing is 
exempted” (1997, p. 80). The question of biology as process is once again deferred. 
In the end, even though she so clearly delineates the problem, Kirby, like her 
philosopher colleagues, is still unable to solve it. 
  
Challenging the science 
 
For the final group of feminist theorists I wish to discuss in this chapter, I turn to 
a  selection  of  works  undertaken  within  the  field  of  feminist  science  studies, 
which  originated  before  and  extends  throughout  and  after  the  work  of  the 
corporeal feminists. Feminist science studies attracts a large and disparate group 
of contributors from both sides of the campus and is thus comprised of scientific 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  
 
Some of the ‘outsiders’, from fields such as philosophy, history and sociology, are 
chiefly  concerned  to  critique  the  practice  of  ‘science’  as  an  enterprise  that  is 
inherently masculinist, to encourage greater participation in science by women, 
and/or to develop a feminist approach to science (for example, Harding, 1991; 
Hird, 2004; Keller & Longino, 1996; Laslett, Kohlstedt, Longino, & Hammonds, 
1996; Rosser, 1992; Schiebinger, 1993; Tuana, 1989, 1993). This body of work, vital 
as it is in other contexts, is not germane to my specific concerns here. Still others   37
(although they are relatively few) engage with particular scientific disciplines to 
explain and to some extent defend them (see, for example, Patai, 2000; Richards, 
2004; Vandermassen, 2005), and this latter group will be discussed later in the 
thesis. 
 
Of  more  direct  interest  here  are  those  who  are  intent  on deconstructing and 
exposing the ways in which specific scientific enterprises are interpreted, the 
social effects that follow, and the alternative readings that might be made (among 
many others, Diprose, 1991; Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002; Mahowald et al., 1996; 
Mahowald,  2000;  Martin,  1991;  Morse,  1998;  Nelkin,  1993b,  2001;  Nelkin  & 
Lindee, 1995a; Rose & Rose, 2000; Rosner & Johnson, 1995; Segal, 2001; Tavris & 
Offir, 1977; Travis, 2003).  
 
Similarly,  ‘insiders’  –  feminist  biologists,  ethologists,  neuroscientists, 
primatologists,  physicists  and  molecular  geneticists  –  engage  with  the 
reductionist science that is the focus of this thesis from different perspectives,  
depending on whether their primary identity is as a feminist or a scientist.  This,  
of course, is a subtle and fluid distinction, since locations can shift and none of 
these groups are mutually exclusive: all are wanting to ask a different set of 
scientific questions shaped by their feminism in order to do better science, but in 
pursuit of this end, they adopt differing approaches. The majority – the ‘feminist 
scientists’ – primarily employ their specialised scientific skills through a feminist 
lens to critique androcentric bias in the questions, methodologies, and products 
of the science of others (see Birke, 1986, 2000; Bleier, 1984; Fausto-Sterling, 1985,   38
2000a, 2000c; Hubbard, 1990, 2003; Kaplan & Rogers, 2003; Keller, 1985, 2000; 
Keller & Longino, 1996; Rogers, 2000; Rosser, 1992; Spanier, 1995). Others – the 
‘scientist  feminists’  –  utilise  the  tools  and  methodologies  of  their  particular 
disciplines alongside the ‘tools’ provided by feminism, working for change from 
within largely through the insights of their own research (in sociobiology, for 
example,  see  Hrdy,  1999,  original  publication  1981;  Smuts,  Cheney,  Seyfarth, 
Wrangham, & Struhsaker, 1987; Smuts, 1999; Zuk, 2002).21  
 
Any general discussion of this enterprise must begin with British sociologist Ann 
Oakley who, in 1972, opened the door to feminist examination and critique of 
scientific and sociobiological views of sex difference with her now classic text, 
Sex,  gender  and  society  (1972).  The  first  paragraph  of  Oakley’s  original 
‘Introduction’ poses the central questions in the debate over sex difference, and 
in so doing, delineates the disciplinary and philosophical split that still exists 
within the field: 
Everybody knows that men and women are different. But behind this knowledge 
lies  a  certain  uneasiness:  how  different  are  they?  What  is  the  extent  of  the 
difference? What significance does it have for the way male and female behave 
and are treated in society? (1972, p. 9). 
 
Her questions foreshadow the difference in approach and emphasis that I am 
considering: between, on the one hand scientists who, in general, emphasise the 
importance of gathering empirical data, grounded in biology, in an attempt to  
answer the first two questions; and, on the other hand, feminists among others, 
                                                 
21  As I indicate in chapter 4, I am conscious that not all those whose work includes analysis of the 
biology of social behaviour – whether in humans or in other animals – would choose to identify 
themselves as a ‘sociobiologist’. Sarah Hrdy, Barbara Smuts, and Marlene Zuk, however, do so.   39
who  are  more  concerned  with  the  social  significance  of  any  findings  of  sex 
difference, and with proposing alternatives to biological explanations for them.  
 
To put some order into my discussion of feminist engagement with the science of 
sex differences, I am going to rely heavily upon Oakley’s progression through the 
various debates around sex differences. This is because Sex, gender & society is, in 
very many ways, the paradigmatic example of feminist response to sex difference 
research. In its orderly marshalling of the research across various domains and its 
posing  of  social  realities  as  alternatives  to  reductionist  conclusions,  it 
foreshadows the particular concerns of much of the work that has followed in the 
intervening decades up to today. As well, in its overarching concern to shift the 
focus  from  innate  male/female  difference  to  a  focus  on  the  ‘lived  body’  and 
individual difference, it is a precursor to the theoretical concerns of the corporeal 
feminists discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that in the nearly four decades since first 
publication, some of the science that Oakley cites has been superseded, and thus 
certain  statements  that  she  makes,  based  on  that  science,  would  today  be 
disputed. Her acceptance of a characterisation of the female as the ‘basic’ human 
form and the male as the result of something ‘added’, for example, has been 
challenged by the literature discussed later in this thesis, as a mistaken exemplar 
of the naturalised hierarchy of the sexes (see 1972, p. 22).22 In what follows, I 
leave these inevitable inaccuracies and outdated research cited in the text aside, 
                                                 
22  See, for example, Lynda Birke (2000, p. 37), and Anne Fausto-Sterling’s discussion of this issue 
(2000c, in chapter 8, in particular pp. 203-205 ).   40
and instead use her text as a valuable case study of common feminist responses 
to claims of biological sex difference, a methodical approach to sex difference 
theory as it applies across specific domains of human and social attributes, and a 
useful organisational model for my precis of this literature.23 I will demonstrate 
this throughout by drawing upon the more recent feminist work in this field, 
before moving on to deal with feminist responses to science not addressed by 
Oakley.  
 
Oakley begins her examination of ‘the biology of sex’ with a discussion of the 
role played by hormones in physical development through the life cycle from 
conception to old age in both sexes. She then notes: 
What  other  sex  differences  are  determined  by  biology?  Genetic  maleness  is 
correlated  not  only  with  the  possession  of  penis  and  testicles,  but  also  with 
greater  size,  weight  and  strength.  These  are,  in  fact,  the  sum  total  of  the 
advantages produced by the Y chromosome (1972, p. 27). 
 
This comment is mirrored by early reactions to the discovery of the small size of 
the  Y  chromosome  (<23  million  base  pairs)  (ORNL,  n.d.-a),  and  its  relatively 
small  number  of  genes  (~  78  protein-coding  genes)  (Skaletsky,  Kurodo-
Kawaguchi, Minx, Cordum, & et al, 2003; and see, for example, Maureen Dowd, 
2003). It is interesting to note how quickly the Y chromosome was re-positioned, 
however, as a “goldmine for understanding chromosome evolution” (Whitfield, 
2001, final para), as “providing the answers to some very big cultural questions”, 
and as “the wild frontier of the genome, where strange and important things 
happen” (Burne, 2001, para 1, para 3). 
                                                 
23  Although the text was ‘revised’ and reissued in 1985, the two versions appear to be identical (the 
1985 version even including typographical errors as they appear in the 1972 version). The only 
revision seems to be the inclusion of a new Introduction to the later text, in which Oakley notes that 
“nothing that has happened since 1972 would lead me to alter the basic themes” (1985, p. 6).   41
However that may be, Oakley goes on to elaborate on her claim, citing the many 
(still  existing)  disadvantages  of  being  born  male:  among  them  a  greater 
vulnerability to genetic disorders, a higher risk of foetal and infant mortality, and 
a lower life expectancy. She does not (as many of her successors have)24 ask why 
women should have been constructed by society as the weaker sex, but goes on 
to  deal  with  hormonal  effects  on  behaviour  in  fairly  short  order.  Without 
denying  that  hormonal  change  occurs,  in  what  has  become  the  standard 
manoeuvre  for  dealing  with  this  argument  for  biological  influence,  Oakley 
proposes that the pressure to adopt specified societal roles is just as likely to 
explain behavioural change as would the impacts of hormonal changes in either 
sex during adolescence (1972, pp. 27-48).  
 
From this starting point, Oakley moves through a succession of theories about 
sex differences across the six domains of personality, intellect, sexuality, social 
roles, sex and gender, and gender roles. Foregrounding her discussion of sex and 
personality by noting somewhat wryly that only “the everyday observation of 
men and women in society is needed to ‘prove’ that differences of personality 
follow the biological differences of sex” (1972, p. 49), she proceeds to agree that 
personality  tests  do  show,  on  average,  that  men  and  women  differ 
temperamentally. She challenges only the conclusion that these differences can 
be  reliably  shown  to  be  an  outcome  of  either  biology  or  culture.  Noting  in 
passing that research into sex-differentiated toy preference in young children 
would  tend  to  support  a  finding  of  either  biological  or  very  early  cultural 
                                                 
24  See, for example, Fausto-Sterling (1985), Martin (1991), Russett (1989), Tuana (1993).    42
influence in shaping behaviour, Oakley turns to evidence from other cultures, 
comparing  the  ways  in  which  ‘masculine’  and  ‘feminine’  behaviours  and 
personality differences are defined there. Drawing on anthropological studies 
across a number of tribal groups, she demonstrates a wide variability in beliefs, 
expectations, and outcomes.25  
 
Turning then to more specific research, Oakley first looks at sex differences in 
aggression, as a “key word in the literature on sex differences” (1972, p. 64). She 
discusses a number of studies that tend to show greater aggressiveness in males 
than in females. In keeping with her general approach of presenting both sides of 
the argument, she says that one interpretation “might reasonably be that the 
biological drives responsible for this sex difference account for the remarkable 
consistency in female-passive and male-aggressive behaviour” (1972, pp. 64-65). 
Other  possibilities,  however,  lie  in  differences  in  parental  treatment,  and 
socialisation from peers, the school system, and society generally. As important, 
she notes, are the different ways in which males and females display aggression, 
and how the links between social role and expectation and aggression play out in 
differing patterns of behaviour.  
 
Writing soon after the publication of Oakley’s revised text, Alice Eagly & Valerie 
Steffen  conclude  from  their  meta  review  of  the  literature  on  aggression  and 
gender that “aggression sex differences are a function of perceived consequences 
                                                 
25  Oakley relies for much of her discussion on the work of anthropologist Margaret Mead, whose 
work in Samoa was later discredited (after Mead's death; see Freeman, 1984, 1999), igniting a fierce 
debate in anthropological circles (see, for example, Feinberg, 1988; Leacock, 1988; Levy, 1984).   43
of aggression that are learned as aspects of gender roles and other social roles” 
(1986, p. 309). More recent research on aggression does indeed show that females 
are far from being passive, but that aggressive behaviour is usually expressed 
differently by females. Nicki Crick and Jennifer Grotpeter (1995), for example, 
have  found  that  girls  are  more  relationally  aggressive  than  are  boys.  Kaj 
Bjorkqvist and colleagues distinguish between direct and indirect aggression as a 
“definite phenomenon, at least during adolescence” (1992, p. 127) with the latter 
being more often practised by girls. Further research confirms these findings, but 
extends them to investigate the strategies of intrasexual competition between 
women,  including  indirect  aggression  (Campbell,  2002),  and  other  studies 
indicate that while women are more likely to deploy indirect aggression, they are 
also  more  likely  to  inhibit  and  “divert  their  aggression”  through  the  use  of 
defusing strategies (Campbell & Muncer, 2008, p. 282). Without drawing any 
conclusions as to whether the gender roles adopted by females and males are the 
result  of  socialisation  or  evolution,  Anne  Campbell  and  Steven  Muncer  do 
conclude  that  gender  roles,  including  differing  beliefs  about  aggression,  are 
associated with sex-differentiated acts of, and responses to, aggressive behavior. 
 
Moving then to a discussion of sex differences in intelligence, Oakley begins with 
the comment that: 
It used to be a tradition among anti-feminists that the smaller size of the female 
brain was proof of woman’s inferior intelligence (1972, p. 79). 
 
This is an aspect of the debate over intelligence that Oakley feels safe to dismiss 
in 1972, but, as I discuss in chapter 3, it is one that has returned with some force 
in  recent  years  and  must,  once  more,  be  confronted.  Other  findings  in  sex   44
differences in intelligence not disputed by Oakley in 1972 are also consistent with 
those being researched and reported today: differential skill is found in verbal 
ability  (favouring  females);  number  ability  (favouring  males  in 
numerical/arithmetical reasoning and females on tests of computation); spatial 
ability (males); and creativity – defined as the ability to “restructure a problem in 
a  new  way”  (1972,  p.  80)  –  including  analytic  ability  (males  are  less  field 
dependent than are females).  
 
Oakley discusses the way in which these disparities in spatial and creative ability 
are demonstrated by Erik Erikson’s observations of the use made of space by 
girls and boys when playing. He concludes, she says, that girls focus on inner 
space,  simpler  structures,  lower  enclosures;  whereas  boys  construct  more 
elaborate, higher, outer space structures, with a correspondingly greater potential 
for accident and ruin (1972, pp. 83-84). Observing that “not surprisingly, Erikson, 
as  a  psychoanalyst,  considers  that  this  different  use  of  space  by  males  and 
females is a reflection of their anatomy” (1972, p. 84), Oakley herself finds that 
these  differences  in  spatial  orientation  ‘echo’  differences  found  in  field 
dependence studies, but draws no further conclusions. 
 
This question of sex differences in the use of space is, however, later taken up by 
Iris  Marion  Young  in  her  classic  essay,  ‘Throwing  like  a  girl’  (1990).  Young 
argues, contra Erikson’s linking of it to analytic ability, that the different ways in 
which girls use space is an outcome of the experience of female existence, and of 
our socialisation. Girls are told we are more fragile, to stay ‘clean and tidy’, to   45
play ‘nicely’, and, unlike boys, girls are not encouraged to engage in physical 
contact sports or dangerous pursuits. As well, female body existence, according 
to Young, is characterised by our experience of our bodies as both subject and 
object. That is, we experience our body both in its subjectivity and as a thing 
which is looked at and acted upon by others. The knowledge of the other’s gaze 
becomes part of our own body image. Because women are, in effect, physically 
handicapped by the social construction of our bodies under patriarchy, the use of 
enclosed space forms a barrier within which we can move freely and which also 
provides a kind of defence against invasion.26  
 
Reflecting further on the differences that have been found in IQ testing, Oakley 
makes the point that “demonstrated intellectual achievement” tells another story:  
Throughout school life girls achieve better results than boys, and generally do 
better  in  examinations.  If  this  intellectual  achievement  is  compared  with 
aptitudes for specific subjects, it is clear that girls do better even in subjects where 
boys tend to have the greater aptitude (1972, p. 85). 
 
However,  the  subsequent  achievement  of  women  in  the  workplace  reflects a 
considerable disparity between measured IQ and achievement. Noting that the 
‘drop-off’ in achievement for girls begins around puberty, Oakley proposes two 
possible causes: accelerated hormonal activity, and inculcation of adult social 
roles.  While much of her following discussion around the differing expectations 
for career and marriage is, to a large extent, now outdated, her conclusion about 
parental and societal sex role modelling and expectations as strongly implicated 
as explanation for these disparities are still valid today, and similar conclusions 
                                                 
26    See  also  Janice  Haaken’s  paper,  ‘Field  dependence  research:  a  historical  analysis  of  a 
psychological construct’ (1996).   46
have been drawn in a variety of recent feminist treatments (see, for example, 
Halpern, 2000; Hines, 2004; Hird, 2004; Kaplan & Rogers, 2003; Rogers, 2000, 
among many others).  
 
Oakley does allow for the possibility of biologically based causes for differences 
in intellectual ability, including the different developmental timetables of boys 
and girls,  but maintains that this does not explain differences in spatial ability, 
nor the disparities between measured IQ and achievement. Conceding that it 
could be held that ”the intellect is to some extent genetically controlled by the sex 
chromosomes” (1972, p. 95), Oakley makes the further point that the mechanism 
for control, if it exists, is unknown. That being so, she recommends cross-cultural 
studies into patterns of intelligence, making the “intelligent guess” (1972, p. 98) 
that such a study would not find universal sex differences. Instead – and in line 
with  similar  arguments  made  later  by  Carol  Bacchi  (1990),  and  by  corporeal 
theorists  among  others  –  she  proposes  that  any  such  variations  would  more 
likely  be  an  outcome  of “the tremendous variation in individual endowment 
among human beings generally” (Oakley, 1972, p. 98). 
 
Oakley  next  considers  the  question  of  whether  there  are  innate  differences 
governing the expression of sexuality in men and women, that is, that “male 
sexuality arises spontaneously and is specifically genital while the female’s is 
not” (1972, p. 107). Again, she draws on anthropological research to illustrate 
cross-cultural differences in the meanings given to physiological events such as 
puberty, menstruation, sexual play, intercourse, and orgasm, demonstrating that   47
sex-differences in sexual behaviour are not universal and are therefore unlikely 
to  be  genetically  determined.27  Instead,  she  points  to  (Western)  society’s 
stereotypical expectations of sexual behaviour and the greater restrictions on, 
and control over, female sexuality – circumscribing the physical movement of 
girls  and  women  through  parental  controls;  fear  (for  example,  of  pregnancy, 
assault  or  rape),28  or  via  the  psychological  deterrent  of  the  sexual  double 
standard (‘nice girls don’t’). As Sarah Blaffer Hrdy notes, “Almost universally, 
sexual sanctions are stricter for women than for men” (1999, original publication 
1981, p. 177). Hrdy goes on: 
Even  societies  which  appear  to  esteem  women  for  their  sexual  purity  and 
passivity nevertheless take extensive precautions to prevent them from breaching 
their  chastity.  On  one  point  there  is  an  extraordinary  consensus:  woman’s 
readiness to engage in sexual activity is great enough that the majority of the 
world’s cultures … have made some effort to control it (1999, original publication 
1981, p. 177). 
 
Hrdy’s  recognition  that  women’s  attitudes  to  and  physiological  responses  to 
sexual matters are “profoundly influenced” by social expectations – even to the 
extent of cultural variance in the enabling or inhibiting of orgasm (1999, original 
publication 1981, pp. 162-163) – supports Oakley’s earlier proposal that the “long 
conditioning of the female to a particular kind of sexual response (or lack of 
response)” leads to the conclusion that differences in sexual behaviour can more 
certainly be attributed to conditioning and learning than to any innate factors  
(Oakley, 1972, p. 126). Rather than speculate on such matters as the origins of the 
female  orgasm,  Oakley  says,  it  is  “surely much more important to study the 
                                                 
27  Again, she relies in part on research conducted by Margaret Mead. 
28  Although pregnancy is not as much a deterrent in these days of readily available contraception, 
it still figures in the control of (particularly teenage) girls, especially those for whom, for one reason 
or  another,  access  to  adequate  ‘safe  sex’  information  or  medical  advice  and  treatment  is  still 
difficult.   48
whole moulding of personality and sexual response by culture, and in different 
forms of human society” (1972, p. 127), and in a clear illustration of the need to 
revisit the same arguments over time, as we will see later in the thesis, Marlene 
Zuk sees the need to make a very similar point nearly three decades later (2002, 
p. 152). Sarah Hrdy also notes the changes in attitudes to the female orgasm 
within Western society over the three decades between 1948 and 1980, observing 
that “Few generalisations about sexuality apply cross-culturally” (1999, original 
publication  1981,  p.  163).29  Ruth  Hubbard,  in  her  discussion  of  the  social 
construction of sexuality, also explicitly states that “There is no ‘natural’ human 
sexuality”  (1990,  p.  130).  Other  contemporary  discussions  can  be  found  in 
Meredith Small’s work on female choice (1993), Anne Fausto-Sterling’s extended 
treatment (2000c), and in Elisabeth Lloyd’s essay on bias in evolutionary science 
(2008). 
 
Similarly, in her discussion of social and gender roles, Oakley reveals the ways in 
which  ascriptions  of  a  ‘natural’  division of social labour rest on assumptions 
made, and links drawn, between economic and reproductive tasks. These revolve 
around the characterisation of the work of motherhood and domestic tasks as 
time-consuming  and  all-encompassing  –  but  at  the  same  time,  “relatively 
sedentary”,  and  “marginal”  to  the  economy  –  and  a  further  positioning  of 
women as physically weaker than men (1972, pp. 130-131).  In the following 
pages, Oakley convincingly dismantles each of these assumptions.  
                                                 
29  Also see Hrdy’s bibliographical update to chapter 8, regarding more recent research than was 
available  at  the  time  of  original  publication  of  The  woman  that  never  evolved  (1999,  original 
publication 1981, pp. 249-251).   49
She first demonstrates that, cross-culturally, parenthood is enacted in various 
ways,  often  with  child  care  undertaken  by  both  parents,  and  concludes  that 
“putting child care in the hands of women alone is not necessarily the best way 
of doing things, nor the most natural, nor should we think of it as a rule which 
holds in all but a few insignificant and peculiar cultures” (1972, p. 136).  As well, 
claims that child care and housework are largely sedentary occupations, and that 
women (because they are physically weaker than men) are best suited to these 
tasks, are rendered nonsensical by an appeal to what those of us (of both sexes) 
who perform domestic tasks and have children all know: 
… child care is physically exhausting and mentally demanding work: it needs 
tireless vigilance, a great deal of energy, and a kind of protectiveness and 
responsibility that is aggressive rather than passive, implying as it does the 
ability to stand up for the child and fight for its rights in a world that is not 
always sympathetic. In particular, the physical strength needed in child care is by 
no means negligible … Traditionally domestic work has required – and in 
unmechanised cultures continues to require – considerable physical stamina and 
ability to carry loads … the idea that the males do the ‘heavy’ work while the 
females are occupied with ‘light’ domestic tasks seems to be a merely fictional 
opposition between two forms of work which both demand energy and strength 
(1972, pp. 137-138). 
 
The sexual division of labour is, Oakley concludes, a result of convenience and 
precedent, based on beliefs about feminine, masculine and parental roles. These 
are “matters of culture, evolving without any necessary reference to biology” 
(1972,  p.  146),  and varying between cultures, based on culturally determined 
beliefs about reproductive function. Such beliefs then spill over into the world 
outside, and affect the roles that women and men take up (or are enabled to take 
up)  in  education  and  in  the  paid  workforce.  In  her  work  on  motherhood, 
although based in biology, Hrdy draws similar conclusions to Oakley in regard 
to the ‘naturalness’ of the expectation that women should be primarily or solely 
responsible for child care. Anthony McMahon (1999) also provides a relatively   50
recent and insightful critique of these beliefs in the era of ‘the new man’ and ‘new 
fatherhood’. 
 
Finally, as a precursor to much recent work on the question of the ‘naturalness’ of 
gender  (see,  in  particular,  Fausto-Sterling,  2000c;  Hird,  2004;  Kessler,  1996), 
Oakley draws upon research with intersex individuals to support the contention 
that the psychological characteristics associated with ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ 
behaviour are not necessarily linked to female and male biology. She concludes, 
on the basis of studies with hermaphroditic individuals, that, in general “gender 
identity  is  established  early  and  usually  irreversibly”  (1972,  p.  164),  and  its 
development follows not from our biological make-up, but from a combination 
of role identification and imitation, differential parental responses to their male 
and female children, and social classification and stereotyping. On the biology of 
gender, Oakley says, finally: 
If gender has a biological source of any kind, then culture makes it invisible. The 
evidence of how people acquire their gender identities, taken together with the 
facts set out in the previous chapter [on research into intersex individuals], 
suggests strongly that gender has no biological origin, that the connections 
between sex and gender are not really ‘natural’ at all (1972, pp. 187-188). 
 
Despite  the  large  volume  of  contemporary  research  that  appears  to  confirm 
Oakley’s view, the ability to separate sex from gender via social means is once 
again  being  questioned.30  The  story  of  David  Reimer,  the  boy  who  was 
reassigned and raised as a female as the result of a bungled circumcision (ablatio 
penis), and reverted at age 15 to living as a male before taking his own life in 2004 
at age 38, has been widely-reported as disproving this contention (see Colapinto, 
                                                 
30  But I note in passing the ubiquitous use of ‘gender’ on official and other forms to indicate one’s 
biological sex (ie, female/male).   51
2000). However, Theresa Wizemann & Mary-Lou Pardue note that interim results 
from ongoing studies of boys reassigned as girls are equivocal – while “more 
than half” identify as boys, “consistent with their male-typical prenatal androgen 
exposure, and not with their female-typical rearing”, some of the children accept 
their  female  identity  (2001,  p.  84).  The  relative  contributions  of  nature  and 
nurture to our gendered identities are, then, still uncertain, and any  claim for an  
unquestioned  ‘natural’  connection  between  sex  and  gender  therefore  seems 
premature.  
 
The publication of Sex, gender and society in 1972 – prior to the publication of 
Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: a new synthesis (1975) and Richard Dawkins’ The 
selfish  gene  (1976),  and  the  subsequent  upsurge  of  sociobiological  theories  – 
precluded  Oakley  from  specifically  addressing  ‘sociobiology’  in  this  work.31 
Similarly, her book predates the explosion of genetic information in the nearly 
two decades since the inception of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in 1990. 
Confronting these more recent developments, of necessity, has been left to others, 
and many have taken up the challenge. 
 
Representative  of  most  of  those  who  confronted  (and  continue  to  confront) 
sociobiological theory are texts produced in the early 1980s by feminists Janet 
Sayers  (1982)  and  Ruth  Bleier  (1984).32  Again,  both  are  early  exemplars  of 
feminist  responses  to  sociobiology.  Sayers  is  widely  recognised  as  having 
                                                 
31  And  nor  does  the  1985  ‘revised’  edition  deal  with  questions  of  sociobiology.  She  has  more 
recently, however, described it as a ‘delusional system’ (see Oakley, 2002). 
32 Ruth Bleier trained in medicine and neuroanatomy, and developed a strong interdisciplinary 
interest in feminist analysis of science. Janet Sayers trained as a clinical psychologist.   52
inspired other feminists with her groundbreaking work, Biological Politics (1982),33 
while Bleier was among the first to combine a successful career as a working 
scientist  with  a  proactive  involvement  in  feminist  approaches  to  scientific 
knowledge.  The fine detail of the research discussed by these authors, and others 
like them, is not rehearsed in great detail here because it by and large falls within 
those general categories covered by Oakley. That is to say, both Sayers and Bleier 
specifically  challenge  research  into  sex  differences  of  personality,  aggression, 
social and gender roles, the effects of sex hormones on behaviour, and beliefs 
about human universals.  
 
Unlike Oakley, however, Sayers and Bleier are explicitly in conversation with 
and  against  social  Darwinian34  and  sociobiological  theory.  Their  expressed 
purpose  is  to expose, in Sayers’ words, the “way in which those opposed to 
changes  in  women’s  social  role  have  sought  to  appropriate  biology  for  their 
cause” (1982, p. 1); or, as Bleier puts it, the conservative “mythology of women’s 
biological  inferiority  as  an  explanation  for  their  subordinate  position  in  the 
cultures of Western civilizations” (1984, p. vii).   
 
In a text that is equally concerned with the problem of sociobiological theory, and 
with feminism’s response to it, Janet Sayers devotes five of her nine substantive 
chapters  to  those  sociobiological  theories  she  identifies  as  most  damaging  to 
                                                 
33  See,  for  example,  the  2004  Special  Feature  “Biological  politics:  feminist  and  anti-feminist 
perspectives  –  a  reappraisal”  in  Feminism  &  Psychology,  14:3,  edited  by  Colleen  Heenan,  and 
including  papers  by  Lynda  Birke,  Linda  Gannon  and  Hilary  Rose,  among  others,  as well as a 
response and afterword by Janet Sayers.  
34   In Sayers’ case, with historical as well as contemporary social Darwinism.   53
women. She first takes on W.D. Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness, whereby 
the altruism of individuals (such as the protection of children and kin) is recast as 
a  selfish  desire  to  ensure  the  survival  of  their  genes.  She  claims  that  this 
reduction of altruism to ‘self-interest’ is taken a step further by Robert Trivers’ 
theory of parental investment, later endorsed by Richard Dawkins (see Dawkins, 
2006; Hamilton, 1972; Trivers, 1972; Trivers, 2002). This theory proposes that, 
while both sexes will attempt to maximise their reproductive success, women 
will invest more in their offspring because they are more directly involved in 
reproduction and, crucially, because they provide the largest gamete and thus 
the greatest resources. This, in turn, leads to differing mating strategies (males 
are  more  promiscuous,  females  are  ‘choosier’),  and  to  strategies  designed  to 
“exploit and outwit” each other (Sayers, 1982, p. 53). Emily Martin (1991) later 
expands upon this particular argument in her influential paper, ‘The egg and the 
sperm:  how  science  has  constructed  a  romance  based  on  stereotypical  male-
female roles’. 
 
Asserting  that  sociobiological  theories  of  inclusive  fitness  and  parental 
investment  are  flawed,  Sayers  argues  that  Trivers  and  Dawkins  gloss  the 
differences between their own theories and Darwin’s theory of evolution, in two 
significant ways. To begin with, she claims they mistakenly argue that natural 
selection favours the maximisation of reproductive success (more offspring), in 
contrast  to  Darwin’s  notion  of  relative  reproductive  success  (more  offspring 
compared  to  others  of  the  same  species).  Further,  she  contends  that  Trivers  and 
Dawkins  suggest  ‘fixity’  in  behavioural  adaptations,  contrary  to  Darwin’s   54
concept of a system open to change and chance variation (1982, p. 55). Sayers 
then goes on to demonstrate that Trivers’ account of human sex roles relies on 
“social – not biological – presuppositions” (1982, p. 56) and that both he and 
Dawkins rely upon circular reasoning. She makes the case that wife guarding to 
protect  property  inheritance  is nonsensical across classes and societies where 
there is no ownership of property; that labour power is not freely alienable and 
therefore the notion of mutual exploitation relies upon “forms of relatedness” 
that are not universal (1982, p. 60), and finally, that there is no reason to suppose 
that a female’s prior parental investment would be any more likely than a man’s 
to secure an offspring’s future. In sum, she says, sex roles in childcare, relations 
between  the  sexes,  and  the  double  standard,  far  from  being  biologically 
determined and fixed, are dependent on the “existence of particular forms of 
society” (1982, p. 64).  
 
Turning next to theories on dominance via greater innate male aggression, Sayers 
asserts  that  this  theory,  expanded  on  by  E.O.  Wilson  in  Sociobiology:  a  new 
synthesis  (1975),  rests  on  the  uncertain  hypothesis  that  competition  results  in 
success. After discussing the historical antecedents of this idea, Sayers rejects the 
arguments that men’s greater “biological propensity for aggression” (1982, p. 81) 
is the basis for men’s dominance, based as they are upon comparative animal 
studies  and,  in  particular,  the  linking  of  the  activity  of  hunting  with 
contemporary male wage-earning activities (1982, p. 79). She argues that it is by 
no  means  clear  that  dominance  is  dependent  upon  aggression,  or  that  it  is 
competitive  in  nature.  Further,  she  notes  that  social  organisation  is  not   55
universally  hierarchical,  and  concludes  that  male  dominance  is  a  “learned 
phenomenon, a response to the material conditions of life” (1982, p. 82). 
 
More recently, Lynne Segal has written that “Few things are more depressing for 
me to have to write about than the renaissance of a Darwinian fundamentalism” 
(1999, p. 80). Like Sayers, Segal takes Richard Dawkins and E.O. Wilson to task 
for their attempts to characterise all human behaviour as based in a reproductive 
process  which  ensures  that  males  will  be  “aggressive,  hasty,  fickle  and 
undiscriminating”,  while  females  will  be  ‘coy’,  holding  back  “until  they  can 
identify the male with best genes (1999, p. 84;  see also Hubbard, 1990, pp. 117-
118).  Describing  the  arguments  of  sociobiology  as  “circular”  and 
“anthropomorphic”  (1999,  p.  85),  she  also  confronts  what  she  calls  the 
“shallowness”  of  similar  arguments  about  mating  strategies  emanating  more 
recently from evolutionary psychology, at the same time noting the convergence 
of many of these arguments with cultural theory (1999, pp. 86-94). 
 
Other recent feminist scholarship similarly endorses and extends Janet Sayers’ 
conclusions.  Research  undertaken  by  Janet  Shibley  Hyde  demonstrates  that 
where  gender  differences  are  found  in  aggression,  they  are  dependent  on 
methods of measurement and study setting, concluding that the “variation in 
results is consistent with social-role theory” (1996, p. 319). Ruth Hubbard concurs 
that “competition and dominance hierarchies are not characteristic of all human 
societies” (1990, p. 118), and, elaborating on this insight, Segal points out that it is 
the  competitive  inequalities  and  differences  between  men  that  are  most  often   56
destructive  within  manifestations  of  dominance.  Rather  than  an  innate 
aggression,  she  demonstrates  that  male  dominance  is  a  function  of  a  social 
hierarchy, where men compete with each other, and where “boys in caring, non-
violent households in non-violent neighbourhoods, are hardly more likely to be 
violent than girls from similar backgrounds” (1999, p. 162).  
 
Ruth Bleier is more strident in her criticism of sociobiology than is Sayers: it is, 
she  says,  “deeply  flawed  conceptually,  methodologically  and  logically  as  a 
science”  (1984,  p.  16).  In  a  discussion  that  ranges  widely  through  the 
sociobiological literature, and confronts much the same ground as Sayers, she 
highlights  the flaws she detects as: ethnocentricity and anthropomorphism; the 
“absence of any precise description or definition of the behaviors Sociobiologists 
are seeking to explain” (1984, p. 26); the omission of data that fails to support the 
argument; the ‘manipulation’ of language and logic, and, in common with Sayers 
and Segal, the kind of circular logic that is “validation by prediction” (1984, p. 
38).  Despite  her  acknowledgement  of  genetic  and  hormonal  influences  on 
developing human brains, her politics are evident: 
Distinctions  of  human  characteristics  and  temperaments  into  innate  male  and 
female natures have been social, cultural constructs and are not natural. They are 
part of an ideology that attempts to make what are in fact social and political 
distinctions  appear  to  be  natural  and  biological  and,  therefore,  to  justify 
differences in social roles and also relationships of dominance and subordinance 
(1984, p. 7). 
 
That  such  scepticism  about  and  opposition  to  sociobiology35  is  widespread is 
clear: for example, Ruth Hubbard asserts that sociobiology does not sufficiently 
                                                 
35    As  I  note  in  chapter  4,  throughout  this  thesis,  I  use  the  umbrella  term  ‘sociobiology’  to 
encompass both ‘classic’ or Wilsonian sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology; however, as I 
make clear also in that chapter, feminist sociobiologists such as Sarah Hrdy are critical of and have 
distanced themselves from the evolutionary psychology approach to sociobiology.    57
consider  cultural  and  historical  circumstance  in  its  universalising  of  ‘reified’ 
human traits (1990, p. 112); Hilary Rose accuses sociobiology of attempting to 
colonise “social science under the banner of biology” (2000); Lesley Rogers states 
that “sociobiology is a mode of thinking that is based entirely on reductionism” 
(2000,  p.  45),  and  Barbara  Herrnstein  Smith  takes  evolutionary  psychologists 
Steven Pinker, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby to task for being “captive to an 
unregenerate  Two  Cultures  mentality,  with  its  familiar  intellectual 
provincialisms  and  disciplinary  antagonisms”  (2000,  p.  139).  Zuleyma  Tang-
Martinez  specifically  targets  those  she  terms  ‘sociobiological  feminists’,36 
wondering  whether  they  have,  despite  their  “very  important  contributions”, 
added anything to the more usual approaches to ending sexist oppression. She 
says: 
The  main  problem  with  sociobiological  feminism  is  that  it  draws  from  a 
discipline  that  is  not  only  scientifically  suspect  but  also  has  been,  and  will 
continue  to  be,  used  to  justify  male  dominance  and  sexist  oppression  … 
Sociobiological feminists should guard against becoming so enamored of their 
method that they fail to realize that they are helping to  legitimate a field that 
inherently justifies and condones male domination, Western patterns of male-
female gender roles, and many other forms of social inequality (1997, p. 143). 
 
 
Feminists  who  deal  specifically  with  new  knowledge  emerging  from  post-
genome research, as distinct from sociobiological theories, are similarly sceptical 
of the links that are drawn between genetics and behavioural attributes. Thus, 
many feminist responses to the HGP, and the work in molecular biology that 
follows from it, are most focused on its reductive vision and promise of control. 
                                                 
36  Defined as feminists who use “a sociobiological approach, informed by a feminist perspective, to 
reinterpret data” and those who use “a sociobiological methodology and analyses in an attempt to 
understand the origins of male domination and female oppression” (Tang-Martinez, 1997, pp. 117-
118). This definition would include, for example, Sarah Hrdy, Meredith Small, Patricia Gowaty, 
Barbara Smuts, among others.   58
Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee, for example, draw attention to the powerful 
metaphors surrounding the project (Nelkin, 1993b; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995a).37 
Ruth  Hubbard  is  similarly  concerned  with  “genomania”  and  “genetic 
mythologizing” (1999, p. xvii), calling the goals of the HGP “reductionism at its 
most extreme” (1999, p. 3) and asserting that claims of cures for disease as an 
outcome of the achievement of these goals are “misleading” (1999, p. 65). Gisela 
Kaplan  and  Lesley  Rogers  claim  that  molecular  genetics  (and  evolutionary 
psychology) are founded upon “many flawed and grandiose assumptions” (2003, 
p. 10). However, they themselves base much of their argument on their own 
assumption  that  reductionism  promotes  a  vision  which  attempts  to  “explain 
behavior entirely in terms of hormones or genes” (2003, p. 21, my emphasis). As I 
attempt to show in this thesis, some forms of reductionism do not inevitably 
equate (as much critique would have it) with immutability.  Evelyn Fox Keller, 
herself an early critic of the genome project, acknowledges that, as a result of the 
knowledge arising from it, she is now willing to: 
… celebrate the surprising effects that the successes of this project have had on 
biological thought. Contrary to all expectations, instead of lending support to the 
familiar notions of genetic determinism that have acquired so powerful [a] grip 
on  the  popular  imagination,  these  successes  pose  critical  challenges  to  such 
notions (2000, p. 5). 
 
Keller’s insight into the new potential for change in our ways of thinking about 
determinism – and thus, I suggest, sex difference research as a whole – supports 
the case made by others for a reflexive feminist ‘antiessentialism’ in much of the 
critique directed at reductionist science (Wilson, 1998; see also Fuss, 1989; Kirby, 
1997); that in fact the restricted vision created by ideological ‘blinkers’ that is so 
                                                 
37  Discussed in greater detail in the next chaper.   59
criticised on the part of reductionist scientists can, and does, affect participants 
on  both  sides  in  this  debate.  Elizabeth  Wilson,  for  example,  observes  that 
“[d]espite an avowed interest in the body, there is a persistent distaste [among 
feminists] for biological detail” (1998, p. 15). She cites the work of Ruth Bleier 
(1984) and Lesley Rogers (1988; see also 2000) as examples of the ways in which 
feminist politics intervenes in the “critical habits” of feminists engaging with the 
science of neurological difference, thus ensuring that scientific politics cannot be 
thought as anything other than either “objective sites of truth” or “oppressive 
forces of social control” (Wilson, 1998, p. 17).  
 
In sum, ‘outsider’ feminists who engage with sociobiological and genetic science 
do walk across the campus to see what is going on in these fields, while ‘insider’ 
feminists have the (at times difficult) advantage of being able to utilise both their 
science  and  their  feminism  in  their  critique.  The  scientific  knowledge  and 
insights of this latter group provide an invaluable entrée into an understanding 
of  the  more  difficult  aspects  of  these  fields  for  the  non-scientist.    However, 
reading around the ‘science’, I am in agreement with Wilson that some of the 
feminist  critique  suffers  from  an  ideological  recoil  from  biology.  Further,  I 
suggest that the terms of this critique from both sides of the campus still builds 
upon the methodology used by Oakley and Sayers, in particular. That is, most 
accounts advance their case by setting forth the contested theory; discussing the 
relevant research; drawing on cross-cultural and anthropological work, and then 
asserting that even where biological differences exist, they are neither sufficient 
nor significant enough to explain or excuse the social and political dominance of   60
men in society. In the end, these accounts do not avoid the ‘trap’ of dualistic 
thinking  in  proposing  alternative  (social)  explanations  which  return  us  to  a 
dualistic  frame.  The  outcome  is  often  a  zero  sum  game  where  the  social 
construction  argument  ‘wins’  via  the  agency  of  asserting  an  ‘on  balance’ 
argument (on balance, innate male/female natures are socially constructed) or an 
‘extent’ argument (biological predispositions may exist, but they are completely 
overshadowed by the extent of social influence) that works to exclude biology. 
 
And so, despite the many differences in tone and approach, and regardless of the 
many  years  intervening,  the  final  stance  most  often  adopted  on  theories  of 
biological sex difference by feminists who engage critically with reductionism is 
still concisely captured by Ann Oakley:  
To  sum  up,  then,  we  can  say  that  the  chief  importance  of  biological  sex  in 
determ[in]ing  social  roles  is  in  providing  a  universal  and  obvious  division 
around which other distinctions can be organised. In deciding which activities 
are to fall on each side of the boundary, the important factor is culture (1972, p. 
156). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The biosocial politics of difference, as they continue to be played out in the lives 
of real women, almost mandate that feminist body theory will embrace nurture 
as  the  defining  influence  on  differential  social  and  behavioural  outcomes  for 
women and men.  To do otherwise is to risk the most unacceptable consequences 
of a biologically determinist view of the world, ‘fixing’ us within a naturalised 
status quo.  
   61
Feminists adopt various strategies in their attempts to deal with the intransigent 
problem of the nature/nurture, mind/body dualisms, and with the challenges 
posed by reductionism.  I have asserted that the most extreme positions of strong 
essentialism and constructionism, in dealing with the dualism by either adopting 
or  denying  it,  both  effectively  make  questions  about  biological  sex  difference 
redundant, and are therefore not useful to the questions I wish to ask in this 
thesis. A third strategy, what I have called the metatheoretical approach, is useful 
in pointing out the ways in which social realities force us to focus on dualistic 
alternatives such as sameness/difference, while at the same time highlighting the 
pervasive nature of dualistic thinking, but again it does not advance my key 
question.   
 
The final two feminist strategies considered here both struggle with the dualisms. 
Corporeal  theorists  are  concerned  to  overcome  interpretations  of  sexual 
difference  that  continually  return  us  to  the  familiar  reductionist  explanations 
inherent in the mind/body, sex/gender, nature/nurture splits. They attempt to 
respond to the concerns underscored by the metatheorists by advancing a notion 
of  the  body  that  is  neither  a  product  of  social  inscription,  nor  of  biological 
prescription, but of something in between. That they cannot, in the end, avoid re-
situating  the  body  within  the  realm  of  the  social  world  illustrates  both  the 
slipperiness of dualistic thinking and the strength of our recoil from allowing 
biology  any  meaningful  toehold  in  the  formation  of  sex-differentiated 
psychological characteristics.   
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Such biological explanations of sex differences, and the reasons why we recoil so 
vehemently from them, are the focus of those feminists who, as insiders and as 
outsiders,  challenge  the  models  of  human  behaviour  advanced  by  the 
reductionist sciences. Their critique of these models is informed by insights from 
either – or in some cases both – the physical and the social sciences, and succeed 
in  exposing  and  holding  them  to  account  for  the  more  outrageous  of  their 
determinist  claims.  Nevertheless,  in  pursuing  an  ‘in  sum’  or  ‘on  balance’ 
conclusion,  or,  alternatively,  a  ‘predisposition’  versus  ‘extent’  argument,  this 
strategy, like the others discussed here, does not sufficiently come to terms with 
dualistic thinking to be able to escape it.   
 
As long ago as 1972, Ann Oakley said that the “enduring questions are these: 
does  the  source  of  the  many  differences  between  the  sexes  lie  in  biology  or 
culture? If biology determines male and female roles, how does it determine 
them? How much influence does culture have?” (1972, p. 15). That we – feminists 
and reductionists alike – still pursue answers to these questions in this form, 
clearly  illustrates  that  we  remain  caught  up  in  a  nature/nurture,  social 
construction/genetic reductionism model.   63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part two : The vampires in the sacristy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biology is the key to human nature. 
Edward O. Wilson (1978, p. 13) 
 
 
Both the text and the notes stride through some disciplines and territories in which I’m 
not  qualified  as  an  expert;  so  I’m  bound  to  have  got  some  things  wrong,  although  I 
believe  I’ve  also  got  some  right.  Straying  into  these  ‘expert’  lands  is  something  I’m 
convinced we all must do …  
Ann Oakley (2002, pp. 3-4). 
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Two 
Genetics, genomes and control : biology’s Holy Grail 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more important set of instruction books will never be found by human beings. 
When  finally  interpreted,  the  genetic  messages  encoded  within  our  DNA 
molecules will provide the ultimate answers to the chemical underpinnings of 
human existence.  
James D. Watson (1990, p. 44) 
 
The Human Genome Project is the quintessential reductionist endeavor. 
Allison Morse (1998, p. 225) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The pursuit of the human genome has its roots deep in a human history that 
documents an insatiable desire to interrogate not only the world around us, but 
also the world within. The Human Genome Project (HGP), officially begun in 
1990 and completed in 2003, was seen by many as the culmination of millennia of 
wonder and conjecture about what it is that makes a human being. The project’s 
goal of identifying and sequencing all of the genes in human DNA held out the 
promise  of  answering  this  question  and,  in  so  doing,  providing  us  with  an 
unparalleled level of control over the future of human existence.  
 
The  promise  of  such  control  over  our  biological  destiny  provokes  division 
amongst those who consider what it might mean to be living in the post-genomic   65
era. For the scientists involved in the project, the post-genomic era means that we 
humans now have available to us the ‘book of life’ and all that remains is to learn 
how to read it. Their hope is that reading and understanding the genetic code 
contained in the DNA of all living things will allow them in effect to ‘edit’ the 
text, forestalling, curing and eventually eradicating genetic disease; they will be 
able to mend, alter, and even create life. So, whilst acknowledging the legitimate 
concerns surrounding ethical, legal and social issues, for scientists the knowledge 
arising from the Human Genome Project provides for an exciting and positive 
future. The goals of the project were, without question, biology’s Holy Grail. 
 
On the other hand, for many feminist and other critics and commentators, the 
post-genomic future brings with it the worrying prospect of increasing genetic 
surveillance,  a  new  eugenics,  social  upheaval  and  biological  reductionism. 
Feminist commentators, in particular, have noted how the metaphoric discourse 
around the Human Genome Project is steeped in the rhetoric of control, and this 
has been extensively documented (for example, Doring, 2005; Gogorosi, 2005; 
Hellsten,  2005;  Keller,  2000;  Kerr  &  Cunningham-Burley,  2000;  Morse,  1998; 
Nelkin, 2001). Metaphors such as the ‘master molecule’ and the ‘master code’, the 
‘book/code/language  of  life’,  ‘our  instruction  book’,  a  map,  a  blueprint,  the 
‘blueprint of  destiny’ – each of these can be read as a language of determinism, 
implying a genetic mechanism that both makes and controls us. A step further 
removed is a concern that once scientists have ‘cracked the code’, control over 
individual  humans  as  machines  that  are  (or  can  be)  programmed,  books  or 
blueprints that can be read (or rewritten), will pass to them.   66
 
The construction of (mostly male) genome scientists as explorers, questers and 
heroes  setting  out  on  a voyage of discovery is also endemic to the literature 
around  the  genome  project.  The  home  page  for  the  project  on  the  National 
Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) website begins: 
The Human Genome Project (HGP) was one of the great feats of exploration in 
history – an inward voyage of discovery rather than an outward exploration of 
the planet or the cosmos; an international research effort to sequence and map all 
of the genes – together known as the genome – of members of our species, Homo 
sapiens. Completed in April 2003, the HGP gave us the ability to, for the first time, 
to  (sic)  read  nature’s  complete  genetic  blueprint  for  building  a  human  being 
(NHGRI, n.d.-a, para 1). 
 
This paragraph deliberately draws parallels between the project and such things 
as the moon landing, the more recent journeys of NASA probes to Mars and the 
outer  planets  and,  in  the  American  context,  with  the  terrestrial  journeys  of 
exploration undertaken by Columbus and the founding fathers.   
 
Mary Rosner and T.H. Johnson, in their own exploration of the metaphors of the 
project, assert that “the Project intends to chart nature and to ‘discover’ certain 
kinds of information there” (1995, para 4), and go on to state that: 
…  by  comparing  nature  to  things  inanimate,  dehumanized,  and  ordinary  – 
books, machines, and territories – and the scientist to the librarian, mechanic, and 
explorer, [James] Watson (and he is not alone) promises a heroic and patriarchal 
tale. In this tale, nature is a distanced and impersonal Other that science can, 
should, and will subordinate (1995, para 5). 
 
Similarly, Ruth Hubbard argues that the selection of ‘the Holy Grail’ and ‘the 
book  of  life’  as  metaphors  for  DNA  “underlines  the  ideological  content  of 
molecular  genetics”  (2003,  p.  794),  which  is  presumably  an  ideology  of 
patriarchal conquest and control.  
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Likewise, Dorothy Nelkin & Susan Lindee argue that the appeal of ‘the blueprint 
of destiny’ lies in its seductive promise of predictive science and its justification 
of ‘social agendas’. They go on to discuss the social implications of predictive 
typing and risk assessment for individuals, concluding that this may “create an 
underclass  of  individuals  whose  genes  seem  to  have  marked  them  for  the 
nowhere track” (1995a, p. 67) and that “the world view of genetic essentialism 
leads to policies that restrict the … rights of individuals, for it suggests that order 
in a society depends on the genetic qualities of its population” (1995a, p. 68).  
 
In her discussion of DNA as the ‘master molecule’ of life, Evelyn Fox Keller 
focuses  on  the  ways  in  which  knowledge  of  the  process  reverses  our 
understandings of nature as destiny and nurture as freedom, leading to a belief 
that we can now “more readily control the former than the latter” (1993a, p. 288). 
This view of nature as malleable in turn leads to a problematising of the concept 
of health, such that molecular biology searches not for those traits accepted as 
‘normal’  but  rather  for  the  genetic  basis  of  ‘unhealth’.  She  concludes  that 
eugenics  “has  become  a  vastly  more  realizable  prospect”  through  our  own 
complacency about changing definitions of normality (1993a, p. 299). 
 
The  construction  of the gene as the ‘master molecule’, of course, is the most 
fundamental  of  all  metaphors.  Although  acknowledged  to  be  a  convenient 
shorthand for intricate concepts, critics and commentators on genetic discourse 
take some trouble explaining that the ‘gene’ as a discrete entity does not in fact 
exist (Hubbard, 2003; Keller, 2000; Lewontin, 1993, 2000b). It seems clear from   68
recent  literature,  and  especially  given  the  pace  of  new  discovery,  that  even 
geneticists can no longer agree on what a ‘gene’ actually is, other than to agree 
that it is far more complex than the popular conception of it as a bead on a string 
of DNA.38  Nonetheless, the gene is still reified in popular culture as the immortal 
master molecule that directs and controls, at the very least, our physiology, and 
even possibly our psychology. In The century of the gene, Keller notes that the idea 
of ‘gene action’ had: 
… endowed the gene with a most curious constellation of properties. At one and 
the same time, the gene was bestowed with the properties of materiality, agency, 
life, and mind (2000, p. 47). 
 
 
The use of such simplified metaphors helps to create an everyday understanding 
of the gene as a causal agent and the genome as a master code, an understanding 
that in turn impacts on concepts of individual, racial, ethnic, sexual/sexed and 
kinship identities. This can lead to a belief that there is now scientific support for 
the  theories  about  biological  sex  difference  and  the  more  reductionist 
sociobiological theories discussed in the next chapters in this thesis. It is useful, 
then, to walk across the campus and look beyond the metaphors surrounding the 
HGP, to the history of modern genetics, the project itself, its objectives, and its 
actual outcomes and projected benefits.  
                                                 
38  I take up the discussions around what a ‘gene’ actually is in Chapter 4 of the thesis.   69
Background to modern genetics 
Alfred H. Sturtevant makes the point that the beginnings of genetics39 go farther 
back even than Aristotle (2001, first published 1965, p. 1), and Portugal & Cohen 
state that: 
 
Two thousand years before Miescher discovered DNA [1869], the ancient Greeks 
had speculated on the process by which male and female genital secretions gave 
rise to an organism that in appearance closely resembled the parents (c1977, p. 
90).  
 
Speculation  about  human  genetic  inheritance  is,  then,  by  no  means  a  novel 
pursuit. Most historians and commentators place the shift from speculation to 
‘science’  in  the  modern  beginnings  of  genetics,  with  the  work  on  particulate 
inheritance in pea plants by Gregor Mendel (1822-1884), the Austrian monk often 
called the first geneticist, or the ‘father of genetics’ (Judson, 1993; Moore, 2001; 
Orel,  1996;  Portugal  &  Cohen,  c1977;  Sturtevant,  2001,  first  published  1965; 
Tudge, 2000; Watson, 2003b). Mendel’s work was published in 1866,40 but went 
largely  unnoticed  until  simultaneously  rediscovered  by  three  independent 
researchers  in  1900.41  His  laws  of  inheritance  –  dominance,  segregation,  and 
independent assortment – are widely accepted as providing the basis for modern 
genetics (The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2005; Tudge, 2000), although 
Sturtevant comments that the “systematic study of the genetics of man (sic)” 
began earlier, with Francis Galton (a first cousin of Charles Darwin ), in 1865 
                                                 
39  The introduction of the word ‘genetics’ is attributed to William Bateson, in 1905 (Portugal & 
Cohen, c1977, p. 118). Although anachronistic prior to that time, for purposes of clarity I use the 
word throughout when discussing this field of research. 
40  There is some confusion in the literature as to year of publication, but it seems clear that the 
paper was read in 1865 at meetings of the Natural History Society of Brunn, and published in the 
Proceedings of the Natural History Society of Brunn in 1866.  
41  Carl Correns in Germany, Hugo deVries in Holland, and Erich Tschermak in Austria (Kevles, 
1986, p. 43). See (http://www.esp.org/foundations/genetics/classical/browse/chrono-lst.html) for 
facsimiles of their original papers.   70
(Sturtevant, 2001, first published 1965, p. 126), and Galton himself conducted 
experiments with sweet pea plants in the early 1870s (Kevles, 1986, p. 14). 
 
Mendel’s  overlooked  paper  was  followed  by  numerous  other  incremental 
discoveries  in  the  19th  and  early  20th  centuries,  including  Johann  Friedrich 
Miescher’s discovery of DNA in 1869, Walther Fleming’s observation of what 
would later be known as chromosomes,42 and Hugo de Vries’ development of a 
concept of intracellular communication43 which would later be largely confirmed 
by the discovery of messenger RNA (Portugal & Cohen, c1977). James Watson 
identifies  Walter  Sutton’s  discovery  in  1903  of  the  Chromosomal  Theory  of 
Heredity as another important step forward in the development of a science of 
genetics  (2000,  p.  180)44  and,  from  1907,  Thomas  Hunt  Morgan’s  famous  ‘fly 
room’ at Columbia University provided both important developments in genetics 
(through studies of Drosophila) and a research home for young geneticists such as 
Sturtevant and Hermann J. Muller (Portugal & Cohen, c1977, p. 124).45  In the 
early 1950s, Maurice Wilkins’ and Rosalind Franklin’s work on x-ray diffraction 
patterns pointed to a helical structure for DNA (c1977, pp. 240-246), providing a 
critical  step  toward  what  is  probably  the  20th  century’s  most  well  known 
announcement in genetics, that of the discovery in 1953 of the double helical 
structure of DNA by James Watson and Francis Crick (Watson & Crick, 1953) .46  
 
                                                 
42  Published in Cell Substance, Nucleus, and Cell Division (1882).  
43  See de Vries (1910). 
44  See Sutton (1903). 
45  Sturtevant is credited with having developed the first sequence map (Judson, 1993, pp. 45-47); 
Muller with demonstrating that x-rays caused mutations in fruit flies (Judson, 1993, pp. 47-48) and 
Morgan himself with discovering sex-linkage and recombination (Watson, 2003b, pp. 13-16). 
46  There has been controversy over Watson & Crick’s access to Franklin’s work without her 
knowledge (see Maddox, 2002; Sayre, 1975).    71
Unfortunately for the fledgling discipline of human genetics, much of the early 
work on Mendelian inheritance was used as support for eugenic beliefs and for 
the  implementation  of  various  negative  eugenic  social  policies  in  the  United 
States, England and Germany.47 The practice of eugenics, of course, is not new; it 
is  inherent  in  Darwin’s  evolutionary  principles,  and  in  his  formulation  of 
evolution it is practised by most species instinctively in their mating strategies. It 
has also been consciously applied by humans to their animal and plant breeding 
methods  for  centuries.  However,  it  is  the  application  of  deliberative  social 
policies for enhancing so-called ‘good (human) stock’ and, more importantly, for 
preventing the proliferation of ‘bad (human) stock’, that we think of as eugenic 
and  which  gives  the  word  its  pejorative  colouration.  The  word  ‘eugenics’, 
literally ‘good birth’,48 was coined by Francis Galton, and defined as “the study of 
agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of 
future generations either physically or mentally” (Searle, 1976, p. 1).49  
 
Right from the beginning, then, knowledge about genetic inheritance has been an 
‘applied’  rather  than  a  ‘pure’  science.  Galton’s  vision  of  a  “planned  human 
genetic improvement” (Hellyer Corning, 1973, p. 732) was enthusiastically seized 
upon by eugenic movements, which drew much of their credibility, and many of 
their adherents,50 from the emergent science of genetics in the early 20th century. 
                                                 
47  James Watson notes that eugenics ”proved a disaster for the emerging science of genetics, which 
could not escape the taint” (2003b, p. 33). 
48  From the Greek ‘eu’ = good, ‘genesis’ = generation, creation (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on 
historical principles). 
49  Watson also credits Galton with being the first to refer to the “nature/nurture” dichotomy 
(2003b, p. 21), as does Sturtevant (2001, first published 1965, p. 128). 
50  Among them, biologists William Bateson, Charles Davenport (director of Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory in 1910), and Harry H. Laughlin (superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office); Karl 
Pearson (joint founder of Biometrika, and foundation professor of Galton Eugenics at University   72
Support from scientists was progressively withdrawn as eugenic beliefs, based 
on insufficient or misinterpreted science, were translated into such abhorrent 
social practices as forced sterilisations, discriminatory immigration policies, the 
stigmatisation  of  whole  families  as  ‘degenerate’  or  ‘feebleminded’,51  and 
ultimately  led  to  the  experimentations  and  genocidal  practices  of  the  Nazis 
during World War II. Daniel J. Kevles notes that: 
In 1935, the American geneticist and future Nobel laureate Hermann J. Muller 
was  moved  to  write  that  eugenics  had  become  “hopelessly  perverted”  into  a 
pseudoscientific facade for “advocates of race and class prejudice, defenders of 
vested  interests  of  church  and  state,  Fascists,  Hitlerites,  and  reactionaries 
generally.” By the mid-thirties, mainline eugenics had generally been recognized 
as a farrago of flawed science (1986, p. 164). 
 
James  Watson  reiterates  these  sentiments,  and  further  observes  that  “by 
midcentury the valid science of genetics, human genetics in particular, had a 
major  public  relations  problem  on  its  hands”  due  to  its  association  with  the 
“utterly  reprehensible”  social  programs  carried  out  in  the  name  of  eugenics 
(2003b, p. 33). Earlier, however, he has qualified this statement somewhat by 
stating that: 
Eugenics these days is a dirty word, associated with racists and Nazis – a dark, 
best-forgotten  phase  of  the  history  of  genetics.  It  is  important  to  appreciate, 
however,  that  in  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth  and  early  years  of  the 
twentieth centuries, eugenics was not tainted in this way, and was seen by many 
as offering genuine potential for improving not just society as a whole but the lot 
of  individuals  within  society  as  well.  Eugenics  was  embraced  with  particular 
enthusiasm by those who today would be termed the “liberal left” (2003b, p. 22). 
 
                                                                                                                                      
College, London), geneticist Ronald Fisher and, for a time, future Nobel laureate Hermann J. 
Muller. Leading figures in the birth control movement, including Margaret Sanger and Marie 
Stopes, were also proponents of eugenics (see Pickens, 1968). 
51  The most well-known examples of which are Henry Goddard’s characterisation of the entire 
illegitimate line of the ‘Kallikak’ family as ‘defective degenerates’ (Watson, 2003b), and the case of 
Buck v Bell in 1927 where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ordered that Carrie Buck be sterilised 
since "three generations of imbeciles is enough" (Pickens, 1968). I note that Pickens does not himself 
appear to question that Carrie Buck was ‘feebleminded’. 
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Here,  Watson  appears  to  be  attempting  to  ‘rescue’  eugenics  from  its  ‘utterly 
reprehensible’ past, and while it may be the case that the ‘liberal left’ were well-
intentioned,  he  still  glosses  over  the  question  of  who,  exactly,  were  the 
individuals whose lives were to be improved (the poor, the feebleminded, the 
‘native’?) and of how this was to be accomplished (by restricting their procreative 
rights?). Despite the passing of time, concern about the study of human genetics 
lingers. The spectre of eugenics, raising as it does these and other questions about 
possibilities for individual ‘improvement’ and the potential for negative personal 
and social consequences, provides the backdrop for many of the fears expressed 
about the Human Genome Project (see, for example, Alper et al., 2004; Duster, 
2003; Galton, 2002; Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002; Kevles, 1986, 1993).52  
 
The Human Genome Project and its objectives 
 
The 15-year Human Genome Project formally began in October 1990, when the 
Department  of  Energy  (DOE)  and  the  National  Institutes  of  Health  (NIH) 
presented a joint five-year plan to the US Congress. Chroniclers of the project 
place its real beginnings some six years earlier, at a conference held in Alta, Utah, 
in December 1984. It was reading a report of this conference that gave Charles 
DeLisi, the then new director of the Office of Health and Environmental Research 
(OHER) at the DOE, the idea for a project to map the human genome (Cook-
Deegan, 1989; DeLisi, 1988; Kevles, 1993), and in 1985, two conferences were 
held: one at the University of California convened by molecular biologist Robert 
                                                 
52  The publisher’s note to the Kerr & Shakespeare text states that they reject “the two extreme 
positions that tend to pervade contemporary debates about human genetics: genetics as either 
fatally corrupted by, or utterly immune from, eugenic influence”. Thus debates around eugenics 
are seen as creating yet another dualism within the literature around genetics.    74
Sinsheimer, and one at Santa Fe, commissioned by DeLisi and David A. Smith, to 
“assess the feasibility of a Human Genome Initiative” (ORNL, n.d.-c).53 Funding 
for pilot projects was provided by the OHER in 1986 and by the NIH in 1987. The 
published goals of the Human Genome Project were to: 
￿ identify all the approximately 30,000 genes in human DNA [originally 
estimated to be around 100,000], 
￿ determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical bases that make up 
human DNA, 
￿ store this information in databases, 
￿ develop faster, more efficient sequencing technologies, 
￿ develop tools for data analysis, and 
￿ address the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) that may arise from the 
project (ORNL, n.d.-d). 
 
In  April  2003,  the  International  Human  Genome  Sequencing  Consortium 
announced  the  successful  completion  of  the  project,  coinciding with the 50th 
anniversary of Watson & Crick’s discovery of the double helix (Watson & Crick, 
1953).  The genome project – the “crown jewel of 20th century biology” (Roberts, 
2001, p. 1182) – was biology’s first foray into what has been called Big Science, 
and  involved  the  cooperation  of  20  research  laboratories  across  six  countries 
(Great Britain, France, China, Germany and Japan, as well as the United States). 
Jointly funded by the DOE and the NIH, US investment in the project grew from 
a modest joint annual budget of $US27.9m in 1988, to $US437m in 2003. In the  
                                                 
53  ORNL is the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.   75
end, budget allocations for the project over these 16 years totalled just under 
$US3.8  billion.54  
 
Much has been made of the enormous cost of the project. To put these figures 
into some context, expenditure on the Human Genome Project in any single year 
over the life of the project was, in comparison to expenditure on other projects, 
only a small proportion of the total yearly budget for the NIH.55 For example, of 
the  proposed  total  NIH  budget  of  $US27.3  billion  in  2003,  genome  project 
funding totalled only 1.36%, compared with 20.1% for cancer-related research 
(MedicalNewsService, 2002).56 As well, the joint Human Genome Project Budget 
page notes that:  
The Human Genome Project was sometimes reported to have cost $3 billion. 
However, this figure refers to the total projected funding over a 13-year period 
(1990 – 2003) for a wide range of scientific activities related to genomics. These 
include studies of human diseases, experimental organisms (such as bacteria, 
yeast, worms, flies, and mice); development of new technologies for biological 
and medical research; computational methods to analyze genomes; and ethical, 
legal, and social issues related to genetics. Human genome sequencing represents 
only a small fraction of the overall 13-year budget (ORNL, n.d.-b, para 1).57 
 
 
The sequencing of all the DNA in the 24 human chromosomes, or an estimated 
3.1 billion base pairs,58 was completed two years ahead of schedule, covering 99 
per cent of the genome with an error rate of less than 1 in 10,000 base pairs 
(NHGRI, n.d.-g). Although called the Human Genome Project, it also included the 
                                                 
54  The exact figure, arrived at by simple addition of each year’s budget allocation from 1988 
through to 2003, is $3,798,300,000 (ORNL, n.d.-b). NHGRI puts the actual cost of the project at 
“about $2.7 billion in FY1991 dollars” (NHGRI, n.d.-g). 
55  Of the two agencies, NIH has been lead funding agency on the project. 
56  The figure quoted for cancer-related research in fiscal year 2003 is US$5.5 billion; the NIH budget 
for the HGP in fiscal year 2003 was US$372.8 million.  
57  As noted above, pilot funding for the program began in 1988. 
58  The complementary strands that make up DNA are comprised of four nucleotide bases – 
cytosine, guanine, adenine and thymine. C always pairs with G, and A always with T, giving the 
base pairs AT or CG.   76
sequencing  of  the  genomes  of  a  number  of  model  organisms,  including  the 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (baker’s yeast) genome in 1996, E. coli (bacteria) in 1997, 
Caenorhabditis elegans (nematode worm) in 1998, and Drosophila melanogaster (fruit 
fly) in 2000. By late 2006, some 50 genomes had been or were being completed by 
laboratories worldwide. The  mouse and rat genomes have been sequenced, and 
other  model  organism  sequencing  continues,  with  the  rice  and  honey  bee 
genomes recently completed. The Sanger Institute is, at time of writing in early 
2009,  sequencing  the  zebrafish  (Danio  rerio)  genome,  as  part  of  a  ‘suite’  of 
genome-related projects (Sanger Institute, n.d.). In September 2006, researchers 
from the Johns Hopkins Kimmel Cancer Center (JHKCC) announced that they 
had completed the first draft of the genetic codes for breast and colon cancer, and 
expect the identification of the genes involved in these diseases to guide further 
research (JHKCC, 2006). Also in 2006, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and 
NHGRI began a joint pilot project investigating the feasibility of the development 
of  a  complete  cancer  atlas  (Collins  &  Barker,  2007).  These  and  many  other 
projects are ongoing. 
 
Outcomes and benefits 
 
Proponents of the Human Genome Project have claimed that potential benefits 
across a number of areas will flow from the knowledge gained from the project 
itself, and from post-HGP projects such as those above. Many of these benefits 
are already evident: new techniques in forensic science are being used to help 
identify crime suspects and to exonerate those who have been wrongly accused 
of crime; in agriculture, disease and insect resistant crops have been engineered   77
and biopesticides developed, reducing the use of harmful chemical pesticides 
(Watson, 2003b, p. 145).  
 
Advances in molecular medicine have been slow, and plagued by setbacks, but 
are beginning to gather momentum. There has, however, been progress in the 
diagnosis  and  prevention  of  some  diseases.  Most  recently,  for  example, 
Australian  scientists  at  the  University  of  Queensland  have  used  genetic 
technologies to develop a cervical cancer vaccine that is 100 per cent effective 
against the strain of the human papilloma virus (HPV) that causes two-thirds of 
all cervical cancers. The vaccine is only effective in those who are not infected 
with HPV, and work is continuing on production of a second vaccine that will 
treat existing infections (UQ News Online, 2005). The Australian Government 
moved relatively quickly to add this vaccine to the national inoculation schedule, 
and mass vaccinations of target groups of girls and young women began in 2007. 
 
There is no clearer example of how the promise of control is fulfilled, than in the 
fact that a primary use of this information is in the development and application 
of  gene  therapy  and  genetic  diagnosis  for  various  purposes. New treatments 
utilising  gene  therapy  and  therapeutic  cloning  continue  to  be  trialled,  with 
predictably uneven results (see Thrasher, 2005). The discovery in 1993 of the 
mutation that causes Huntington disease – an unusually large number of CAG 
repeats in the gene located at 4p16.359 – has until recently allowed for certainty in 
                                                 
59  Standard genetic nomenclature for the bases is in this form, ‘CAG’ – that is, 
cytosine/adenine/guanine. The designation ‘4p16.3’ refers to the physical location of the gene, on 
the short arm (p) of chromosome 4, at position 16.3 (for a written/pictorial description see 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/gene=htt; http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/howgeneswork/genelocation).   78
diagnosis of the disease, but provided no treatment options. Within the last few 
years, however, researchers have reported some hope of a potential treatment 
and  eventual  cure  utilising  gene  therapy.  A  report  from  the  University  of 
California Urvine Medical Center, in 2002, noted that: 
A  protein  developed  in  the  laboratory  halts  the  progression  of  Huntington’s 
disease in fruit flies ... and it may help researchers find effective ways to use gene 
therapy to prevent – or halt – the disease (UCI Medical Center, 2002, para 1). 
 
 
Researchers at the University of Iowa have conducted experiments on mice using 
a technique called RNA interference that switches off unhealthy genes, which 
they  are  hopeful  will  lead  to  treatments  in  humans  for  Huntington  and 
Alzheimer’s diseases (Holmes, 2003; Xia, Mao, Paulson, & Davidson, 2002; Xia et 
al., 2004).  Similarly, experimental gene therapy in humans with cystic fibrosis 
has been underway since 1993, although the search for the most effective delivery 
system is continuing (NHGRI, n.d.-d). Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
has been used in Britain to select embryos who do not carry the gene for either 
disease, and University College, London, has recently announced the birth of a 
baby girl ‘selected’ to be free of the breast cancer gene, BRCA1 (Quinn, 2009). In 
the last few years, gene therapy has been used to treat metastatic melanoma with 
limited success – with two of 17 patients treated remaining disease-free a year 
after treatment (Maisey, 2006) – and to treat an inherited disease that causes 
blindness (Bainbridge, Smith, Barker, Robbie, & et al, 2008; Maguire, Simonelli, 
Pierce, Pugh, & et al, 2008).  
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Perhaps the most publicly visible gene therapy, because so widely reported in the 
media, has been its use in patients with severe combined immune deficiency 
syndrome  (SCID).  The  NHGRI  reports  the  successful  treatment  with  gene 
therapy for two young girls with one form of SCID in the United States in 1990  
(NHGRI,  n.d.-h),  and  clinical  trials  of  gene  therapy  for  X-linked  SCID  were 
conducted in Paris and reported in the journal Science in 2000 (see Cavazzana-
Calvo  et  al.,  2000).  Following  reports  of  the  development  of  cancer  in  three 
patients between 2002 and 2005, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 
United  States  suspended  gene  therapy  trials  (Harris,  2005),  as  did  Australia 
(NH&MRC, 2005). However, an April 2002 report on BBC News Health reported 
the success of the therapy in an 18-month-old boy with SCID (BBC News Health, 
2002),  and  similar  gene  therapy  trials  underway  at  the  Great  Ormond  Street 
Hospital,  London,  were  permitted  to  continue,  on  the  basis  that  the  “study 
represents  a  significant  milestone  in  the  development  of  gene  therapy 
treatments” (Medwirenews, 2002, penultimate para).  
 
Therapeutic cloning – more correctly somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) – has 
also been at the forefront of public discussion in Australia in the last few years, 
with the drafting of a Bill by Senator Kay Patterson to lift the ban on cloning of 
human pre-embryos for stem cell research. This Bill was based on the Lockhart 
Review presented to the Australian Government on 19 December 2005, which 
recommended that SCNT be  permitted. The government’s initial reaction was to 
ignore this recommendation of the committee: 
After careful reflection, the Government is not disposed to make any changes to 
the  existing  national  legislative  framework  for  research  involving  human 
embryos, agreed in 2002 (Prime Minister of Australia, 2006).   80
 
However,  widespread  challenge  to  this  position  prompted  the  then  Prime 
Minister, John Howard, to allow parliamentarians a conscience vote on the issue. 
Patterson’s Bill, amended to disallow the use of animal eggs to create animal-
human hybrids, passed the Senate on 7 November 2006, by a close 34 to 32 votes, 
and  then  passed  the  lower  house  without  amendment  a  month  later  by  a 
convincing margin of 82 to 62. This Bill replaced that passed in 2002 which had 
allowed the extraction of stem cells from ‘spare’ IVF embryos, but prevented 
SCNT.  
 
Stem cell research is currently being used to target a wide range of diseases and 
trauma-related  injuries,  including  diabetes,  Alzheimer’s  and  Parkinson’s 
diseases,  and  spinal  cord  injury.  Scientists  at  the  University  of  Wisconsin-
Madison have announced success with converting stem cells into spinal nerve 
cells,  which  they  hope  will  be  “a  stepping  stone”  towards  a  cure  for  motor 
neurone disease (Jeffery, 2005, para 8), and in February 2005, British researchers 
were also granted a licence to clone human embryos for research into motor 
neurone disease (Jeffery & Perrone, 2005). In related work, researchers  at the 
University of California Irvine, report that “paralysed rats regained their ability 
to walk after having their spinal cord injuries treated with human embryonic 
stem cells” (Jeffery, 2005, para 8).  
 
American researchers have successfully used embryonic stem cells to vaccinate 
mice against lung cancer, although they point out that this research is in its very 
early stages and is unlikely to be of benefit to humans for some considerable time   81
(European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer, 2006). Stem cell 
research is, however, beginning to move ahead in a number of other areas. In late 
2004, French cardiovascular surgeon, Dr Phillippe Menasche, reported on a trial 
to use embryonic stem cells to treat heart failure patients (Menasche, 2004); two 
years later, British researchers harvested stem cells gathered from a heart attack 
victims’ own bone marrow, injecting them into the heart within a few hours of 
the  attack,  in  the  expectation  that  the  stem  cells  would  help  to  repair  the 
damaged heart muscle (Towie, 2006). 
 
In  November  2008,  pharmaceutical  giant  Pfizer  announced  the  launch  of  a 
Regenerative Medicine Unit, co-located in the UK and the USA and employing 
around 70 researchers. Their press release notes that the focus of the unit will be 
on exploring “the use of stem cells to develop future treatments that may prevent 
disability, repair failing organs and treat degenerative diseases. The ultimate goal 
will be to deliver new medicinal products that can pave the way for the use of 
cells as therapeutics” (Medical News Today, 2008, para 2). At University College 
London, the London Project to Cure Blindness (LPCB) is developing embryonic 
stem cell therapy to treat patients with age-related macular degeneration (LPCB, 
2007).  Most  recently,  on  23  January  2009,  the  American  Geron  Corporation 
received regulatory permission to treat up to 10 patients who are paralysed from 
the  chest  down  with  embryonic  stem  cells  injected  into  their  spines  (Geron 
Corporation, 2009; see also Stein, 2009).  
   82
 
Controversies  
 
The proposal to undertake the Human Genome Project provoked controversy on 
many  levels,  at  least  initially  as  much  from  within  scientific  circles  as  from 
without.60 This was to be biology’s first foray into ‘Big Science’, and there was 
considerable  discussion,  at  times  heated,  amongst  leading  scientists  about 
whether  it  was  worth  doing  at  all,  and  of  its  effects  on  more  traditional 
laboratory-driven  research  (see  Cook-Deegan,  1995,  in  particular  chapter  8). 
While Walter Gilbert, winner of the Nobel prize in chemistry in 1980 and co-
founder of biotech company Biogen,61 asserted from the beginning that the “total 
human sequence is the grail of human genetics” (Lewin, 1986, p. 1598; see also 
Cook-Deegan, 1995, p. 88; Gilbert, 1993; Kevles, 1993, p. 19), others were not so 
sanguine. David Botstein62 was reported as saying that the project “endangers all 
of us, especially the young researchers” (Lewin, 1986, p. 1598), and, at the same 
time, Nobel prize winner David Baltimore commented, “The idea is gathering 
momentum. I shiver at the thought” (Lewin, 1986, p. 1600). A year later, leading 
cancer  researcher  Robert  Weinberg  said  he  was  “surprised  consenting  adults 
have been caught in public talking about it” (Hanna, 1991, p. 154). There was also 
early  debate  about  which  of    two  major  US  agencies  –  DOE,  with  its  strong 
research background in human mutation grounded in its involvement in atomic 
                                                 
60  See, for example, James Watson’s account of what he called the “backlash against the human 
genome project” (1993, p. 165). 
61  Founded in 1978; see http://www.biogenidec.com/site/history.html. 
62  One of the researchers who, in 1980, had suggested a method of producing a linkage map of 
genes through the use of restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs), a method later used 
in the genome project. A RFLP (rif-lip) is defined in the Talking Glossary on the NHGRI website 
(www.genome.gov) as “Genetic variations at the site where a restriction enzyme cuts a piece of 
DNA. Such variations affect the size of the resulting fragments. These sequences can be used as 
markers on physical maps and linkage maps”.   83
research, or NIH, the primary US government health agency – should lead the 
project.  
 
While these debates were settled early, and indeed critics Botstein, Baltimore and 
Weinberg all became involved in genome research, controversies surrounding 
the  implications  for  and  impacts  upon  equitable  and  ethical  societies  of  this 
knowledge  are  ongoing.  These  controversies,  originally  centred  around  the 
pursuit of the project itself, now focus on the very many fields of research that 
have either been made possible, or been advanced, by scientists’ access to the 
completed  genomes  of  humans  and  various  other  species,  and  by  the 
technological advances that in many ways progressed hand-in-hand with the 
project.  
 
In their Introduction to The Code of Codes, a collection of essays first published in 
1992 addressing the scientific and social issues likely to arise from the project, 
Daniel Kevles and Leroy Hood said: 
The search for the biological grail has been going on since the turn of the century, 
but  it  has  now  entered  its  culminating  phase  with  the  recent  creation  of  the 
human genome project, the ultimate goal of which is the acquisition of all the 
details of our genome. That knowledge ... will transform our capacities to predict 
what we may become and, ultimately, it may enable us to enhance or prevent our 
genetic fates, medically or otherwise (1993a, p. vii).  
 
This  anticipated  capacity  to  transform  our  genetic  fates  is  a  focal  point  for 
controversy about the application of genomic knowledge. Writing in 2003, James 
Watson, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, said: 
The Human Genome Project is much more than a vast roll call of As, Ts, Gs, and 
Cs: it is as precious a body of knowledge as humankind will ever acquire, with a 
potential to speak to our most basic philosophical questions about human nature, 
for purposes of good and mischief alike (2003b, p. 173).   84
 
His early recognition of the potential for harmful consequences and of the wide 
range  of  issues  likely  to  arise  out  of  genome  research  informed  Watson’s 
independent decision, shortly after his appointment as inaugural director of the 
Human  Genome  Project  at  the  NIH,  to  set  aside  three  per  cent  of  genome 
program funding for ELSI research. This figure increased over time to five per 
cent of the genome budget (2003b, p. 349).  In an address delivered in October 
2003, Watson discussed his reasons for funding the ELSI working group: 
Increasingly, both what we as humans expect from ourselves and how we deal 
with  other  human  beings  will  be  affected  by  genetic  knowledge.  Assigning 
genetic causation to human capabilities and disabilities almost always has ethical 
consequences ... Geneticists no longer should have a largely hands-off attitude to 
how their results bear on the functioning of human society (2003a, p. 83). 
 
While  Watson’s  motives  have  been  called  into  question  as  political  by  some 
commentators (for example Mahowald, 2000, pp 3-4; Spanier, 1995) – and the 
ELSI program itself judged as limited, unable to be honestly critical of genome 
research because it is not independently funded (Lehrman, 2000) – Watson does 
have a track record of support for outside scrutiny of scientific advances: 
In the early 1970s, Watson was almost alone among scientists in supporting a 
commission  on  reproductive  technology  and  new  biomedical  advances.  The 
Senate had a hard time finding a scientist who did not regard such commissions 
as intrusions onto sacred scientific lands, but Watson spoke out in favor of public 
deliberation (Cook-Deegan, 1995). 
 
The genome project was unique in providing internal funding for this kind of 
scrutiny (Clayton, Fisher, McInerney, Press, & Walters, 2000; Mahowald, 2000). 
Daniel Kevles comments that: 
The  commitment  of  NIH  resources  to  the  provocation  of  ethical  debate  was 
unprecedented, as was making bioethics an integral part of an NIH biological 
research program. By no means all biologists … supported Watson’s policy, but 
Watson,  undaunted,  defended  it  …  Watson  was  not  only  undaunted  in  his   85
commitment to ethics but also, it would appear, shrewd. His policy undoubtedly 
helped defuse anxieties (1993, p. 35). 63 
 
New government-funded genetic research, in the United States at least, routinely 
now includes ELSI (or EELS – ethical, economic, legal & social issues – as it is 
now also sometimes called) as part of its brief.  
 
Ethical, legal & social issues 
 
I foreground my discussion of the implications of the use of new or existing 
technologies as a result of knowledge arising from molecular biological research 
by saying that the religious arguments deployed in opposition to them will not 
be dealt with here. These arguments, involving divisive and firmly oppositional 
views on such questions as when life begins, the sanctity of human life, and of 
what we should and should not do based on religious belief, are not capable of 
being rationally resolved and are a distraction for this thesis. In any event, the 
foregoing discussion makes it clear that we have already travelled too far along 
this road to turn back. In my view, we need now to focus our attention on the 
much more critical issue of how we grapple with the implications of the actions 
that are already being taken, and those which seem likely to be taken in the 
future, as a result of  this knowledge.  
 
                                                 
63  Watson is undoubtedly a strange character who also has a track record for speaking his mind 
and for ‘rubbing people up the wrong way’. However, he can also surprise with what are, on the 
face of it, enlightened, liberal (if ‘shrewd’) responses to complex issues. He is prone to holding firm 
opinons on divisive issues where others fear to tread. For example, his strong advocacy of germline 
gene therapy is both positive in its recognition that it is primarily women who still bear major 
responsibility for child rearing and care, and negative in its rushing toward a therapy with 
unknown consequences (see 2003b, pp. 424-427). This is just one instance that confirms Bonnie B. 
Spanier’s argument that, contra Cook-Degan and Kevles, Watson puts forward “an exaggerated 
positivist view” of science. She further argues that he is “one of the most overtly ‘political’ scientists 
in the world” and that his “obfuscation of politics and politicking in science is pure propaganda” 
(1995, p. 131).    86
The  ELSI  research  program  identifies  seven  program  priorities,  or  ‘grand 
challenges’ for genomic research including intellectual property issues; access 
and use of genetic information in health, and in non-health (for example, the 
criminal  justice  system  or  employment)  settings;  ethical  conduct  in  genetic 
research  on  humans;  the  impact  on  concepts  of  race,  ethnicity,  kinship  and 
identity;64 implications of the discovery of genetic contributions to behaviour and 
human traits; and individual, cultural and religious views on the ethical use of 
genomics (NHGRI, n.d.-f).  
 
Each  of  these  seven  areas  of  interest  has  aroused  concern  and  provoked 
discussion in the academic literature, government publications, and the public 
arena. The ELSI program was originally envisaged as a dedicated space where 
such  concerns  could  be  pursued,  and  the  NHGRI  claims  some  significant 
successes for ELSI right from the beginning of the project. These include the 
“decision to sequence the DNA of several anonymous individuals, rather than a 
known individual, in order to protect privacy”, and “the development of widely 
used genetic privacy guidelines and draft legislation” (NHGRI, n.d.-g, para 22). 
Given  the  focus  of  this  thesis,  I  will  concentrate  here  on  those  areas  that 
potentially support reductionist theories or have an impact on notions of the 
body; that is to say, the implications of genetic contributions to behaviour and 
human traits, and the related issue of impacts on concepts of identity.  
 
                                                 
64  Given the preoccupations of sociobiology and sex difference research, it is noteworthy that 
gender is not accorded the same conceptual status as race and ethnicity but, presumably, is 
subsumed under identity along with sexual preference.    87
There are a number of issues that come to mind when we turn our attention to 
public debates around the knowledge arising from the genome project. Claims of 
‘genes  for’  behavioural  attributes,  such  as  sexual  orientation,  intelligence, 
anxiety-related personality traits, and susceptibilities to alcoholism and eating 
disorders,  raise  all  kinds  of  questions.  These  range  from questions about the  
purpose the information serves, to questions of accountability, to questions of 
social  policy.  Would  knowing  that  people  with a homosexual orientation are 
‘born gay’ change the way society views them? If so, would it be for the better? If 
I  have  a  genetic  susceptibility  to  alcoholism  and,  when  drunk,  I  become 
aggressive  and  harm  people,  can  I  be  held  accountable?  If  pre-implantation 
diagnosis reveals that my genetic make-up endows me with a ‘below average’ 
level of intelligence, is it worth trying to educate me? More fundamentally, should 
such knowledge change the way society (and individuals within society) views 
gay  people,  holds  individuals  accountable  for  their  actions,  or  fulfils  its 
obligations to provide (to the best of its ability) for each of its citizens? And, of 
course, the pursuit of such behavioural genes raises the question of eugenics: if a 
‘gay gene’ were discovered, how would society respond to a parent’s wish to 
abort a child for no other reason than that it had such a gene? Would society 
pressure parents to abort children with an IQ quotient below a certain level?  
 
Gene patenting has also been a concern since the beginning of the project, and 
the  debate  in  Australia  has  most  recently  revolved  around  the  attempted 
enforcement of patents over BRCA1 and BRCA2, the genes implicated in breast 
and ovarian cancers, by biotechnology firm, Genetic Technologies (see Gaglioti,   88
2008, para 1; Smith, 2002). The Community Affairs Committee of the Senate is 
currently  conducting  an  inquiry  into  gene  patents  and  is  due  to  report  its 
findings by the last sitting day for 2009. Among other things, the committee will 
consider whether the Patents Act 1990 should be amended “so as to expressly 
prohibit the grant of patent monopolies over such materials” (Senate Community 
Affairs Committee, 2008, point (c)).65  
 
Also of concern is the current state of knowledge about identified disease genes 
such  as,  for  example,  those  for  Huntington  disease,  and  cystic  fibrosis.  As 
previously mentioned, we now know that the cause of Huntington disease is an 
unusual number of CAG repeats in the gene located at 4p16.3 (NINDS, n.d.)66 
and  that  cystic  fibrosis  is  caused  by  mutations  in  the  gene  located  at  7q31.2 
(Collins,  1992).  Although  some  treatments  exist  for  the  management  and 
amelioration  of  these  conditions  (and  Francis  Collins  is  optimistic  about  the 
potential  of  gene  therapy  as  a  future  treatment  for  cystic  fibrosis),  the  only 
current  ‘cures’  are  pre-implantation  genetic  diagnosis  (PGD)  and  abortion.67  
Ethical  concerns  have  centred  around  the  utility  of  this  genetic  knowledge, 
particularly for diseases such as Huntington disease, where the individual will 
most likely have 40 years free of disease, and cystic fibrosis where the presence, 
                                                 
65  Hubbard & Wald discuss patenting (1999, pp. 124-126, 174-178). See also Watson (2003b, pp. 180-
185) and Cook-Degan (1995, p. 310ff). 
66  NINDS is the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NIH. 
67  Francis S. Collins succeeded James Watson as director of the Human Genome Project (later 
NHGRI) in 1993 and remained director until August 2008. A physician and geneticist by training, 
he led teams that identified the genes responsible for cystic fibrosis, neurofibromatosis, 
Huntington’s disease and Hutchinson-Gilford progeria syndrome. He is known for the approach to 
the identification of genes which he labelled ‘positional cloning’ (see the brief biography of Collins 
at http://www.genome.gov/10000779), and for his strong religious faith and ethical approach to 
science (see Collins, 2003).   89
but  not  the  severity,  of  the  disease  can  be  detected  (see,  for  example,  Ciske, 
Haavisto, Laxova, Rock, & Farrell, 2001; Kotwicki et al., 2001).68  
 
The related debate then centres around notions of negative eugenics inherent in 
testing for and aborting embryos found to have a genetic condition which will 
cause them to be born with some disability or disease. Here, ethical and moral 
questions  revolve  around  ‘perfectibility’,  and  the  value  of  human  life.  For 
example, disability rights groups argue that testing and aborting for disability or 
disease devalues their lives;69 others, such as James Watson, maintain that it can 
only be a good thing to ‘prevent’ suffering caused by disease, although Watson 
states  that this is a decision that must ultimately rest with individual women.70 
Again, the debate circles back to imponderables. For my purposes, it is more 
useful  to  examine  how  the  funding  provided  through  the  ELSI  program  has 
advanced research dealing with issues such as these that directly impact upon 
notions of personal identity, the genetics of behaviour, and women’s rights.  
 
                                                 
68  See also Hubbard & Wald’s discussion of treatments of inherited conditions, and of gene 
manipulation in general, in chapter 8 (1999, pp. 108-116). 
69  And some groups have lobbied for the right to make a deliberate choice to have a child that 
would be considered within the wider society to have a disability (see Savalescu, 2002; Spriggs, 
2002). 
70  This appears to be an enlightened and well-meaning response to these issues, and I choose to 
read it in that way. In keeping with my general view in this thesis that individual scientists 
involved in these enterprises are not ill-intentioned, I see no reason for suspecting Watson of any 
covert scheme (for example, to make things easier for men by shifting the ultimate decision in these 
matters onto women, effectively returning us to a situation of ‘mother-blaming’) or of a merely 
rhetorical gesture to women’s reproductive rights. This is not to say that it is not also a somewhat 
naïve view, however. When placed within the wider debates around women’s rights, and issues 
around the real or illusory nature of control and choice (all of which have been well rehearsed in 
other contexts, such as debates surrounding abortion rights and the uses of new reproductive 
technologies), it is clear that such decisions are very far from being so simple.    90
There is no doubt that ELSI funding has been significant in enabling research 
projects investigating a broad range of ethical and practical issues, including a 
large  body  of  work  aimed  at  enhancing  the  public  understanding  of  genetic 
science  and  its  impact  on  society  generally  (for  example,  legal  and  policy 
outcomes,  and  debates  around  informed  consent,  ownership  and  gene 
patenting).71 The ELSI funded research around questions of personal identity has 
focused on race and ethnicity, genetic difference, and pre-symptomatic testing 
for  genetic  disease,  but  comparatively  few  projects  are  specifically  related  to 
gender issues.72 Mary Mahowald’s project into the gender justice effects of the 
HGP  on  women  is  one  exception  (Mahowald  et  al.,  1996;  Mahowald,  2000). 
However, I have been unable to locate any ELSI research on the implications for 
women of, for example,  research on the genetics of intelligence and between 
intelligence  and  brain  volume,  a  large  and  significant  body  of  sex  difference 
research that I discuss in the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
Indeed, while research that purports to have found a genetic component to a 
range of behaviours is well represented in the academic literature (for example, 
Chorney  et  al.,  1998;  Hamer  &  Copeland,  2000;  Hamer,  2004;  Ilies,  Arvey,  & 
Bouchard Jr, 2006; LeVay, 1994; LeVay & Hamer, 1994; Plomin, Defries, Craig, & 
McGuffin, 2003; Spector, 2003) and is almost continually present in the press, it 
does not seem to be as widely represented in the ELSI research program. This 
                                                 
71  Over 550 research outputs in the 11 years between 1990 and 2001, including documentaries, 
educational materials, refereed journal publications and books. For a complete list, see NHGRI 
(n.d.-e). 
72  As I review this in late February 2009, however, I note that the US Department of Health and 
Human Services has reissued a program announcement for funding of research into women’s 
mental health and sex/gender differences research – see http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-
files/PA-09-108.html.     91
‘absence’ is problematic. There are some exceptions, however. In an extended 
discussion  of  behavioural  genetics  prepared  by  Erik  Parens  (principal 
investigator of The Hastings Center project, Crafting tools for public conversation 
about behavioral genetics), 73 both the promise and the dangers of this research are 
made clear:  
Given that those at greatest risk for being hurt are those who already hurt as a 
result of the current organization of our society, there is a special obligation to 
guard  against allowing research aimed at increasing knowledge and reducing 
suffering from being hijacked by the desire to justify the status quo (2004, p. S9).  
 
Parens  distinguishes  between  the  ‘species-typical’  perspective  –  which,  as  its 
name  suggests,  searches  for  traits  or  behaviours  that  are  ‘normal’  –  and  the 
‘individual differences’ perspective, which instead asks why we are different. 
Behavioural geneticists, he says, adopt the latter approach, beginning with the 
“fact of human variation” which can be visually represented by the distribution 
along a bell curve (2004, p. S7).  In the discussion that follows, Parens notes that, 
while  researchers  are  moving  closer  to  being  able  to  understand  causal 
relationships  between  genes  and  phenotypes  through  the  technology  called 
microarray analysis (2004, p. S21), thus far results from behaviour genetics have 
been  modest, and those genes identified in association studies in the future are 
“expected” to be those having small effects (2004, p. S22).74 
                                                 
73  The Hastings Center is an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit bioethics research institute.    
Erik Parens is a senior research scholar with the Center. This report was a collaborative effort with 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and was funded by NHGRI. 
74 Parens adds, however: “One of the few exceptions to the rule is the discovery that an 
allele for an enzyme involved in the metabolism of alcohol may help to explain why 
some  people  are  less  prone  to  excessive  alcohol  consumption  than  others.  (Too,  if 
Alzheimer’s disease falls within the purview of behavioral genetics, then we should note 
that association studies have found that individuals with a copy of a particular allele 
[APOE4] are six times as likely to develop the common form of Alzheimer’s disease as 
those without it” (2004, p. S22).   92
 
Be that as it may, there are a number of behavioural traits listed in the Online 
Mendelian Inheritance in Man (OMIM) database, and while many of these are 
trivial – for example, handedness (2p12-q22), tongue curling, and arm folding 
and hand clasping patterns (none of which have an identified gene locus) – some 
are potentially of considerable social significance. These include behaviours such 
as novelty seeking (11p15.5); susceptibility to tobacco addiction (9q22.1, 5p15.3, 
20q13.2-q13.3,  19q13.2);  to  alcoholism  (13q14-q21,  4q22,  4p13-p12),  and 
neuroticism  (including  anxiety  –  mapped  to  17q11.1-q12).    Intelligence  –  the 
heritability of which OMIM notes is likely to be due to multiple genes – has been 
mapped to genes on chromosomes 2q, 4, and 6p. Finally, male homosexuality has 
been linked to a gene called the SMCY gene on the Y chromosome and also, of 
course, to Xq28, which OMIM lists as the location of the  ‘disorder’ in the form of 
[?Homosexuality, male]. 75  
 
What is encouraging in Parens’ report, however, is his discussion of a major 
study which showed a strong correlation between a genotypic condition (low 
MAOA levels) and an environmental situation (abuse) in developing antisocial 
behaviour of some kind (2004, p. S22; see also Caspi et al., 2002), thus proving the 
importance  of  taking  an  interactive  approach  to  understanding  behavioural 
outcomes.  Parens concludes by saying that: 
If  it  would  be  a  serious  mistake  for  behavioral  geneticists to forget that their 
findings  can  be  used  to  justify  inequalities,  it  would  be  an  equally  serious 
mistake for commentators to ignore how the individual-differences perspective 
of behavioral genetics research could be put to salutary purposes … while the 
                                                 
75  Last checked early March 2009; see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Omim/getmap.cgi?l306995.    93
individual-differences perspective harbors an old danger, it also harbors a new 
opportunity (2004, pp. S31-S32). 
 
The ELSI Working Group is also careful to distance itself from more controversial 
work in this area, and felt it necessary to release a statement directly commenting 
on claims made by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their  book The Bell 
Curve (1994).  After stating their concern about this and other books with ‘similar 
themes’, they say: 
We are only beginning to explore the intricate relationship between genes and 
environment and between individual genes and the rest of the human genome. If 
anything, the lack of predictability from genetic information has become the rule 
rather than the exception … Genetic arguments cannot and should not be used to 
determine or inform social policy in the areas cited by Herrnstein and Murray 
[eliminating  welfare  to  discourage  poor  women  from  reproducing  and 
developing programs to encourage women from higher socioeconomic classes – 
and thus they argue with higher IQs – to have more children]. Since the lessons 
of  genetics  are  not  deterministic,  they  do  not  provide  useful  information  on 
deciding whether or not to pursue various programs to enhance the capabilities 
of different members of society  (ELSI Working Group, 1996). 
 
 
As well, in their paper on the NHGRIs vision for the future of genome research, 
Francis Collins and colleagues note the poor design and detrimental effects of 
some  research  in  behavioural  genetics.  They  emphasise  the  need  for  “even 
greater responsibility than in other areas” to ensure that research into genetic 
contributions  to  human  traits  and  behaviour  is  robust  and  that  the  social 
implications  are  fully  considered  (2003,  p.  844).  Notwithstanding  all  these 
caveats,76 there can be no doubt that behavioural genetics is a growing enterprise 
(although whether, as a science, it will stand the test of time is, of course, yet to 
be seen).77  
                                                 
76  Including a very clear explanation of the limitations on behavioural genetics that can be found in 
the HGP pages at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/behavior.shtml. 
77  See also NHGRI (2000, Part D, para 5).   94
Although the genetics of sex difference and sex differentiated behaviour are not 
an obvious focus, extra-mural researchers funded by ELSI have considered many 
other  issues  of  direct  relevance  to  women,  including  difficulties  surrounding 
reproductive decision-making (for example, prenatal screening and diagnosis, 
amniocentesis, ‘designer’ babies and genetic engineering more generally), and 
the impact on women of testing for breast cancer susceptibility genes. They have 
also conducted research with, or of particular interest to, women belonging to 
specific ethnic groups including Mexican, African-American, Native American 
and Jewish women. As well, the ELSI program administers a specific grant for 
advancing novel science in women’s health research, and has directly funded 
research  undertaken  by  feminist  critics  on  such  questions  as  the  impact  of 
genome  information  on  society  and  of  the  genome  project  on  women 
(Mahowald, 1993, 1994, 1996; Mahowald et al., 1996; Nelkin, 1993a, 1993b; Nelkin 
& Lindee, 1995a, 1995b). 
 
While the ELSI program funds what appears to be a varied and productive range 
of  research,  a  number  of  concerns  –  including  communication  difficulties 
between genetic/genomic and ELSI researchers, the accessibility of ELSI data to 
outside  researchers  and  policymakers,  and  the  need  to  ensure  that  the  ELSI 
research community includes representatives from a range of communities and 
disciplines – resulted in the provision of additional funding to establish Centers 
of Excellence in ELSI Research (CEERs).78 The first four of these were established 
                                                 
78  For a fuller discussion of the concerns that led to the establishment of the CEERs, see Ethical, 
Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) Research Advisors (2005). Funding was provided by the 
NHGRI, DOE, and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD).   95
in August 2004, and two further centres received funding in September 2007.79  
The overall goals of the CEER program are to: 
Transcend  the  boundaries  between  genetic  and  genomic  research  and  ELSI 
research; translate ELSI research to safe, effective and just genetic and genomic 
policies and practices in research, health and non-medical settings; and train the 
next  generation  of  ELSI  researchers  to  ensure  disciplinary  and  demographic 
diversity (Ethical Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) Research Advisors, 2005, 
p. 6). 
 
CEERs are expected to “promote intensive and sustainable interactions” between 
researchers  drawn from all areas of the academy who may have a contribution to 
make  to  ELSI  issues.  As  well,  although  again  there  seems  to  be  no  specific 
mention of gender issues, the CEERs are explicitly charged with “addressing 
potentially controversial issues” and with encompassing a diversity of voices 
(including those of ‘vulnerable groups’), in their development of public policy 
options (NHGRI, n.d.-c, para 2).  
 
The CEERs bode well for furthering interdisciplinary work that recognises and 
validates a multiplicity of approaches to ELSI questions and, since the scheme’s 
inception, the six full CEERs, each with a different research focus, have received 
grants  of  between  US$3.8  and  US$5.6  million.80  Within  their  individual 
                                                 
79  Two exploratory centres located at Harvard University and at Howard University, Washington,  
are also currently funded. 
80  Case Western Reserve University’s Center for Genetic Research Ethics and Law, focuses on “the 
ethical issues in the design and conduct of human genetic research, including issues regarding the 
protection of human subjects in research”; The Duke Center for the Study of Public Genomics, will 
“gather and analyze information about the role of publication, data and materials sharing, 
patenting, database protection and other practices that may affect the flow of information in 
genomics research”; University of Washington’s Center for Genomic Health Care and the 
Medically Underserved, conducts “research on the ethical, legal and social factors that influence the 
translation of genetic information to improved human health”; Stanford University School of 
Medicine’s Center for Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics, “will focus on the ethical, 
legal and social consequences of uncovering the genomic contributions that may contribute to 
behavioral and neurological conditions”; Center for Genomics and Society at University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill, “is conducting an integrated set of research, policy, and education activities 
focused on new or heightened ELSI issues resulting from large-scale gene discovery and disclosure   96
overarching  research  foci,  diverse  research  questions  are  being  pursued.  Of 
particular  interest  for  women  are  the  programs  being  undertaken  at  the 
University  of  Pennsylvania  Center  for  the  Integration  of  Genetic  Healthcare 
Technology  (Penn  CIGHT),  where  researchers  are  investigating  implications 
around  the ways in which uncertain genetic information is communicated to 
society; and at Stanford, where the ELSI implications of genomic contributions to 
behaviour are the primary focus. For example, in  2006, the Stanford University 
School of Medicine Center for Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics 
(CIRGE) hosted a conference entitled, ‘Interpreting complexity: the scientific and 
social meaning of behavioral genetics’, the object of which was to “explore the 
complexity of gene-environment interactions in mediating behavior, as well as 
the complexity of the relationship between scientific and social interpretations of 
behavior” (CIRGE, n.d.-c, para 3). Speakers at this conference included feminist 
philosopher Helen Longino, whose paper asked whether behavioural genetics 
challenges  or  reinforces  stereotypes;  and  cultural  and  medical  anthropologist 
Nancy Press, who focused in her presentation on issues of phenotypes and social 
construction. Press is also a co-editor of the volume resulting from the five-year 
‘Crafting tools’ project mentioned earlier (Parens, Chapman, & Press, 2006). One 
of the  research premises of this project was: 
If our society is to promote the salutary uses and resist the pernicious uses of 
behavioral genetics, there must be open and informed public conversation about 
what the scientific findings do—and do not—tell us about behavior and about 
who we are (The Hastings Center, 2009, 3rd premise). 
 
                                                                                                                                      
projects”; and University of Pennsylvania Center for the Integration of Genetic Healthcare 
Technology (Penn CIGHT), focuses “on the implications of the communication and use of 
potentially uncertain genetic information” (NHGRI, n.d.-b).   97
A  more  recent  symposium  (in  May  2008)  was  aimed  at  “considerations  in 
measuring the environment, how to tease out the interplay between genes and 
environments,  and  ethical  and  policy  implications  of  gene-environment 
research” (CIRGE, n.d.-c, para 2).  
 
At  Penn  CIGHT,  researchers  are  currently  undertaking  a  sociological  and 
historical analysis of the ethical, legal and social consequences of prenatal testing 
for  Downs  syndrome  and  cystic  fibrosis,  and  are  researching  the  “long  term 
psychological social and medical effects of testing for BRCA1/2 genes on African-
American women and their families” (Penn CIGHT, n.d., para 3). At Stanford, 
current  projects  include  the  building  of  a  ‘master  map’  of 
gene/disease/environment interactions, with a view to providing new ways of 
thinking about how genes and environment interact in disease (CIRGE, n.d.-a), 
and “a multi-method approach to explore how and what scientists think about 
the societal and ethical considerations related to life science research” (CIRGE, 
n.d.-d, para 1). A documentary film on the “biology of spirituality” investigated 
the “biological underpinnings of faith and religious experience” (CIRGE, n.d.-b, 
para 4).81  
 
This range of projects illustrates the difficult political issues ELSI research raises 
for  feminists:  the  first  three  of  these  projects  are  clearly  relevant  to,  and 
                                                 
81  I note that the blurb for this documentary film exemplifies what has been the object of much 
criticism of sociobiological research in the feminist literature; that is, in asking whether “some of us 
[are] hardwired through our DNA to understand God better than others?”(my emphasis) it appears 
to make a pre-emptive assumption of fact (in this case, that God exists) upon which it then builds 
its research.  
   98
potentially beneficial for, women. The final project has no obvious relevance, yet 
a search for a ‘biology of faith’ (see Hamer, 2004), could fuel yet more of the all-
too-easy, vulgar reductionist slippages that are explored in chapter five of this 
thesis: in this instance, from a ‘God gene’ to any number of sex-differentiated 
behavioural genes. In raising this concern, I am not proposing that such a project 
should not be undertaken, merely that this appears to be the type of project that, 
without due care, lends itself to the sorts of popular misinterpretations of genetic 
research that defend a particular kind of status quo.  
 
In sum, ELSI research is wide-ranging and, although health and health-related 
issues are a central focus, there is considerable research being undertaken on the 
social issues surrounding genome research. Some of this research holds special 
interest  for  women.  In  particular,  it  is  encouraging  to  see  clear  statements 
recognising past bad acts, and the possibilities for behavioural genetics to be 
used as support for inequitable beliefs and practices. It is, however, a cause for 
concern that gender is not specifically mentioned in the program priority dealing 
with impacts on concepts of race, ethnicity, kinship and identity, even though it 
can be discerned as a component within the broader range of ELSI research, and 
is the major focus in a small percentage of them. What this overview of ELSI 
reveals is that the gendered implications of genome research are still less well-
considered than are the implications of this research for other areas of social 
concern. 
    99
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A decade ago, Lee Silver forecast a future society in which there will essentially 
be two ‘species’ of humans – the Genrich-human and the Natural-human, so 
distinct  as  to  be  unable  to  interbreed  (Silver,  1999,  p.  282)82  –  and  Damien 
Broderick predicted that those of us now living, or our children, may well be the 
last mortal generation (Broderick, 1999).  Just as these more extreme visions of a 
genetic future have lost their grip on the imagination over time, many of the 
more extreme claims and metaphorical descriptions that surrounded the pursuit 
of the human genome in the early years have been tempered by the complexities 
uncovered  in  its  realisation.  However,  there  seems  little  doubt  that  genome 
research does hold out a realistic promise of enriching the lives of individuals 
through  the  alleviation  of  suffering  across  a  broad  spectrum  of  disease  and 
injury-related conditions. The potential for the elimination of hitherto intractable 
genetic conditions also clearly exists.  
 
In  terms  of  my  specific  concerns,  it  is  also  clear  that  we  are  looking  at  the 
prospect of finding genetic determinants of behaviour, even if for the present a 
degree of uncertainty protects us. This uncertainty, however, is constantly under 
challenge.  That  being  so,  what  is  there  here  that  we  can  utilise  in  our 
conversation, in the world, about biological determinism?  
 
                                                 
82  Silver’s vision goes even further than the futuristic dystopia portrayed in the 1997 movie, 
Gattaca, where genetically enhanced humans – the genetic elite – could still breed with In-Valids 
(those conceived naturally).   100
My walk across campus has reassured me that I am correct in my assumption 
that here, at least, scientists are neither ill-intentioned nor unaware of the wider 
implications associated with their endeavours. Moreover, even if the politics of 
gender are not foregrounded to the same extent in ELSI research as are certain 
other socially significant issues, the genome enterprise is at least not completely 
gender blind. There is some attention being paid both to the specific health and 
social  concerns  of  women  within  the  context  of  research  into  and  practical 
applications of treatments arising from such knowledge.  
 
Importantly,  there  is  an  understanding  that  our  ‘instruction  book’  is  both  a 
treasure chest and a Pandora’s box (Collins, 2003, p. 152). 83 Genome scientists are 
conscious of the ethical, legal and social issues and controversies surrounding 
their  work  and  have  expressed  an  interest  in  conversations  around  them. 
Crucially, without denying a foundation in biology, there is a recognition in the 
associated ELSI literature that even where genetic ‘determinants’ of behaviour 
are proposed, these will inevitably act as part of a complex of genetic, social and 
environmental  elements  and  thus,  that  our  behavioural  ‘instruction  book’  is 
continually  open  to  being  rewritten.  The  assertive  acknowledgement  of  the 
interactive, fluid and flexible nature of ‘nature’ is an important outcome of the 
genome project for feminist body theorists, linking both enterprises in a public 
repudiation of bodies as fixed and stable entities.  Each of these things opens up a 
space  for  alliances  to  be  built  between  scientists,  and  feminist  and  other 
commentators  and  critics  of  future  genetic  research,  to  enable  positive 
                                                 
83  While noting in passing that the unreflective use of metaphors that imply certainty and control, 
while tempered, has not completely disappeared from the rhetoric around the human genome.   101
interventions to be made into some of the more determinist assumptions and 
claims evident in the subject matter discussed in the next three chapters of this 
thesis.   102
 
 
Three 
The bent twig : cognitive sex differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can we imagine a woman, in an interesting situation, dividing her time between 
morning sickness and Malthus on Population … suffering all those flutterings, 
palpitations, whims, and fancies, frequent in the impregnated state, and plunging 
absorbedly into Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Buckle’s Civilisation, or Colenso on 
the Pentateuch? 
James McGrigor Allan (1869, p. cc) 
 
For two millennia, “impartial experts” have given us such trenchant insights as 
the fact that women lack sufficient heat to boil the blood and purify the soul, that 
their heads are too small, their wombs too big, their hormones too debilitating, 
that they think with their hearts or the wrong side of the brain. 
Beth B. Hess (1990, p. 81) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout history, the search for human nature has been accompanied by a 
fascination  with  the  psychological  differences  between  the  sexes.  Although 
research on sex differences has been ongoing, it had become more commonplace 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  century  to  attribute  whatever  psychological 
differences  were  thought  to  be  evident  between  the  sexes  to  the  differing 
environments inhabited by individuals of each sex – that is, to nurture rather 
than to nature. Since the early 1990s, however, there has been an increasing shift 
back toward explanations that rely much more heavily on notions of inherent 
differences in the genetic and hormonal make up of males and females. Two   103
developments have been influential in bringing this shift about. Firstly, as we 
have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  search  for  the  human  genome,  while 
focusing on ‘human’ nature and not on sex difference per se, holds out both the 
promise of genetic discovery to buttress existing beliefs about psychological sex 
differences,  and  provides  the  technological  means  to  extend  such  research. 
Secondly, in the early 1990s, a new iteration of sociobiology arose which focused 
particularly  on  psychological  sex  difference,  and  provided  comfort  for  a 
proliferation of vulgar reductionist theories about women and men in popular 
culture.  
 
Contemporary sex difference research aims to identify and quantify differences 
between women and men in intellectual functions, abilities and behaviours. It 
begins, as such inquiry always has, from an observation that differences exist, 
proceeds to identify and describe these in terms of biological function and then, 
in some cases, extends further into associating difference with social role. In this 
chapter, I first briefly survey the history of theories about human nature and the 
nature of ‘woman’, the sexual dimorphism of the brain, and the impact of these 
on beliefs about the intellectual capabilities of women. Although many of the 
theories I discuss were criticised in their time, I note this only in passing, since 
my focus is on the persistence of such theories, rather than on the objections to 
them. I then turn to contemporary research on sex differences, in the brain and 
elsewhere, and how this has material effects on our everyday lives. Finally, I 
consider whether, how far, and in what ways, current research and attitudes 
have moved away from the earlier versions.     104
From antiquity  
 
Plato, together with his teacher, Socrates, and his pupil, Aristotle,84 may well 
have been “one of the shapers of the whole intellectual tradition of the West”  
(Plato, 1979, Frontispiece), but that tradition has not been kind to women. Indeed, 
it is only in recent times that it has, in only some places and in still limited ways, 
begun to approach the remarkable vision of Plato’s Athenian –   
Almost every state, under present conditions, is only half a state, and develops 
only half its potentialities … so far as possible, in education and everything else, 
the female sex should be on the same footing as the male (Plato, 1970, p. 294)   
 
– or of Socrates, debating the merits of differentiating between female and male 
Guardians in occupation and education in Book 5 of The Republic: 
If the only difference apparent between them is that the female bears and the 
male begets, we shall not admit that this is a difference relevant for our purpose 
(Plato, 1979, p. 233). 
 
This is because these equalitarian sentiments, momentarily heartening as they are 
when one stumbles upon them, are in no way representative either of Plato’s 
views in general, or of the Platonic and Aristotelian intellectual traditions that 
have   helped to shape modern Western societies (see, for example, Spelman, 
1999; Tuana, 1993). Rather, it is precisely this difference between bearing and 
‘begetting’ that has historically been considered of most relevance to questions of 
the relative ‘fitness for purpose’ of the sexes. Specifically, it is the reproductive 
capacities  of  women  that  have  been  constructed  as  the  essential  feature  of 
‘woman’,  as  the  key  source  of  difference  in  cognitive  process,  ability  and 
occupation  between  the  sexes,  and  as  justification  for  social  and  political 
inequality. 
                                                 
84  Socrates c. 469BC-399BC; Plato 427BC-347BC; Aristotle 384BC-322BC.   105
In the creation myth Timaeus, Plato proposes that woman was created only after 
the ‘fall’ and rebirth (as women) of those men who had failed to conquer their 
passions:  
Man is the primary creation, the true form of humanity. Woman is a 
degeneration of the original state of being … Plato implied that mind or reason is 
more perfect than sensation or emotion … they must be “conquered” by the 
intellect of man or he will lose perfection … women, since they were created 
from “those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives” in their first birth, will 
be less capable of such control (Tuana, 1993, p. 7). 
 
This positioning of ‘man’ as primarily associated with mind, and ‘woman’ as 
primarily associated with body, is discouraging, although very familiar. It has 
been  reflected,  refined  and  recycled  by  others  throughout  recorded  history, 
especially by and among men as a basis for having common interests above and 
beyond their individual differences. 
 
Nancy Tuana notes that Plato’s seemingly liberal approach to the sexes in The 
Republic is further nullified through its location within his primary focus on class 
(1993, p. 54). While women situated further up the class hierarchy are considered 
to be ‘better’ than men at the lower levels, they are physically and intellectually 
weaker  and  therefore  ‘less’  than  the  men  within  their  own  class.  Thus,  for 
example, while women in the Guardian class might share in all the activities of 
the male Guardians, they, along with their children, are to be held in common by 
the men who will win, as a reward for service “in war and in other activities … 
more frequent opportunities to sleep with women” (Plato, 1979, p. 241). Plato’s 
vision is, then, an early example of a sexual hierarchy (within which the male is 
more perfect than the female ab initio), further complicated by eugenic overtones 
in which the characteristics of social class are expressed in the body’s biology.    106
 
Aristotle  accepted  and  extended  this  hierarchy  of  the  sexes,  providing  a 
biological (as distinct from a religious or spiritual) explanation for man as the 
‘proper form’ of human with his theory of heat as the source of perfectibility. The 
less heat generated, the weaker and less perfect the animal. Aristotle reasoned 
that men generate more heat than women, evidenced by their ability to transform 
the male equivalent of menstrual fluid from the red colour of blood to the white 
of semen. Since a female embryo was formed through a lack of the requisite heat 
to “bring it into its proper form”, females were a ‘monstrosity’, a “departure from 
type” (Tuana, 1993, p. 19; see also Battersby, 1999, p. 348). This weaker and colder 
nature, however, was not without purpose since Aristotle further reasoned that it 
is necessary for reproduction, providing woman with the residual matter (which 
man has used up in perfecting his form) needed to nourish a foetus (Tuana, 1993, 
p.  21).  If,  then,  as  Charlotte  Witt  argues,  what  “a  thing  is,  for  Aristotle,  is 
determined by what it can do”, then clearly what woman is, is intricately tied to 
her role in reproduction (Witt, 1998, p. 127).85 
 
Nancy Tuana details how the Aristotelian system of heat-dependent sexually 
differentiated  biology  has  continued  to  influence  theories  of  woman’s  nature 
across  diverse  disciplines  up  until  the  20th  century:  in  medicine,  through  the 
Greek physician Galen, who proposed that a woman’s internal genitals were 
further proof of her lesser perfection (since she lacked the requisite heat to cause 
them to protrude); in Christianity through the writings of Thomas Aquinas in the 
                                                 
85  Although Witt is here speaking about Aristotle’s notion of  the ‘becoming human’ of infants as 
they begin to develop their physical and intellectual abilities.   107
12th century, who argued that God had intentionally made woman less perfect 
than man, in order that she fulfil her generative function; in biology in the work 
of 16th century biologist Ambroise Paré and 19th century biologists Patrick Geddes 
and John Arthur Thomson, and in the work of psychologist Sigmund Freud in 
the early 20th century (1993, pp. 21-25; see also Russett, 1989, pp. 89-92).  As well, 
Plato’s dualistic constructions of man and woman, mind (soul) and body, reason 
and passion, echo down the centuries, entwined around and within Aristotle’s 
biology  and  carried  forward  through  the  writings  of  historians,  theologians, 
alchemists, scientists and philosophers (see Tuana, 1993, in particular chapters 2, 
3 & 8).  
 
This, then, in broad terms, is the intellectual legacy inherited by 19th century 
scientists and scholars engaged in addressing questions of sex differences within 
human nature: that woman is, by nature, weaker/colder, less perfect than man, by 
a design that ties her purpose to reproduction and thus, to the body. In Mary 
O’Brien’s  words,  women  were  positioned  as  “the  handmaidens  of  biological 
continuity” (1981, p. 19).  
 
The Victorians 
 
The 19th century was an especially fertile period for theories about difference.  
Differences between men and women, and between those of different races, are 
entwined  in  much  of  the  Victorian  literature  as  are  taken-for-granted,  and 
therefore often unexpressed, assumptions about class difference. I will not be 
considering here those themes of racial and class difference evident in the works   108
under discussion, but will rather confine myself to picking out only those aspects 
of the theories that are relevant to perceptions of sex difference.86  
 
Herbert Spencer clearly expresses the widespread belief about these differences: 
That  men  and  women  are  mentally  alike,  is  as  untrue  as  that  they  are  alike 
bodily. Just as certainly as they have physical differences which are related to the 
respective parts they play in the maintenance of the race, so certainly have they 
psychical differences, similarly related to their respective shares in the rearing 
and protection of offspring (1985, first published 1873, p. 17).87 
 
Spencer’s was just one of many voices raised in this debate throughout the 19th 
century,  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  Cynthia  Eagle  Russett  attributes  the 
renewed  ‘liveliness’  of  interest  in  the  subject  to  the  emergence  of  a  more 
empirical ‘sexual science’ that was fuelled by developments across a number of 
fields of inquiry, including physical anthropology, psychology, sociology and, in 
particular, to the rise of the new field of biology, based upon evolutionary theory 
(1989, pp. 3-5).  
 
The science of phrenology, for example, begun in the early 1820s by Franz Joseph 
Gall,  proposed  that  one’s  character  is  revealed  by  the  shape  of  the  skull. 
Phrenology confirmed many of the conventional distinctions between the sexes – 
that the superior faculty in men was intellect, in women, emotion; that men were 
more combative, women more “timid and careful”; that men have more interest 
in sexual love and women in maternal love, and that men have greater self-
esteem  while  women  are  more  vain.  More  positively,  Russett  notes  that 
                                                 
86  For a comprehensive discussion of the racial science of the 19th century, see Stephen Jay Gould’s 
The mismeasure of man (1996).  
87  Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), philosopher, and coiner of the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ which 
is often incorrectly ascribed to Charles Darwin.     109
phrenology was reformist in nature, recognising that human nature was both 
“malleable”  and  “improvable”,  and  supporting  women’s  professional  and 
personal aspirations in areas traditionally reserved for men (1989, pp. 16-22). 
Interestingly,  unlike  the  tenor  of  much  vulgar  reductionist  theory  today, 
phrenology “did not insist on the cultivation of separate spheres” but, rather, 
“accommodated,  even  encouraged,  distinctly  unconventional  aspirations  for 
women” (1989, p. 22). Further, in asserting that the brain is the instrument upon 
which the mind depends, it complicated the independence of mind from body, 
challenging  both  contemporary  religious  belief  and  Cartesian  notions  of  a 
mind/body split.  
 
Since  the  conformation  of  the  skull  could  not  be  empirically  linked  to 
observations  of  temperament  and  intellectual  ability,  however,  phrenology’s 
‘science’ did not stand up to scrutiny and was dismissed by the wider scientific 
community (1989, pp. 22-24). Yet scientists did not abandon pursuit of a means of 
establishing  relative  intelligence;  and  these  other  means  of  inquiry  into 
differences  of  race  and  sex  stepped  back  not  only  from  the  scientific 
underpinnings  of  phrenology,  but  also  from  it’s  somewhat  more  enlightened 
views on the malleability of nature. Subsequent scientific endeavours put woman 
firmly back in her place, bearing children and caring for the household.  
 
The first of these, the study of craniology, used skull size, facial angle, and the 
size and weight of the brain to determine the relative intelligence of the different 
races and sexes. It will be immediately obvious, as indeed it was to many people 
at the time, that the use of brain size and weight as a measure of intelligence has   110
serious flaws, primarily, of course, the ‘elephant’ problem.88 Nevertheless, the 
notion of greater brain size as an indicator of superior intelligence flourished in 
the later 19th century, often via breathtakingly tortuous logic when the facts were 
inconsiderately contrary.89 The most well-known of the craniologists, Paul Broca, 
and others of his school, concluded from the data they collected that male brains 
always outweighed women’s brains. Stephen Jay Gould points out that Broca, 
despite recognising that part of this difference in brain weight between men and 
women was a consequence of average differences in body size, “made no attempt 
to measure the effect of size alone, and actually stated that he didn’t need to do 
so”: 
We might ask if the small size of the female brain depends exclusively upon the 
small size of her body … But we must not forget that women are, on the average, 
a little less intelligent than men … We are therefore permitted to suppose that the 
relatively  small  size  of  the  female  brain  depends  in  part  upon  her  physical 
inferiority and in part upon her intellectual inferiority (quoted in Gould, 1996, p. 
136). 
 
 
Others drew similarly ill-founded conclusions. Paul Topinard asserted that men 
needed  more  brain  than  women  because  they  were  more  active  (quoted  in 
Gould,  1996,  p.  136),  and  Gustave  Le  Bon  –  whom  Gould  labels  the  “chief 
misogynist  of  Broca’s  school”  –  likened  women’s  brains  to  those  of  gorillas, 
stating  that  women  “represent  the  most  inferior  forms  of  human  evolution” 
(quoted in Gould, 1996, pp. 136-137).  
                                                 
88  Russett quotes suffragette Helen Hamilton Gardener (1853-1925) as commenting that “Almost 
any elephant is several Cuviers in disguise, or perhaps an entire medical faculty” (1989, p. 36). 
Naturalist Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) had a brain that weighed 1,830 grams – well above the 
European male average of 1300 to 1400 grams. Paul Broca (1824-1880) himself had a brain that 
weighed only slightly over the average at 1424 grams, while Franz Gall’s (1758-1828) brain weighed 
just 1198 grams (Gould, 1996, p. 124). Anne Fausto-Sterling discusses both the ‘elephant problem’ 
and the ‘bird problem’ – that is, Cuvier’s notion of estimating the relative sizes of cranial and facial 
bones to gauge intellect – in Myths of gender (1985, p. 37). 
89  See Gould (1996), chapter 3 ‘Measuring heads’, in particular pp. 114-138.   111
The calculated brain weight differentials between men and women – ranging 
from  181  grams  or  over  6  ounces,  to  113  grams  or  just  under  4  ounces  –  
prompted  psychologist George J. Romanes to state: 
Seeing that the average brain-weight of women is about five ounces less than that 
of  men,  on  merely  anatomical  grounds  we  should  be  prepared  to  expect  a 
marked  inferiority  of  intellectual  power  in  the  former  (reprinted  in  Spender, 
2001, p. 11).90  
 
Belief in woman’s intellectual inferiority based on these ‘missing five ounces’ 
remained a feature of the literature until it came under scrutiny in the early 20th 
century,  in  research  undertaken  by  Alice  Lee  of  Karl  Pearson’s  Biometrics 
Laboratory  and  by  Pearson  himself.  Their  criticisms/conclusions  were  also 
supported  by  the  research  of  American  anatomist  Franklin  P.  Mall,  and  by 
anthropologist  Franz  Boas  (Russett,  1989,  pp.  164-166;  Gould,  1996,  pp.  112, 
140).91 From the studies conducted in his laboratory, Pearson concluded that: 
For practical purposes it seems impossible … to pass any judgment from size of 
head to ability or vice versa (quoted in Russett, 1989, p. 165),  
 
while Mall, commenting more particularly on the relevance of the research to 
male and female brains, said: 
                                                 
90  Russett notes that a German scientist reported figures that showed a smaller (140 grams, or 5 
ounces) average difference between men and women (1989, p. 35) than that reported by Gould on 
Broca’s figures (181 grams, or 6.4 ounces). I also note that Russett and Gould differ considerably on 
Broca’s figures for females. Gould gives 1325 grams for males and only 1144 grams for females, 
while Russett gives 1323 grams for males but 1210 grams for females, a smaller average difference 
of 113 grams, or four ounces. 
91  Karl Pearson (1857-1936), protégé of Francis Galton, socialist and feminist sympathiser, was a 
statistician and population biologist, Director of the Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics and 
first Galton Professor of Eugenics (later Genetics) at University College, London; co-founder of the 
journal, Biometrika, and founder of Annals of Eugenics (later Annals of Human Genetics) (Pickens, 
1968; Kevles, 1986, 1993). Alice Lee (1859-1939), earned her doctorate in the Biometrics Laboratory 
at the University of London, and was co-author with Pearson on a number of papers (see Love, 
1979; Porter, 2004; Sweeney, 2001). Franklin Paine Mall (1862-1917), was Professor of Anatomy at 
Johns Hopkins, with research interests in embryology (see Magoun, 2003, pp. 86-87; Sabin, 1934). 
Franz Boas (1858-1942), sometimes called the father of modern American anthropology, was known 
for applying the scientific method to anthropological research, for his views on race as an invalid 
concept, and for theories of cultural relativism (see Boas, 1929, 1965; Williams Jnr, 1996).   112
Until  anatomists  can  point  out  specific  differences  which  can  be  weighed  or 
measured, or until they can assort a mixed collection of brains, their assertions 
regarding male and female types are of no scientific value (quoted in Russett, 
1989, p. 166). 
 
 
At the same time as Broca and others were proposing their various craniometric 
measures to establish the superior intelligence of (educated, white, European) 
males,  others  were  emphasising  women’s  more  evident  involvement  in  the 
procreative process as the main reason for why they could not equal men in 
intellectual matters.  
 
Debates around women participating more fully in education, and in the public 
sphere more generally, mobilised arguments based on both the biological events 
in women’s lives connected to reproductive process, and on the social constraints 
placed upon women as a consequence of their potential to bear children. Thus, 
menstruation was constructed as a recurring weakness, periodically rendering 
women incapable of sustained or intense intellectual labour or, indeed, of logical 
thought: 
Although the duration of the menstrual period differs greatly according to race, 
temperament,  and  health,  it  will  be  within  the  mark  to  state  that  women  are 
unwell, from this cause, on the average two days in the month, or say one month 
in the year. At such times, women are unfit for any great mental or physical 
labour. They suffer under a languor and depression which disqualify them for 
thought or action … imagine a woman, at such a time, having it in her power to 
sign the death-warrant of a rival or a faithless lover! (Allan, 1869, pp. cxcviii-
cxcix). 
 
American, Edward H. Clarke, author of the widely-read and much quoted Sex in 
Education, or A Fair Chance for Girls, believed that higher education placed women   113
at risk of sterility, atrophy of the uterus and ovaries, and masculinisation.92 He 
proposed that girls should study less than four hours a day, and not at all whilst 
menstruating:  
The system is then [during menstruation] peculiarly susceptible; and 
disturbances of the delicate mechanism we are considering, induced during the 
catamenial weeks of that critical age by constrained positions, muscular effort, 
brain work, and all forms of mental and physical excitement, germinate a host of 
ills. Sometimes these causes, which pervade more or less the methods of 
instruction in our public and private schools, which our social customs ignore, 
and to which operatives of all sorts pay little heed, produce an excessive 
performance of the catamenial function; and this is equivalent to a periodical 
hemorrhage. Sometimes they produce an insufficient performance of it; and this, 
by closing an avenue of elimination, poisons the blood, and depraves the 
organization. The host of ills thus induced are known to physicians and to the 
sufferers as amenorrhoea, menorrhagia, dysmenorrhoea, hysteria, anemia, 
chorea, and the like. Some of these fasten themselves on their victim for a 
lifetime, and some are shaken off. Now and then they lead to an abortion of the 
function, and consequent sterility (2006, first published 1875, pp. 11-12).93 
 
 
In the United Kingdom, Henry Maudsley echoed these sentiments, claiming that, 
in deciding whether females should be educated in ways that had been designed 
for males, it was “needful to consider whether this can be done without serious 
injury to her health and strength” (1985, first published 1874, p. 77). 94 He pointed 
out that the ‘real educational strain’ would coincide with puberty, which in itself 
places great demands on the not-inexhaustible resources of the body. Women’s 
bodies and minds, unlike those of men, “for one quarter of each month during 
the best years of life [are] more or less sick and unfit for hard work” (1985, first 
published 1874, p. 86). Such education as was provided to women must, then, be 
adapted to their, 
                                                 
92  Edward H. Clarke (1820-1877), was a physician and medical writer in private practice in Boston, 
and Professor of Materia Medica at Harvard Medical School until 1872.  
93  ‘Catamenia’ = the menstrual discharge. 
94  Henry Maudsley (1835-1918), had a distinguished career as a physician, and was professor of 
medical jurisprudence at University College from 1869-1879 (see Anonymous, 1918).    114
… foreordained work as mothers and nurses of children … For, it would be an ill 
thing, if it should so happen that we got the advantages of a quantity of female 
intellectual work at the price of a puny, enfeebled, and sickly race (1985, first 
published 1874, p. 81). 
 
 
While many women, and some few men, raised their voices in opposition to 
these views,95 society’s need for women to bear children, and to continue in their 
social roles confined to the private sphere as homemakers and carers, is similarly 
tied  to  woman’s  biological  ‘nature’  in  other  late  19th  and  early  20th  century 
discourses.   
 
Resolving the biological distinction in this way enabled the active promotion of 
social  distinctions.  Edward  Drinker  Cope’s  catalogue  of  traits  ‘proved’  that 
woman was the more infantile of the sexes and, by extension, that “Woman is no 
longer a misbegotten man. She has become an unevolved man” (Tuana, 1993, p. 
44).96 Cope argued against women’s suffrage on the basis that men have a greater 
capacity for rational processes and for mechanical skill. While women have a 
greater  aesthetic  sense,  he  asserted  that  they have less endurance for mental 
strain, and therefore more easily “breakdown under stress” (1985, first published 
1888,  p.  211).  The  effect  of  a  maternal  instinct  “in  those  departments  where 
affection  should  not  enter”  –  that  is,  rationality,  logic  and  justice  –  rendered 
woman man’s inferior (1985, first published 1888, pp. 211-212).  
 
                                                 
95  See, for example, the rebuttals reprinted in Newman, 1985. For a contemporary discussion of the 
politics of menstruation see Emily Martin’s The woman in the body (2001). 
96  Edward Drinker Cope (1840-1897), American paleontologist, in later years curator of the 
National Museum in Washington, D.C. (1884), Professor of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at 
the University of Pennsylvania (1895-1897), and President of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (1896) (see Davidson, 1997). For Cope’s list of traits see Tuana (1993), p. 43.   115
Canadian-born author Grant Allen, while claiming to be an enthusiast on the 
‘Woman Question’, nevertheless also believed that since most women must be 
mothers,  they  “should  therefore  be  trained,  physically,  morally,  socially,  and 
mentally,  in  the  way  best  fitting  them  to  be  wives  and  mothers”  (1985,  first 
published 1889, p. 127).97 Allen held that women who were educated like men 
“became  unsexed  in  the  process,  and  many  others  acquired  a  distaste,  an 
unnatural distaste, for the functions which Nature intended them to perform” 
(1985, first published 1889, p. 128). In particular, the education of women of the 
‘cultivated classes’ had rendered them unfit for their roles as wives and mothers 
since  many  refused  marriage  and,  following  Maudsley,  Allen  declared  that 
others who did marry produced only ‘enfeebled’ descendants.  In his view, those 
who refused marriage or, for some other reason remained a “self-supporting 
spinster”  were  an  abnormality  and  a  “deplorable  accident”,  and  to  educate 
women for occupations other than motherhood was to “sacrifice the race to a 
handful of barren experimenters” (1985, first published 1889, p. 130).  
 
In a similar vein, Canadian gynaecologist A. Lapthorn Smith, argued that the 
“duties of motherhood are direct rivals of brain work” and that educated women 
would be unable to please or be pleased by men. Writing in 1905, Lapthorn Smith 
asserted that women were then in worse health than in the past, and blames this 
on their over-education,  
                                                 
97  Grant Allen (1848-1899), born Wolfe Island, Canada but spent most of his adult life in England. 
Science writer turned prolific novelist, his best known and in its time controversial work is ‘The 
Woman Who Did’, about a woman who defies convention to have a child out of wedlock, 
published in 1895 (available at Project Gutenberg http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4396).    116
… which first deprives them of sunlight and fresh air … second, takes every drop 
of  blood  away  to  the  brain  from  the  growing  organs  of  generation;  third, 
develops their nervous system at the expense of all their other systems … fourth, 
leads them to live an abnormal single life … fifth, raises their requirements so 
high that they can not marry a young man in good health (1985, first published 
1905, p. 149).98 
 
 
In our reading of these passages today, most of us, I suggest, would react with 
amusement (and some horror) that such assumptions could be made, that such 
views  could  be  pronounced  so  seriously,  with  such  finality,  and  hold  such 
popular general appeal. Yet, these were deeply held beliefs, which had a very 
real impact on the ways in which women and men were organised, policed, and 
lived  their  lives,  and  they  were  beliefs  with  the  whole  weight  of  scientific 
authority behind them. Are we doing any better in the 21st century? Or is our 
reliance upon, and willingness to defer to the authority of scientific method, as 
oftentimes similarly deep and unexamined?  
In  the  twentieth  century  sex  and  scientific  inquiry  continue  their  uneasy 
relationship  in  new  areas  with  new  vocabularies  –  hormonal  research,  brain 
lateralization, and sociobiology among them. The level of discourse is in every 
way  more  sophisticated,  and  the  content  less  overtly  tendentious  …  Still,  the 
historical emphasis on difference continues to be put to the use of an ideology of 
incapacity, though the two concepts are not logically linked (Russett, 1989, p. 14). 
 
 
 
Modern times 
 
In January 2005, the then Harvard University President, Lawrence H. Summers, 
was  at  the  centre  of  controversy  over  remarks  he  made  to  a  conference  on 
diversifying  the  science  and  engineering  workforce.99  In  his  unscripted 
comments, Summers proposed three “broad hypotheses” as explanations for the 
                                                 
98  A. Lapthorn Smith (1855-?) was Professor of Clinical Gynaecology at Bishop’s University, 
Quebec, Canada. 
99  National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering 
Workforce, 14 January 2005.   117
shortage of women in “high-end scientific professions”: the “high-powered job 
hypothesis”,  the  “different  availability  of  aptitude  at  the  high  end”,  and 
“different socialization and patterns of discrimination in a search” (2005b, para 
2).  
 
Summers’ discourse on variance in aptitude between women and men, resulting 
in an estimate of five to one in men’s favour ‘at the high end’, provoked outrage 
amongst women in the conference audience, and widespread media coverage 
both in the United States and abroad (Angier & Chang, 2005; BBC News, 2005; 
Dobbs, 2005; Jaschik, 2005; Kleinfeld, 2005; Lawson, 2005; Taylor Jnr, 2005). Based 
on  available  newspaper  reports,  indignation  appears  to  have  been  focused 
primarily around this question of sex differences in aptitude. However, Summers 
in  fact  wove  together  all  three  hypotheses  using  two  additional  strands  of 
difference, both of which are also problematic.  
 
Summers first frames his discussion of the high-powered job hypothesis around 
(particularly married) women not wanting to undertake a job that requires an 80-
hour-a-week  commitment  –  effectively,  women  do  not  want  high-powered 
intense work, and those few who do are predominantly unmarried and childless. 
Why most women do not want this work is then inferred – they prefer, and thus 
make a choice rather to be married and to have children; although the reason   118
why they make this ‘choice’ – and why it is not expected of married men – is not 
explored.100  
 
What is then explored in some detail is the “reasonably strong evidence of  taste 
differences  between  little  girls  and  little  boys”.  The  evidence  is  provided  by 
anecdotes of experiences in kibbutzim in Israel, the toy preferences of his two-
and-a-half  year-old  twin  daughters,  and  his  assertion  of  the  failure  of  the 
‘socialization  hypothesis’  to  account  for  these  (Summers,  2005b,  para  5).101 
Summers concludes that: 
So my best guess, to provoke you, of what’s behind all of this is that the largest 
phenomenon,  by  far,  is  the  general  clash  between  people’s  legitimate  family 
desires and employers’ current desire for high power and high intensity, that in 
the special case of science and engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude, 
and particularly of the variability of aptitude, and that those considerations are 
reinforced  by  what  are  in  fact  lesser  factors  involving  socialization  and 
continuing discrimination (2005b, para 6). 
 
That  someone  of  Summers’  stature  would  make  such  claims  and  draw  such 
conclusions, albeit in a relatively informal and unconsidered way, is testament to 
the  current  resurgence  and  renewed  strength  of  Russett’s  ‘ideology  of 
incapacity’, even within erstwhile educated circles.102 Within the context of the 
whole argument, and despite the nod to ‘people’s legitimate family desires’, there 
is a deafening silence around the social constraints that may be imposed upon 
men  by  their  ‘family  desires’;  it  is  simply  assumed  they  have  none.  Again, 
                                                 
100  Although Summers does, later in his speech, give some recognition to the difficulties of 
obtaining child care, I note that this in itself features as a problem for women but not for men. 
101  For a discussion of the differing perspectives on sex differentiation of roles in kibbutzim, see 
Carol Tavris and Carole Offir (1977, pp. 285-291). 
102  In a letter to the Harvard community dated 19 January 2005, Summers apologised, saying “I 
deeply regret the impact of my comments and apologize for not having weighed them more 
carefully” (Summers, 2005a, para 1). Summers resigned from his post as president effective June 
2006, after a five-year tenure that encompassed other controversies, including the decrease in 
numbers of women appointed to tenured positions at Harvard during his time as president 
(Goldenberg, 2005).    119
women’s cognitive and reproductive capacities are linked, and then conflated 
with their social roles as wives and mothers. Yet again, women’s (but not men’s) 
aptitudes, ‘choices’ and tastes all converge to explain and excuse the status quo 
through a particularly gendered recourse to nature.  
 
Carol Bacchi revealed for us this predicament:  that women are constantly being 
put into the position of casting ourselves as the problem to be ‘fixed’. The link 
between desire, choice, and biology is not explicit for men, as it is for women.   
Summers’  comments  illustrate  this  point  very  nicely.  He  is  no  more  able  to 
contemplate male biology in terms of constraint than the previous history of male 
scholarship  suggests.  Male  biology  is  advantaged  within  the  context  of  social 
choice, while women’s choices are configured as constrained by a disadvantaged 
biology. The recourse to nature applies only to women – there is no such recourse 
to nature in men’s biology. 
 
As  we  have  seen,  in  the  past  scientific  explanations  of  sex  differences  have 
tended to conform to the existing social structures and popular views on the 
place  of  women  and  men  in  society.  So  we  must  ask  of  the  contemporary 
scientific research on sex differences, how far, and in what ways, does it help to 
shift us from the received wisdom of the past and its trenchant preoccupation 
with  linking  ‘women’s  nature’  to  ‘women’s  place  in  society’,  and  its  equally 
trenchant complacency about men’s nature? 
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Research into sex differences in modern times has conventionally fallen within 
two  broad  categories  of  investigation:  cognitive  ability,  and  preferences  and 
behaviour. Sex difference in cognitive ability is still most often studied within the 
three general cognitive domains of verbal, visuospatial and quantitative abilities 
(Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), relying on various test instruments administered to a 
general population and also to populations with specific brain injuries.  Research 
into  human  sex  differences  in  preference  and  behavior  often  draws  its 
conclusions from studies of individuals with congenital hormonal abnormalities 
(for example, girls with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH));103 with naturally 
occurring variations in prenatal hormone levels (such as in females with a male 
twin; see Miller, 1998), as well as from studies of animal models (thus making 
assumptions of comparability with humans).  
 
Throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st century, sex difference 
research  generally  has  not  only  continued  but  has  been  extended  and 
reinvigorated by the genome and post-genome research juggernaut. With the 
completion  of  the  Human  Genome  Project  and  the  advent  of  powerful  new 
genetic  technologies,  the  field  now  includes  research  on  sex  dimorphic  gene 
expression  (Becker  et  al.,  2008);  non-reproductive  sex  differences  consequent 
upon the chromosomal differences in males and females (that is, that males are 
XY, females XX), and an emergent body of research on the phenotypic effects of 
                                                 
103  CAH girls are relied upon widely in the research literature to establish hormonal influences on 
sex differentiated behaviour in humans; however, the Committee on Understanding the Biology of 
Sex and Gender differences conclude that: “For all behaviors studied, the differences between 
females with CAH and unaffected females are less than the differences between typical males and 
typical females” (Wizemann & Pardue, 2001, p. 93), with the implication that the influence of sex-
related socialisation must be considered.    121
sex difference generally at the molecular level (see Wizemann & Pardue, 2001, 
pp. 28-78).  
 
As  well  as  providing  the  means  for  newer  areas  of  inquiry,  new  genetic 
knowledge  and  techniques  are  being  utilised  to  extend  and  deepen 
understanding within some of the more familiar research approaches. A brief 
excursion into this literature demonstrates the extensive range of characteristics, 
abilities and behaviours that are reported to differ naturally between the sexes: 
there  are  accounts  of  differentiation  as  a  result  of  brain  structure    and  sex 
hormones  (Hampson  &  Kimura,  1992;  Kimura,  1992,  2000;  McEwen,  1999; 
McEwen,  Alves,  Bulloch,  &  Weiland,  1998);  relative  volume  of  certain  brain 
regions (Goldstein, Kennedy, & Caviness Jnr, 1999; Reiss, Abrams, Singer, Ross, 
&  Denckla,  1996),  and  hemispheric  asymmetry,  lateralisation  and  differential 
hemispheric  reliance  for  language  tasks  (Harshman,  1985;  Hiscock,  Inch, 
Hawryluk, Lyon, & Perachio, 1999; Jancke, Schlaug, Huang, & Steinmetz, 1994; 
Kansaku & Kitazawa, 2001; Kimura, 2000; Shaywitz et al., 1995).  
 
The  consequences  of  these  somatic  differences  are  reported  to  include 
behavioural sex differences in: toy choice (Alexander, 2003; Alexander & Hines, 
1994, 2002; Berenbaum & Hines, 1992; Campbell, Shirley, Heywood, & Crook, 
2000)  and  playmate  choice  (Benenson,  Morganstein,  &  Roy,  1998;  Hines  & 
Kaufman, 1994; Maccoby, 1980, 1999); play (Hines & Kaufman, 1994; Maccoby, 
1988,  1999;  O'Brien  &  Huston,  1985;  Servin,  1999)  and  exercise  behaviours 
(Jonasen,  2007;  McDonald  &  Thompson,  1992);  aggression  (Maccoby,  1999; 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974); pain perception (Berkley & Holdcroft, 1999; Berkley,   122
2000; Gear et al., 1996; Hama, 2004), and occupational choice (Bielby & Baron, 
1986; Esgate & Flynn, 2005; Govier, 1998; Govier & Feldman, 1999; Kimura, 1992). 
 
It is not my purpose here to evaluate these studies. The scientific literature on  
‘natural’  physical  and  behavioural  sex  differences  has  been  effectively  and 
exhaustively assessed and critiqued elsewhere.104 It is fair to say, however, that 
the  preponderance  of  conclusions  drawn  across  the  entire  spectrum  of  this 
research into sex-based behavioural differences support a male dominant/female 
subordinate status quo.105 That is to say, such research – which finds that from 
infancy  (prior  to  any  possible  socialisation),  females  show  more  interest  in 
people, and males in objects, for example – reinforces the notion that females are 
hardwired to be more emotionally engaged, while males are more mechanically 
or intellectually inclined and more emotionally distanced. Moving from infancy 
into childhood, sex-specific toy choice – dolls for girls, trucks or guns for boys – 
has  obvious  implications  for  claims  about  the  biological  imperatives  behind 
traditional  family  and  social  roles.  Research  on  same-sex  play  partners,  sex-
differentiated play styles and group dynamics – that boys are rougher and less 
democratic in play, that girls are more sedentary, quieter, more egalitarian in 
leadership styles – has similar implications for expectations that are placed upon 
us  all  as  we  mature  (for  example,  the  expectation  that  women  will  be  less 
assertive  and  aggressive  than  men  is  one  obvious  outcome).  Studies  on  pain 
sensitivity  may  work  to  reinforce  perceptions  of  women  as ‘the weaker sex’. 
Finally, of course, findings that occupations are chosen because of sex-specific, 
                                                 
104  See, for example, Bleier (1984), Fausto-Sterling (1985), Hird (2004), Kaplan & Rogers (2003), 
Rogers (2000), Sayers (1982), Spanier (1995). 
105  Of course, some research reports findings contrary to the majority.   123
biologically-based  strengths  and  weaknesses  has  in  the  past  resulted  in  the 
ghettoisation of so-called ‘women’s work’, with poor pay and lower status.   
 
Questions of biologically-based motivations driving occupational choice bring us 
back to President Summers’ comments, and to the extensive body of research 
into sex-differentiated cognitive function and problem solving abilities. Since this 
journey  through  contemporary  sex  difference  research  began  with  claims  of 
differential aptitude in science and engineering (particularly in mathematical and 
spatial  ability,  and  therefore  with  an  inferred  difference  in  comparative 
intelligence between men and women), this set of studies will repay somewhat 
closer attention.   
 
In numerous studies, tests show that women do better than men in problem 
solving tasks involving perceptual speed, object location, ideational and verbal 
fluency, precision manual tasks, and on mathematical calculation tasks. Men, on 
the other hand, do better than women on spatial tasks such as mental rotation, on 
target-directed motor skills, disembedding tasks, navigational skills, and on tests 
of mathematical reasoning.106 In a well-known and often-quoted article published 
in Scientific American in 1992 (reprinted in 2002), Doreen Kimura suggests that 
this is because “men’s and women’s brains are organized along different lines 
from very early in life” (1992, p. 87). She attributes these mixed patterns of ability 
to differing prenatal hormonal environments: 
                                                 
106  Bibliographies of research on cognitive and problem solving ability in particular skills can be 
found in the ‘Further reading’ sections of each chapter of Kimura’s text; but see also Anne Fausto-
Sterling (2000c), Steven Gangestad & Jeffry Simpson (2007a), Melissa Hines (2004), Myra Hird 
(2004), and Bobbi Low (2000).    124
Since, with the exception of the sex chromosomes, men and women share genetic 
material,  how  do  such  differences  come  about?  Differing  patterns  of  ability 
between men and women most probably reflect different hormonal influences on 
their developing brains. Early in life the action of estrogens and androgens … 
establishes sexual differentiation (1992, p. 82).107 
 
As well, Kimura reports that research undertaken by herself and colleagues has 
found that cognitive ability in both sexes is affected by fluctuations in hormone 
levels postnatally – across the menstrual cycle in women, and seasonally and at 
different times of the day in men (1992, p. 87). One such study found that men 
perform better on tests of spatial skill in the (northern hemisphere) spring, than 
they do in the autumn when testosterone levels are higher, while there was no 
seasonal fluctuation in women. Other studies have found that fluctuations in 
women’s hormone levels over the menstrual cycle had broader consequences, 
affecting verbal fluency, articulatory-motor and spatial skills. A further study 
found  that  men’s  performance  on  tests  of  spatial  skill  improve  as  their 
testosterone levels decrease over the course of the day (2000, pp. 119-120).  
 
In  Sex  and  cognition  (2000),  Kimura  notes  that  the  presentation  to  a  scientific 
meeting of the findings of changes in cognition associated with the menstrual 
cycle created both great media interest and a “storm of controversy” (2000, p. 
118).108 She explains that this was reportedly because some women commentators 
were concerned at the possibility that data from this research could be used to 
                                                 
107  The comment that ‘with the exception of the sex chromosomes, men and women share genetic 
material’ is moderated in Wizemann & Pardue (2001, p. 4), who state that “there are multiple, 
ubiquitous differences in the basic cellular biochemistries of males and females … Many of these … 
are a direct result of the genetic differences between the two sexes.” 
108  Kimura indicates only that this scientific meeting took place ‘a few years ago’, which would 
place it somewhere in the mid to late 1990s. The research upon which the discussion relies is that of 
Hampson (1990a, 1990b), Hampson & Kimura (1988) and Saucier and Kimura (1998).   125
reinforce stereotypical views of women as “creatures of their moods” (2000, p. 
119), while others suspected that the studies masked a hidden agenda:  
Unfortunately,  as  a  result,  most  people  missed  the  real  significance  of  the 
research:  that  a  substantial  part  of  the  cognitive  difference  between  any  two 
individuals may well be related to differing hormonal environments, either early 
in life or at the time of testing (2000, p. 119).  
 
The subtext of Kimura’s comment, of course, is that it was the reaction of women 
commentators to the research findings, and the media coverage of those findings, 
that created controversy, which then overshadowed the ‘real significance of the 
research’.  However,  Kimura’s  slightly  exasperated  tone  indicates  that  she, 
herself, perhaps has missed the significance of the commentary, and of her own 
reaction to it. 
 
The fact that hormonal fluctuations affect the cognitive functioning of individuals 
of both sexes is of interest and potential usefulness, when reported and used in a 
way which does not render difference as unequal. If we pause for a moment here 
to take a step back, what is interesting in this report is that the research that 
shows  the  daily  and  seasonal  effects  of  the  hormonal  environment  on men’s 
ability to think is not the research that is chosen to be presented at this scientific 
meeting or that is deemed worthy of reporting.109 Also interesting, the fact that 
the research has been carried out with both men and women is not used here as 
part of a defence against the criticisms of hidden agendas or bias. Clearly, in the 
context of menstrual cycle research, the two individuals of whom Kimura speaks 
are women. This failure to foreground research that finds in men the same kinds 
                                                 
109  Although it may have been presented, we simply do not know. One might assume, however, 
that if it had been so presented, Kimura may have provided some discussion here of its reception as 
a useful comparison.   126
of  biological cycles, demands, weaknesses, and peculiarities as are so readily 
reported when found in women, is an inequality that works to sustain the well-
worn dualistic notions of man/mind/culture, woman/body/nature.110  
 
It is axiomatic that studies of this kind, noteworthy for their political sensitivity, 
will  inevitably  attract  both  positive  and  negative  attention.  Findings  such  as 
these are a magnet for those who wish to perpetuate the long history of scientific 
‘proofs’ of women’s incapacity already demonstrated in this chapter, and their 
use  for  the  perpetuation  of  such  beliefs  must  and  will  be  pre-empted  or 
countered as a matter of course. As well, more measured expressions of concern 
about, and interrogation of, the findings will often be intermingled with kneejerk 
reactions of denial, or with calls for research of this sort to not be undertaken at 
all. And of course, both the findings and the reactions to them – especially the 
more extreme reactions – are a gift to the reporter looking for a good story.111 
Under these conditions, it is naïve at best to expect that the ‘real significance’ of 
this  research  will  be  regarded  as  a  relatively  neutral  and  non-judgmental 
comparison of two individuals of unspecified sex.  
 
In any event, it seems unlikely that the scholarly attention paid to this research 
was solely concerned with its potential political implications (although this may 
well have been the focus of media reports). Where Kimura writes with some 
                                                 
110  As a further example of this failure, it is noteworthy that the section on the ‘Cognitive effects of 
sex hormones on adults’ in the Wizemann and Pardue report (2001) focuses almost exclusively on 
the effects of estrogen on the cognitive skills of women (see, in particular  pp. 97-104).  
111  Though, in this case, there is not enough detail provided to enable me to locate the media 
reports referred to with any certainty.    127
certainty,  Melissa  Hines  is  less  convinced  by  the  evidence  for  hormonal 
influences on cognitive abilities: 
The idea that hormones have activational influences on human cognitive 
performance has come to be largely accepted. However, the precise nature of 
these effects remains unclear, and, as outlined below, the evidence that they exist 
at all is not strong (2004, p. 176).112 
 
Hines expresses deep misgivings about the usefulness of menstrual cycle studies. 
In particular, she notes a number of limitations with the studies conducted by 
Hampson  and  Kimura  (Hampson,  1990a,  1990b,  1990c;  Hampson  &  Kimura, 
1988),  including  that  they  did  not  use  the  same  measures,  and  nor  did  they 
analyse the data in the same way across the four studies. Most tellingly, she 
reports  that  the  only  skills  that  showed  a  consistent  relationship  with  high 
estrogen levels across the studies were “more motor skills than cognitive ones” 
(Hines, 2004, p. 177). Speaking generally of studies of the relationship between 
menstrual cycle and hormonal influences on cognition, she concludes that for a 
number of reasons, these are not the most rigorous way to identify hormonal 
effects on cognition: 
Particularly if hormones are not measured, it is relatively easy to give women 
cognitive  tests  and  ask  them  to  report  their  cycle  phase  or  their  use  of 
contraceptives. This could lead to a situation where many studies are done, but 
only those reporting the expected results are published (2004, p. 178). 
 
Hines  further  notes  that  studies  conducted  on  the  relationship  between 
testosterone  and  cognitive  function in men, and on the influence of estrogen 
replacement on cognitive ability in postmenopausal women, are equivocal. Some 
of the male studies report positive effects, some negative, and some no effect at 
all (2004, pp. 178-179). Similarly, for postmenopausal women, there are some 
                                                 
112  I have chosen to compare Kimura and Hines because both are women, and because of the  
similarities in their professional backgrounds – both are Professors of Psychology, and both have 
been conducting research in this field for over 20 years.   128
studies which show a positive effect of estrogen replacement therapy, but not all 
do  so,  and  in  any  event,  there  are  questions  of  selection  bias,  in  that  better 
educated,  more  health-oriented  women  may  be  more  likely  to  take  estrogen 
(2004, pp. 179-180). In sum, she says: 
Taken together, the results of the many investigations of activational influences 
of  androgen  and  estrogen  on  human  cognitive  performance  do  not  provide 
convincing  evidence  that  such  influences  exist.  Although  some  studies  have 
reported positive results, others have not, and the likelihood that a study will 
find  an  association  between  hormones  and  cognition  is  not  related  to  its 
methodological rigour (2004, p. 180). 
 
 
All  of  this  is  not  to  say  that  Hines  disagrees  with Kimura on the fact of sex 
differences across a range of skills and behaviours. However, the differences in 
approach  to  this  material,  and  the  conclusions  drawn  from  it  by  these  two 
researchers, are stark. At the outset, Hines points to the particular difficulties that 
complicate research in this field. Following Maccoby & Jacklin (1974), she reports 
these as including: over-reporting of significant differences or of positive results; 
the influence of stereotypical beliefs on both the researcher and the researched; 
situational specificity, and the use of different study methodologies leading to 
incompatible results (Hines, 2004, pp. 5-8).  
 
In an account of individual sex differences, Hines lists many as negligible. These 
include general intelligence, vocabulary, reading comprehension, mathematical 
and verbal ability, and spatial visualisation. Small to moderate sex differences are 
found  in  tests  of  two-dimensional  mental  rotation,  problem-solving,  spatial 
perception,  rough-and-tumble  play,  and aggression (favouring males); and in 
computational  skill  (especially  in  childhood),  speech/verbal  production  and   129
verbal fluency (favouring females). Both sexes show substantial differences in 
preferences for same-sex playmates, and sex-specific toy preferences are said to 
be present from a young age and can be large. Studies have found a large sex 
difference favouring males in tests of three-dimensional mental rotation (2004, 
pp.  11-17)  and  she  notes  that  unlike  some  other  specific  skills  such  as 
mathematical ability and visuospatial ability, the sex difference gap in this skill 
has  not  changed  (2004,  pp.  160-161).  She  argues,  however,  that  these  sex 
differences are unlikely to seriously affect women’s occupational success: 
…  sex  differences  in  circumscribed  abilities,  even  if  found  to  be  completely 
determined by hormones [are unlikely to] seriously limit the ability of women to 
succeed at occupations that require a broad range of abilities. For instance, most 
scientific fields require numerous skills in addition to (and probably even more 
than) the ability to rotate a three-dimensional shape in the mind (2004, p. 222). 
 
 
By contrast, in her discussion of mathematical aptitude, Kimura first questions 
the usefulness of using parental and teacher expectations as an explanation for 
boys’  superior  performance,  and  challenges  findings  of  a  real  decrease  in 
differences in math test scores. Citing the 1990 study conducted by Janet Hyde 
and  colleagues  (Hyde,  Fennema,  &  Lamon,  1990),  she  notes  that  there  is 
insufficient detail of the test characteristics used in the various studies to be able 
to draw firm conclusions about any narrowing of the gap between the sexes 
(Kimura, 2000, pp. 67-69).113 With the probable continued existence of the gap 
thus asserted, Kimura’s explanation for it is a straightforward one: girls are better 
at simple mathematical tasks (that is, computation, considered to be the least 
complex task in mathematics), while boys are better at the most complex task, of 
                                                 
113  Similar problems to those Hines associates with the menstrual cycle studies cited by Kimura.   130
finding the correct solution (2000, p. 72). Querying why it is that girls do as well 
as boys in their grades, but not as well in aptitude tests, she asks: 
Is it that women, on average, are more organized in their study habits, and/or 
that they write better exams? Do they work harder, or are they more motivated to 
get good grades? Or is it that they do better when dealing with material that is familiar, 
where solutions have already been presented and novel problem solving is not required? 
(2000, p. 74, my emphasis). 
 
Is it, in other words, that women are less creative? And consequently, perhaps, 
less intelligent? This may not be what is meant, but when read together with a 
following  discussion  about  the  comparable  productivity  of  male  and  female 
scientists (2000, pp. 75-77), it is fair to conclude that this is the direction she is 
heading. Coupling findings that females do less well on tests of mathematical 
aptitude, with statements that males scientists are more productive even where 
professional age and educational background are equal (and making no mention 
of  the  probability  that  the  life  experiences  and  situations  of  these  male  and 
female scientists are almost certainly not equal), she reasons that the aptitude 
tests  predict  competence  in  occupation.  Her  inference  that  women  are  less 
competent  as  scientists,  because  less  competent  mathematically,  is  almost 
inescapable.  
 
A decade earlier, in 1990, Janet Hyde announced: “We have come a long way 
from the belief, a century ago, that women’s brains, and therefore their mental 
abilities, are smaller than men’s” (1990; reprinted in Laslett, Kohlstedt, Longino, 
& Hammonds, 1996, p. 319). Yet Kimura’s work suggests we have not travelled 
very far from the intent of such craniological research. Nor, as it happens, has 
craniology  disappeared.  In  research  published  just  two  years  after  Hyde’s   131
comment, C. Davison Ankney (1992) and J. Philippe Rushton (1992) reported 
that, after controlling for body size, men’s brains are larger and heavier than 
those of women. Since then, there has been considerable research conducted into 
overall  intelligence,  working  memory  and  comparative  brain  volume.  Brain 
anatomy  and  size  and  intelligence  have  been  correlated  in  a  number  of 
contemporary studies (see, for example, Gur et al., 1999; Jensen, 1998; Jung & 
Haier, 2007; Lynn, 1999; Lynn & Irwing, 2008; McDaniel, 2005; Reiss, Abrams, 
Singer, Ross, & Denckla, 1996; Wickett, Vernon, & Lee, 1994, 2000). At the same 
time,  there  have  been  an  increasing  number  of  studies  investigating  the role 
played by genetics in the relationship between intelligence and brain volume, 
with most, but not all, concluding that heritability is significant (see, for example, 
Dambrun  &  Taylor,  2005;  Pennington  et  al.,  2000;  Posthuma  et  al.,  2002; 
Posthuma et al., 2003; Rushton & Osborne, 1995; Schoenemann, Budinger, Sarich, 
&  Wang,  2000;  Thompson  et  al.,  2001;  Toga  &  Thompson,  2005;  Winterer  & 
Goldman, 2003).114  
 
In 1996, Allan Reiss and colleagues reported that, from their MRI studies of the 
brains of children and adolescents aged between 5 and 17 years old: 
The results show that total cerebral volume is 10% larger in boys compared with 
girls … Increased corticol grey matter is the primary contributor to larger brain 
volume  in  boys  …  IQ  is  positively  correlated  with  total  cerebral  volume  in 
children, in particular, with the volume of corticol grey matter in the prefrontal 
region of the brain (1996, p. 1763).115 
                                                 
114  Michael Dambrun & Donald Taylor (2005) argue, rather, that differences in cognitive ability are 
‘largely illusory’, while P. Thomas Schoenemann & colleagues (2000) find that, although still 
potentially important, genetic associations may be ‘quite small’, and that non-genetic factors may 
have a role in the association between brain volume and cognitive ability. 
115  Shaw et al qualify the importance of the grey matter/IQ relationship in children, stating that 
“‘Brainy’ children are not cleverer solely by virtue of having more or less grey matter at any one 
age. Rather, intelligence is related to dynamic properties of cortical maturation” (2006, p. 678).    132
 
Other research with adult subjects also points to the correlation between IQ and 
the volume of corticol grey matter in the brain (Gur et al., 1999; Thompson et al., 
2001).116  In  his  meta-analysis  of  37  studies,  Michael  McDaniel  finds  a  mean 
correlation  between  brain  volume  and  intelligence  of  0.33,  with  a  higher 
correlation (0.40) for females than for males (0.34), and concludes that it “is very 
clear that brain volume and intelligence are related” (2005, pp. 342-343).117 
 
In  related  research,  John  Wickett  and  colleagues  examined  the  relationship 
between IQ, head size, and brain volume in a sample of healthy, right-handed 
adult male sibling pairs, reporting that there “is no longer any doubt that a larger 
brain predicts greater intelligence” (2000, p. 1096). This finding complements that 
of previous work undertaken by the same researchers with a sample of healthy, 
right-handed adult females, which also concluded that brain size was positively 
correlated with intelligence (1994, p. 831). However, what is more interesting 
about  the  later  study  are  the  conclusions  drawn  in  relation  to  the  positive 
correlation between head size and intelligence: “Overall, the indication is quite 
clear that the size of the head predicts the size of the brain” (2000, p. 1119); 
effectively, a “larger head indicates greater intelligence” (2000, p. 1105).  
 
                                                 
116  Gur et al report that women have a higher percentage of grey matter, while men have higher 
percentages of white matter and cerebrospinal fluid (1999, p. 4065). This study differs from other 
studies which have found that men generally have higher volumes of all three (Posthuma et al., 
2003; Reiss, Abrams, Singer, Ross, & Denckla, 1996). 
117   This relationship is tentatively supported by Jung & Haier who note that “At this point, it does 
appear  that,  across  several  studies  and  groups,  the  relationship  of  intelligence  to  white  matter 
volumes, chemical composition, and perhaps water diffusivity may be higher in women than in 
men” (2007, p. 153).   133
All  this,  of  course,  again  raises  the  ‘elephant’  problem,  which  contemporary 
researchers overcome by noting that although humans have neither the largest 
brain nor the greatest corticol volume, recent research has found that we do have 
a “relatively large number of cortical neurons (~11,000 million), and relatively 
high conduction velocity between those neurons”, and, “the prevailing lore is 
strongly prejudiced toward the relatively massive (when compared with other 
species) human frontal lobes as causally related to intelligence” (Jung & Haier, 
2007, p. 136). In other words, when comparing intelligence inter-species, overall 
size is less important than the size of specific areas, the concentration of neurons, 
and the speed of the connections within the brain.  
 
Intra-species, however, the logic of this research seems to lead somewhere rather 
different. Here, the expectation that men will have larger heads (because of their 
generally larger body size) begins a chain of premises: if the size of the body 
predicts the size of the head, and the size of the head predicts the size of the 
brain; if larger brains generally predict greater intelligence; and if men not only 
have a larger cerebellar volume, but do indeed also have larger volumes of the 
‘little grey cells’ and white matter that are implicated in higher IQ, then men can, 
in general, be expected to be more intelligent than women. 118  
 
While the main body of research avoids stating this in so many words, Richard 
Lynn and Paul Irwing confront it explicitly, claiming an adult male advantage of 
                                                 
118   I note, however, that at least one research group finds that while body size is related to the size 
of the head, it does not appear to be related to the size of the brain, and they discount body size as a 
mediating factor in the correlations between head size and cognitive ability (Wickett, Vernon, & 
Lee, 2000, pp. 1109-1110).   134
between 3.5 and 6 IQ points (Lynn, 1999; Lynn & Irwing, 2004; Irwing & Lynn, 
2005, 2006),119 with intelligence defined as “the sum of verbal comprehension, 
reasoning  and  spatial  abilities”  (Lynn,  1999,  pp.  5-6).  Research  conducted  by 
Douglas Jackson and J. Philippe Rushton (2006), using 1991 Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT) outcomes for 46,509 male and 56,007 female 17-18 year olds, similarly 
concludes that there is a 3.63 IQ point difference in favour of males.120 It would 
seem that debates around the relevance of those ‘missing’ five ounces must once 
again be confronted.  
 
Conclusion 
 
So at birth the twig is already bent a little – what are we to make of that? (Wilson, 
1978, p. 132) 
 
Progressively greater insight into and knowledge about human genetics and the 
complexity  of  biological  process,  new  imaging  and  other  technologies,  and 
increased interest and therefore funding, are all contributing to an invigorated 
focus on contemporary studies of sex difference. This program of research, which 
(somewhat naively) I expected to be the most progressive, and the most useful of 
                                                 
119  Curiously, these differences in IQ points are almost the same as the brain weight differentials 
between men and women found by Paul Broca and discussed earlier in this chapter. 
120  Both Lynn and Rushton are controversial figures, this controversy arising in particular from 
their work on comparative intelligence between different racial groups. Lynn is Professor Emeritus 
of Psychology at the University of Ulster; Rushton is a professor at the University of Western 
Ontario, and a Guggenheim Fellow. Rushton is current President and Lynn a Director of The 
Pioneer Fund, a non-profit organisation founded to “advance the scientific study of heredity and 
human differences”, funding research into behavioral genetics, intelligence,     social demography, 
and   g rroup differences of  sex, social class, and race. Despite its claim that it is neutral on social and 
political issues, the Fund has been criticised as supporting racist and eugenicist views. Its first 
president was Harry Hamilton Laughlin 1880-1943, inaugural Director of the Eugenics Record 
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the reductionist ‘vampires’ for my purposes when I began this thesis, has lived 
up to this latter promise in ways I did not anticipate.  
 
Certainly, as I expected, there is enough reputable research to support the notion 
that  biology  plays  a  part  in  the  formation  of  sex-differentiated  psychological 
characteristics across a range of behaviours and skills. And in contrast to the 
historical literature presented here, contemporary research into these differences 
is, as Cynthia Russett noted (1989, p. 14), couched in new, more careful, more 
sophisticated vocabularies. What is most interesting, however, when compared 
to the generally more progressive approach to the fluidity of biology in research 
outcomes within and since the Human Genome Project, is how little the basic 
presumptions  operating  here  have  changed  over  time.  Many  of  the 
preconceptions, inferences, and conclusions drawn from modern sex difference 
research  still  show  evidence  of,  and  are  considerably  hampered  by,  the 
patrilineal heritage elaborated in this chapter.  
 
That is, the implications of the differences are often still critically examined from 
within a deficit model. It is significant, for example, that females, described as the 
‘basic’ or ‘default’ human type within other reductionist models discussed in this 
thesis (and still often leading to a conclusion that males are in some way ‘added 
value’), are here so indisputably ‘the bent twig’, the deviation from the (male) 
norm.  The false question, so eloquently identified by Carol Bacchi (1990) – why 
are women different from men? – permeates sex difference research, with the 
inescapable consequence that women are still positioned as the ‘problem’ (how   136
do  we  accommodate  the  shortcomings  and  peculiarities  of  women?).  On  the 
other hand, as I have demonstrated, effectively nothing at all is said about the 
biological  constraints  operating  on  men,  with  the  result  that  men  are  both 
empowered and freed within this paradigm.   
 
While  I  am  still  entirely  reluctant  to  ascribe  conscious  ill-intention  to  any 
scientist, my ‘walk’ around this particular reductionist enterprise has served to 
re-emphasise the poverty of claiming objectivity, where responsibility for and 
investment  in  the  social  implications  of  one’s  research  are  left  outside  the 
laboratory door. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, for the most part, the 
intent of sex difference research has changed little, and its ways of thinking are 
still  shaped  by  deeply  embedded  cultural  beliefs  about  ‘science’,  and  about 
women and men,  that continue to underpin (some) scientific research and its 
reception and reporting in society. So, if we ask the question: what is the real-
world usefulness of this research, the answer must be that, for the overwhelming 
majority of it, it is pretty much the same as it has always been, and that is to 
reaffirm and support the status quo.  
 
As it stands, then, there is little comfort here for feminists, unless it be in the 
more moderate voices from within the discipline who are explicitly challenging 
not the fact of difference itself, but the presuppositions and implications that are 
evident  in  the  selection  of  questions  to  be  pursued,  the  investigative 
methodologies chosen, the meanings attributed to difference, and the ways in 
which  results  are  being  conveyed.  These  voices  are  relatively  few,  and   137
comparatively  muted,  yet  they  do  demonstrate  the  existence  of  internal 
resistance  to  the  more  familiar  conservative  and  deeply  reactionary  voices. 
Together with the growing accretion of knowledge about the biological bases of 
human  sameness  as  well  as  about  human  lability  and  variability,  these  more 
balanced  approaches  to  the  meanings  to  be  taken  away  from  sex  difference 
research potentially allow us to more positively theorise biology’s role in the 
construction of sexed bodies. And it is to the reductionist stories about the social 
consequences of biology’s contributions to sexed bodies that I now turn.   138
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Four 
‘Just so’ stories? : sociobiology as persistent paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What on earth do you think you are, if not a robot, albeit a very complicated one?  
Richard Dawkins (2006, pp. 270-271)121 
 
We  have  at  last  come  to  the  key  phrase:  genetic  determinism.  On  its 
interpretation  depends  the  entire  relation  between  biology  and  the  social 
sciences. 
 Edward  O. Wilson (1978, p. 55) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sociobiology,  although  ubiquitous  in  popular  culture  and  well  represented 
within  the  academy,    has  always  been  a  vexed  subject,  evoking  equally 
passionate  espousal,  repudiation  and  defence.  The  application  of  biological 
(genetic)  and  evolutionary  determinative  pressures  to  human  society  and 
individual social behaviour is defended by its adherents as scientific method and 
welcomed as an explanation for everyday, ‘commonsense’ observations of the 
world. Its opponents have criticised it for providing support for a discriminatory 
status  quo,  comfort  for  eugenicists,  and  as  having  profound  implications  for 
concepts of free will and individual responsibility, the efficacy of liberal social 
policy, and beliefs about humanity’s unique and superior place in the scheme of 
things. Condemnation of the theories has, in some cases, escalated to attacks on 
                                                 
121  Following Sir Fred Hoyle (see Dawkins, 1999, original publication 1982, pp. 17-18).   139
individual  sociobiologists,  who  have  been  recipients  of  the  full  spectrum  of 
critics’ displeasure, ranging from immoderate verbal attacks, to demonstrations,  
to threats of and actual physical assault, and bomb threats.122   
 
Generally accepted as having its modern beginnings in 1975 with the publication 
of  Edward  O.  Wilson’s  Sociobiology:  a  new  synthesis  (hereafter  Sociobiology), 
sociobiology is interpreted by its many critics and commentators – among them 
distinguished  biologists,  philosophers  and  feminists  –  as  social  Darwinism, 
reductionism, and/or biological determinism (for example, Bleier, 1984; Ehrlich & 
Feldman,  2003;  Fausto-Sterling,  2000a;  Grosz,  1999;  Kaplan  &  Rogers,  2003; 
Lewontin, 2000a; Midgley, 1979, 1983; Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin, 1984; Rose & 
Rose,  2000;  Sayers,  1982).123  Within  the  academy,  Wilson’s  attempted 
subsumption  of  the  social  sciences  and  humanities  under  the  umbrella  of 
(socio)/biology created further conflict (see Segerstråle, 2000, p. 86).  
 
Most importantly for my purposes, sociobiology is widely regarded as anathema 
in much of the feminist literature. Ruth Bleier, writing in 1984, encapsulates the 
criticisms of many:  
 
Because Wilsonian sociobiology is a particularly dramatic contemporary version 
of biological determinist theories of human behavior, because it is powerful and 
persuasive, because it is a particularly good example of bad science, because it 
provides  “scientific”  support  for  a  dominant  political  ideology  that  directly 
                                                 
122   Mary Midgley’s article in the journal Philosophy  (1979) criticising Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish 
Gene is a well-known example of an immoderate verbal attack; Lionel Tiger writes of bomb threats 
and  threatened  ‘kneecapping’  for  “venturing  to  explore  the  role  of  biology in our social lives” 
(1998); and, at a meeting for the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 
Washington, DC in February 1978, E.O. Wilson was doused with a jug of ice-water as he stood at 
the microphone to deliver his talk (Segerstråle, 2000, p. 23).  
123   As Ullica Segerstråle points out, this is also possibly because of its grammatical resemblance to 
the German word Sozialbiologie, linking it to past eugenic practices (2000, p. 26). Past and potential 
future eugenics is discussed in chapter 3.   140
opposes every goal and issue raised by the women’s movement, and because it 
has been aggressively marketed and perceptibly incorporated into our culture, it 
seems a fitting area with which to begin the examination of science and scientific 
theories of biological determinism (1984, p. 15). 
 
 
These attitudes have not softened over time. In a paper written in 1999, slightly 
amended and republished in 2005, Elizabeth Grosz calls for a possible alliance 
between Darwinism and feminism, arguing for a “more open feminist inquiry 
into  the  value  and  relevance  of  any  discourse,  not  just  Darwin’s”.  Such  an 
inquiry, she states: 
involves not only feminist critique, not simply inspection for errors and points of 
contention,  but  more  passively  and  thus  dangerously,  a  preparedness  to 
provisionally accept the framework and guiding principles of that discourse or 
position in order to access, understand, and possibly transform it (2005, pp. 27-
28). 
 
At the same time, she endorses the need to differentiate Darwin from the social 
Darwinian adoption of his concepts – for example, approving of the way Janet 
Sayers,  
carefully distinguishes Darwin’s theory from the more pointedly politicized and 
self-serving readings of the social Darwinists of Darwin’s own times, and their 
current counterparts, sociobiologists (2005, p. 14, my emphasis). 
 
 
While there is ample feminist critical inquiry into sociobiological discourse, there 
is  little  evidence  of  any  such  passive/dangerous  preparedness  to  even 
provisionally accept the framework of sociobiology, or to assess the potential 
effect/value of an integration of its theories (as distinct from Darwin’s theory) 
with  feminist  body  theory.  Unsurprisingly,  most  feminist  interaction  with 
sociobiology  is  focused  on  critique  of  its  ‘suspect’  science  and  of  its  use  in 
support of a male dominant and oppressive status quo (see, for example, Bleier,   141
1984; Fausto-Sterling, 1985, 2000a; Greene, 2004; Leavitt & Gordon, 1988; Nelkin, 
2000; Nelson, 2003; Oyama, 1991; Sayers, 1982; Schell, 2007; Segal, 2001; Spanier, 
1995;  Sperling,  1996;  Tang-Martinez,  1997).  This  is  not  to  say  there  are  not 
sympathetic  and  transformational  feminist  readings  of  some  sociobiological 
theory  (for  example,  Gowaty,  1997c;  Hrdy,  1999,  original  publication  1981; 
Vandermassen, 2005), but these are the exception rather than the rule; they rarely 
intersect directly with feminist body theory, and even more rarely emanate from 
feminists who are not also scientists.124  
 
As  stated  earlier,  and  evidenced  in  the  previous  two  chapters,  there  is  a 
continuing resurgence of interest in finding biological explanations for human 
sex  differences.  That  this  extends  to  a  greater  interest  in  evolutionary  and 
sociobiological theory is evident in the visibility of high profile exponents (such 
as Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker) in the media, the wealth of new texts 
being published in the field, and in the extensive coverage and celebrations for 
the 200th birthday of Charles Darwin on 12 February 2009.125 Given this level of 
interest,  and  with  the  weight  and  pace  of  scientific  research  and  discovery 
discussed in the previous two chapters poised to further unsettle comfortable 
notions of the body’s meanings and agencies, it seems to me that a “more open 
feminist  inquiry  into  the  value  and  relevance”  of  sociobiological  discourse  is 
timely.  Yet  any  such  attempt  has  been  largely  foreclosed  for  feminist  body 
theory, because the general – if not unanimous – consensus appears to concur 
                                                 
124  Janet Radcliffe Richards and Griet Vandermassen are such exceptions; they are philosophers 
whose work attempts to bridge the gap between evolutionary psychology and feminism. 
125  And as I review this, I have received a call for the 2009 Feminist Ethics & Social Theory 
conference to be held this year in Florida, which will include a panel discussion on evolutionary 
psychology.   142
with Zuleyma Tang-Martinez’s assertion that there are ‘irreconcilable differences’ 
between  the  two  endeavours  (Tang-Martinez,  1997).  This  notion,  which  is 
implicit or, indeed, asserted explicitly in the critical literature, requires unpicking 
if you suspect, as I do, that sociobiology may have something to offer to feminist 
conversations about differences, dualisms and related theoretical dilemmas. 
 
In this chapter, then, I propose that conversations between sociobiologists and 
feminist body theorists have become unproductive, and ask whether there is a 
way through the ideological differences that impede more positive dialogue. I do 
this by looking closely at what the sociobiologists actually say, with a specific 
focus  on  the  vexed  questions  of  the  ‘genetic  determinism’  of  both  universal 
human,  and  sex  differentiated,  behaviours.    To  do  this,  I  propose  to  ignore 
Grosz’s strictures against sociobiology and to accept some of its frameworks and 
guiding principles as a starting point for dialogue. 
 
Two questions and a personal belief motivate this approach. Many feminists, 
including  many  of  those  working  within  science  and  sociobiology,  share 
misgivings  about  science  as  it  is  practised  and  constructed  and,  particularly, 
about any science which in its application tends to prop up those status quo 
dichotomies which are detrimental to the interests of women.126  While the many 
excellent reasons for caution and mistrust have been extensively documented, I 
have an apprehension that, together with ideological difference, this may have 
created ‘blind spots’, leading to some misinterpretation and misunderstanding, 
                                                 
126  So, for example, intellectual/emotional; passive/active; hunter/gatherer (lunch chaser/nest 
defender); private/public; competitive/collaborative, and so on.   143
and  obscuring  the  possibilities  for  constructive  communication.  More 
importantly, I wonder: If the sociobiologists prove to be right, how do we salvage 
a  feminist  body  theory  that  has  rejected  their  framework?  Finally,  and 
recognising  that  even  a  generous  reading  of  the  work  of  some  individual 
sociobiologists cannot help but detect an apparent misogyny, I prefer to believe 
(perhaps naively) that, generally, sociobiologists are not engaged in a conspiracy 
to subvert women’s agitation for change/liberation. 
 
Personal beliefs aside, my interest lies in examining the literature for its positive 
aspects (as a foundation for more productive conversations), so I will not be 
preoccupied with instances of misogynist bias here. Nonetheless, I acknowledge 
it, and it is important to remember, as an underlying theme, that sociobiology as 
a field has opened itself up to criticism of its academic enterprise by failing to 
critically scrutinise misogynistic claims in its own literature, and by not more 
vigorously  policing  and  protesting  against  the  extension  of  those  claims  into 
popular culture. This latter point will be taken up in the next chapter, which 
looks at the ways in which sociobiological theory is popularised. 
 
Beginning, then, from an acceptance that academic sociobiology can legitimately 
be called a science (the debate on this question being tangential to my argument 
and too large to encompass here), 127 I aim to step inside sociobiological discourse 
to engage with it as an ‘intelligent reader’ rather than simply subjecting it to 
critique. An intelligent reader in this context is someone who, entering this body 
                                                 
127  But see, for example, Fausto Sterling (1985), Kaplan & Rogers (2003), Rogers (2000) and Rose & 
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of work without preconceptions or distrust, is prepared to read more generously 
and to be open to the positive interpretations available – and to the possibilities 
for rescuing it from its misogynistic leanings – without sacrificing the critical 
faculties of the average intelligent reader.   
 
I have been writing as though ‘sociobiology’ is a discrete and integrated field of 
study, and, of course, like ‘feminism’ it is no such thing. Just as there are many 
feminisms,  which  straddle,  cross  and  recross  boundaries,  defying  simple 
taxonomy,  there  are  different  schools  of  thought  within  sociobiology,  each 
branching out, like evolution itself, as variations from a central theme. Also like 
feminism,  sociobiology  as  an  academic  framework  is  a  very  broad  church, 
drawing proponents from across the academy with disciplinary affiliations to 
fields such as zoology, ethology, ornithology, evolutionary and developmental 
biology, genetics, primatology, paleontology and psychology, but encompassing 
also anthropologists, philosophers, feminists and theoreticians.  
 
Sociobiology  is  an  interdisciplinary,  multilayered,  but  still  relatively  cohesive 
field of inquiry. That is, just as diverse feminisms share a fundamental concern 
for the wellbeing of women, what unites the diverse endeavours that fall under 
the rubric of sociobiology is their shared pursuit of a “systematic study of the 
biological basis of all social behavior” (Wilson, 1975, p. 4). Although it is not a 
well-regarded word, I choose to use ‘sociobiology’ in preference to other more 
neutral terms (such as evolutionary biology/biologist, for example), for a couple 
of reasons. Firstly, it succinctly describes the elements of the discussion – the 
social and the biological – and the relationship between them; and secondly, I   145
want to challenge the negativity surrounding it and begin to reclaim the word as 
a useful one. For my purposes then, ‘sociobiology’ represents the entire field 
(and,  for  convenience,  I  will  also  refer  to  researchers  in  the  field  as 
‘sociobiologists’ throughout, although many of them would not claim this label 
for  themselves).  Within  this  field,  I  identify  three  main  (both  more  and  less 
interrelated)  approaches:  two  of  these  are academic, broadly characterised as 
‘classic’ sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, discussed in this chapter; and 
the  third  is  ‘popular’  sociobiology  –  which,  I  suggest,  is  more  aptly  labelled 
described as vulgar reductionism – which is examined in the next chapter.128  
 
The  first  distinction  that  can  be  drawn  between  ‘classic’  sociobiology  and 
evolutionary  psychology  is  a  disciplinary  one:    with  some  few  exceptions, 
‘classic’ sociobiologists are primarily evolutionary biologists, while evolutionary 
psychologists are overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of psychologists and 
anthropologists.129  ‘Classic’ sociobiologists focus on identifying the evolutionary 
mechanisms of natural selection, and in pursuing this aim they cast a wide net 
and tend to use animal/insect models for specific behavioural examples.130 Thus, 
most of Wilson’s observations on behaviour in humans are drawn from his study 
of  ants;  Dawkins  makes  use  of  a  variety  of  animal  models;  and  feminist 
                                                 
128  Sayers (1982, p. 79) claims that Wilson crosses the line into “‘vulgar’ sociobiology”. 
129  Within these definitions, Wilson, Dawkins, Maynard Smith, DeVore, Huxley, Mayr, Trivers, 
Haldane, Fisher, Dobzhansky, Gowaty and Hamilton are in the former group; Cosmides, Tooby, 
Barkow, Buss, Pinker and Miller are in the latter. Anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, however, self-
identifies as a sociobiologist, and feminist philosopher Griet Vandermassen defends evolutionary 
psychology.  
130  Dawkins has said in interview that he “almost never has humans in mind” (1996, para 5).   146
anthropologists  Sarah  Blaffer  Hrdy  and  Barbara  Smuts131  extrapolate  human 
behavioural evolution from the study of non-human primates.  
 
Evolutionary  psychologists  share  this  interest  in  identifying  evolutionary 
mechanisms. Since they focus specifically on human psychology, their models 
are human, and their interest lies in linking proximate human behavioural traits 
to  ultimate  evolutionary  pressures.    To  do  this,  they  apply  the  concept  of 
conceptual integration to the fields within which they place their study: 
…  to  understand  the  relationship  between biology and culture one must first 
understand the architecture of our evolved psychology. Past attempts to leapfrog 
the psychological – to apply evolutionary biology directly to human social life – 
have for this reason not always been successful … it is now possible to provide 
conceptually integrated analyses of specific questions: analyses that move step by 
step,  integrating  evolutionary  biology  with  psychology,  and  psychology  with 
social and cultural phenomena (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1995, p. 3). 
 
 
The  other  important  distinction  is  in  the  way  in  which  some  evolutionary 
psychologists conceptualise the structure of the human brain as composed of 
both  ‘content-independent’  and  ‘content-specific  devices’,  adaptations  which 
have evolved “to solve long-enduring adaptive problems characteristic of our 
hunter-gatherer past” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995, pp. 49-50). John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides  provide,  as  examples of these: a language acquisition device; mate 
preference  mechanisms;  sexual  jealousy  mechanisms;  mother-infant  emotion 
communication signals, and social contract algorithms (1995, p. 39). They go on 
to state that: 
Our ability to perform most of the environmentally engaged, richly contingent 
activities  that  we  do  depends  on  the  guiding  presence  of  a  large  number  of 
highly specialized psychological mechanisms. Far from constraining, specialized 
                                                 
131  Barbara Smuts is an anthropologist and psychologist, and lists her area of expertise as 
‘biopsychology’.    147
mechanisms enable competences and actions that would not be possible were 
they absent from the architecture (1995, p. 39). 
 
With these distinctions in mind, I will largely discuss both approaches together 
under the rubric of ‘sociobiology’ since, for my purposes, they share a common 
project, albeit each with a slightly different focus.  
 
The Biogram 
 
… although many social and biological scientists are willing to concede that the 
body is full of the most intricately functional machinery, heavily organized by 
natural selection, they remain skeptical that the same is true of the mind (Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1995, p. 57). 
 
All  sociobiology  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  biogram132  that  provides  a 
template  of  qualities  shared  by  all  human  beings,  while  allowing for a large 
measure  of  flexibility  at  the  level  of  the  individual.  A  flexible-within-limits 
biogram for physical characteristics is evident and non-controversial: clearly a 
genetic ‘recipe’ exists which ensures that the offspring of humans are human in 
physical form and function. For the most part, we understand and accept the 
general constraints of this biogram (none of us can fly unaided, for example), the 
specific physical constraints imposed upon individuals by their sex (only women 
bear children; men, on average, are stronger and heavier than women), and the 
social constraints imposed by the wide diversity of human physical attributes 
which range from the relatively trivial (at 155cm tall, I will never be able to reach 
the top cupboard unaided), to the life-limiting.  
 
However, as its name suggests, sociobiology extends the concept of the biogram 
to include psychological and social qualities: 
                                                 
132  Effectively, an evolved biological ‘blueprint, although ‘blueprint’ has been questioned as an 
appropriate metaphor. See Richard Dawkins (2004, p. 105 ff), who proposes instead the use of 
‘recipe’ or the metaphor of the body as a blanket suspended by rubber bands.   148
The evidence is very strong that there does exist a human biogram, a pattern of 
potentials  built  into  the  heredity  of  the  species  as  a  whole  (E.O.  Wilson, 
Foreword, in Barash, 1977, p. xiv).133 
 
While  it  is  commonplace  to  regard  other  animals  (and  insects)  as  having,  in 
addition  to  a  physical  biogram, inherent natures which guide their everyday 
behaviour, this hypothesis is fiercely contested when applied to humans, largely 
because  of  the  implication of a determinative human psychology which then 
predisposes  us  to  certain  social  structures.  Indeed,  in  some  sociobiological 
literature,  ‘culture’  has  been  theorised  explicitly  as  part  of  the  human  social 
biogram  (Carruthers,  Laurence,  &  Stich,  2006;  Dawkins,  1999,  original 
publication 1982; Gangestad & Simpson, 2007b; Hill, 2007; Lumsden & Wilson, 
1981, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2006; Tooby & Cosmides, 1995). More specifically, 
sociobiology,  in  common  with  some  behavioural  genetics  and  sex  difference 
research, theorises both a universal human social biogram (that both men and 
women  share  an  evolved  predisposition  to  altruism,  for  example),  and  a 
differential female and male social biogram on the basis of our differently sexed 
physical biograms. Thus, while the common constraints of the human physical 
biogram  are  by  and  large  uncontroversial,  as  are  the  general  abilities  and 
constraints  of  the  sexed  physical  biogram,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the 
psychological and social constraints that, in sociobiological theory, inform a sexed 
social biogram arising out of our sexed physical biograms. A clearer understanding 
of this implication is a focus of this chapter.  
 
                                                 
133  See also Tiger & Fox (1971) for their concept of a ‘biogrammar’.   149
Positive engagement with sociobiological discourse is not possible without first 
accepting the principle of the social biogram as an organising framework, and I 
do so unequivocally. This acceptance creates a simultaneous sense of comfort and 
discomfort: comfort because it assists in resolving my longstanding disquiet at 
the recognition of evolutionary processes on body but not mind, and because I 
see some potential in this discourse for resolving the problem of the body/mind 
split;  discomfort  because  the  social  biogram,  as  it  is  currently  interpreted, 
provides a basis for claims and social practices which are harmful to women, 
and, as Ruth Bleier notes, opposed to feminist goals.  
 
My  acceptance  of  the  reality  of  some  form  of  social  biogram  is  nevertheless 
unequivocal because the strong social constructionist or blank slate view of mind 
– what has been called the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM)134 – has always 
seemed to me untenable, and the complex interplay of biology and culture is by 
now so well established that holding to this view is clearly indefensible. Indeed, 
commentators on both sides of the nature/nurture divide have long agreed upon 
and voiced some variation on the view that culture and biology are so closely 
intertwined  that  any  attempt  to  clearly  separate  one  from  the  other  is futile. 
Feminist Ruth Bleier says: 
… most importantly, it is not possible the tease apart genetic and other biological 
factors from environmental and learning factors in human development (1984, p. 
6). 
 
And sociobiologist E.O. Wilson says, similarly: 
Here  is  what  I    believe  the  evidence  shows:  modest  genetic  differences  exist 
between  the  sexes;  the  behavioral  genes  interact  with  virtually  all  existing 
environments  to  create  a  noticeable  divergence  in  early  psychological 
                                                 
134  See Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1995).   150
development;  and  the  divergence  is  almost  always  widened  in  later 
psychological  development  by  cultural  sanctions  and  training.  Societies  can 
probably cancel the modest genetic differences entirely by careful planning and 
training (1978, p. 129). 
 
 
Common as this view of cultural and biological complexity may be, though, it 
still conventionally generates a ‘yes, but’ response. ‘Yes, but’, the argument goes, 
‘one  of  nature  or  nurture  is  the  primary  influence,  because  ...’.  Thus,  seeming 
agreement that nature/nurture cannot be teased apart shifts, often imperceptibly, 
straight  back  into  the  dichotomy  everyone  claims  to  be  intent  on  avoiding. 
Indeed, Sarah Hrdy  speculates that:  “Nature cannot be compartmentalised from 
nurture, yet something about human imaginations predisposes us to dichotomize 
the world that way” (1999, p. 147).  And so, despite the best efforts of many 
commentators on both sides of the argument, nature and nurture persist as rival, 
quantifiable elements of a dichotomy.  
 
The  real  argument  then,  it  seems  to  me,  has  always  been  this  one  of 
quantification; or, as Wilson puts it: 
The  question  of  interest  is  no  longer  whether  human  social  behavior  is 
genetically determined; it is to what extent (1978, p. 19).135 
 
The  sticking  point  is  whether  the  biogram  contains  only  the  most  basic  of 
universal behaviours, “primitive drives like hunger and sex” (Fox, 1971, p. 279), 
or whether it provides an evolutionary foundation for far more significant social 
behaviours: 
… we suspect that human biological universals are to be discovered more in the 
generalities  of  eating,  excreting  and sleeping than in such specific and highly 
variable habits as warfare, sexual exploitation of women and the use of money as 
a medium of exchange (Leeds et al., 1975, penultimate para). 
                                                 
135  See also Donald Symons’ discussion of the characteristics of the nature/nurture argument (1987).   151
 
It seems to me that there is an inability on both sides of the argument to accept 
that the social/psychological biogram may be both limited (in its content), and 
limiting  (in  its  effect),  even  though  we  have  little  difficulty  doing  so  for  the 
physical biogram (we both accept it and live happily with it – the diversity of the 
physical biogram is of little hindrance, except in the case of sex). On the one hand, 
sociobiology  invests  the  social  biogram  with  content  of  considerable  potential 
determinative power. On the other, feminist theorists and other critics struggle 
with  the  notion  that  individual  and  cultural  flexibility  may  be  limited  by  an 
evolved social biogram.   
 
Importantly, then, if the social biogram does contain more than primitive drives, 
predisposing us to perform (aspects of) culture only within certain limits, why 
are those limits (seen to be) invested with so much more determinative power 
than are the limits imposed upon us by the physical biogram? And why does 
sociobiology appear to only interpret that performance in ways that tend to limit 
individual flexibility and maintain the status quo? It is when we move out into 
this wider arena of behaviours long understood to be socially constructed (and 
thus assumed to be malleable, open to change), that the social biogram shifts 
sociobiology onto dangerous, contested ground:  
For  feminists,  the  central  problem  of  evolutionary  biology  is  biological 
determinism. Explicitly, this is the idea that the public and private subordination 
of  women  in  our  own  society  is  inevitable  because  the  sexes  have  been 
differentially selected for genetically controlled behaviors (Allen, 1997, p. 516). 
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Genetic determinism 
 
So  we  have  come  at  last,  as  Wilson  says,  to  the  key  phrase.  The  charge  of 
biological determinism encompasses two concepts: firstly, determinism per se, 
that  is,  that  the  genotype  determines  the  phenotype;  and,  secondly,  that 
determinism then directs and limits proximate individual human behaviour, and 
in turn shapes human culture and consequently the status quo.  
 
Any bald assertion that ‘A determines B’ easily lends itself to the critics’ major 
complaint that sociobiological discourse is, like the language of genome and sex 
difference research, just another language of control. As such, it carries with it a 
heavy load of unwelcome baggage: of ideas about hierarchical worth, of ‘natural’ 
place (specifically in relation to women) and, more generally: 
Sociobiology  is  a  reductionist,  biological  determinist  explanation  of  human 
existence. Its adherents claim, [first,] that the details of present and past social 
arrangements  are  the  inevitable  manifestations  of  the  specific  action  of  genes 
(Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin, 1984, p. 236). 
 
 
“Inevitability”  is  the  key  to  understanding  these  readings  of  the  biological 
determinist character of sociobiology as social Darwinism. In this model, nature 
constrains nurture to the extent that there is little room for free will, individual 
improvement, and social mobility, and little point in policies aimed at achieving 
social justice.  The implication here is that in a clash between the two, nature will 
inevitably limit nurture. So, for example, if one is born with an average IQ, this 
will always hold one back, no matter how enriched the environment may be, or 
how relevant IQ may be to an enriched or meaningful life or, indeed, to basic 
civil  rights.  The  differing  selection  pressures  on  women  to  reproduce  and to   153
nurture, acting through a universal and particularly female genetic endowment, 
will  inevitably  lead  to  their  social  subordination  to  men.  This  positions 
sociobiology  as  the  quintessential  essentialist  and  reductionist  discourse, 
implying  closure,  finality,  fixity;  biology  determines/directs  individual  capacity 
and behaviour towards an inevitable end.  
 
Read  in  this  way,  it  is  unsurprising  that  sociobiology  attracts  forceful 
repudiation.  It  is  also  unsurprising  that  this  is  a  reading  and  charge  that 
sociobiologists   have uniformly and vigorously denied. Richard Dawkins, for 
example, in reply to Rose, Kamin and Lewontin, stated:  
Unfortunately,  academic  sociobiologists  ...  do  not  seem  anywhere  to  have 
actually said that human social arrangements are the inevitable manifestations of 
genes... The myth of the “inevitability” of genetic effects has nothing whatever to 
do with sociobiology (1985, para 7). 
 
Similarly, the late eminent biologist, John Maynard Smith, commenting more 
recently than Dawkins, and more broadly on the nature/nurture debate, said: 
There  has  been  fierce  criticism  of  genetic  determinism.  It  is  seen  as  a  deeply 
wicked attitude, which it very probably is, but I don’t know of any geneticists 
who actually hold that view. Holding the view that human beings have genetic 
tendencies  does  not  mean  that  you  believe  those  tendencies  are  inevitable 
(Humanist News, 2001, penultimate para).  
 
 
In  sum,  there  are  a  couple  of  things  going  on  here:  firstly,  whether  social 
(cultural) behaviours reside in the social biogram at all, and if so, why (only) 
these particular behaviours (which fortuitously just happen to prop up the status 
quo)?  And  secondly,  how  flexible  or  inflexible  is  the  behavioural  (cultural) 
repertoire of the social biogram said to be? There is abiding disagreement about   154
what the sociobiologists say they are saying on these issues, and how feminist 
and other critics read and interpret what they are saying.  
 
So I return at this point to first principles: what do the primary texts actually say? 
If sociobiologists don’t champion inevitability, then in what does this perception 
of inevitability reside? To tease this out, we need to look at the cumulative effect 
of  academic  sociobiological  theory  on  perceptions  of  the  social  biogram  –  its 
contents,  its  diversity,  and  its  plasticity.  What  is  said  in  the  sociobiological 
literature  about  what  makes  up  the  social  biogram:    how  are  genotypes  and 
phenotypes said to interact, what is said about genes and their effect on culture, 
and, importantly, how do these texts deal with ideas about the mutability of 
biology? Once we have a clearer picture of how biology’s agency is positioned, 
we then need to investigate which human universals and sex differences are 
explored  and  purportedly  explained  as  being  contained  within  the  social 
biogram.  
 
Genotype/phenotype interaction  
 
The physical foundation of the social biogram is the genotype, one’s particular 
combination of inherited DNA, which is said to determine the phenotype – how 
we are formed, how we look and how we behave. Clearly, some phenotypic 
effects are determined by the genotype: as well as determining a human-specific 
morphology,  it  is  also  the  sole  determinant  of  particular  traits  in  individual 
bodies;  for  example,  my  genotype  determines  that  I  have  green  eyes.  The 
heritability of so-called Mendelian traits such as eye colour is well understood 
and  non-controversial.  It  is  also  clear,  however,  that  most  characteristics  are   155
polygenic in origin and many, including some physical characteristics, are almost 
certainly an outcome of the combination of genotype and environment. Maternal 
and pre- and post-natal nutrition, for example, may have a modifying effect on 
height.  The  sociobiological  literature  has  long  supported  this  view  of  the 
determinative  power  of  the  genotype  as  restricted  and  contingent,  as  the 
following selection shows. 
No  constant  phenotypic  effect  need  be  associated  with  a  particular  gene.  The 
substitution of one allele for another may have one effect in one genotype and an 
entirely different effect in another (Williams, 1996, original publication 1966, p. 
56). 
 
One of the greatest unknowns in human sociobiology concerns the exact limits 
and  capabilities  of  genotype  to  influence  behavioral  phenotypes. But cautious 
open-mindedness seems most appropriate at this time (Barash, 1982, p. 160). 
 
So, of the two effects that genes have on the world – manufacturing copies of 
themselves, and influencing phenotypes – the first is inflexible apart from the 
rare possibility of mutation; the second may be exceedingly flexible. I think a 
confusion between evolution and development is, then, partly responsible for the 
myth of genetic determinism (Dawkins, 1999, original publication 1982, p. 14). 
 
…  except  for  the  rare  behavioral  conditions  approaching  total  genetic 
determination, heritabilities are at best risky predictors of personal capacity in 
existing and future environments (Wilson, 1999, p. 154). 
 
[A complex human nature] is not, of course, a nature that is rigidly programmed, 
impervious to the input, free of culture, or endowed with the minutiae of every 
concept and feeling. But it is a nature that is rich enough to take on the demands 
of  seeing,  moving,  planning,  talking,  staying  alive,  making  sense  of  the 
environment, and negotiating the world of other people (Pinker, 2003, pp. 100-
101). 
 
Each of these statements rejects any notion of an uncomplicated determinative 
power of genotype over phenotype; clearly, what these authors are talking about 
is  the  uncertainty  involved  in  genotype/phenotype  interactions,  and  the 
unpredictable  and  conditional  nature  of  outcomes.  However,  much  of  the 
sociobiological literature quickly moves on from (or indeed, passes completely   156
over)  this  broader  account  to  what  appear  to  be  a  set  of  more  reductive 
statements/assertions.  
The essence of the argument, then, is that the brain exists because it promotes the 
survival  and  multiplication  of  the  genes  that  direct  its  assembly.  The  human 
mind  is  a  device  for  survival  and  reproduction,  and  reason  is  just  one  of  its 
various techniques (Wilson, 1978, p. 2). 
 
The  gene  specifies  how  development  occurs,  and  that  in  turn  specifies  how 
behavior occurs (Ridley, 2004, p. 139). 
 
Genes do not determine behavior like the roll of a player piano … At the same 
time, it is misleading to invoke environment dependence to deny the importance 
of understanding the effects of genes. To begin with, it is simply not true that any 
gene can have any effect in some environment, with the implication that we can 
always  design  an  environment  to  produce  whatever  outcome  we  value  … 
[studies] show numerous main effects of personality, intelligence, and behavior 
across a range of environmental variation (Pinker, 2004, p. 11). 
 
… we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes … I shall argue 
that  a  predominant  quality  to  be  expected  in  a  successful  gene  is  ruthless 
selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual 
behaviour … Our genes may instruct us to be selfish, but we are not necessarily 
compelled to obey them all our lives (Dawkins, 2006, pp. 2-3). 
 
Statements of this kind, with their apparent assertion of the social as subordinate 
to the biological, need to be unpicked, because shades of inevitability do indeed 
visibly  hover  around  them.  How  do  we  reconcile  Matt  Ridley’s  linear 
progression  from  gene  to  development  to  behaviour,  or  Dawkins’  linking  of 
selfish genes to selfish individuals with, for example, Wilson’s statement that 
heritabilities  are  risky  predictors  of  personal  capacity?  How  are  we to safely 
negotiate  Pinker’s  linking  of  genes  and  their  ‘main  effects’  on  individual 
behavioural  outcomes  with  his  opening  assertion  that  genes  do  not  determine 
behaviour? To do this, we need to look next at  the sociobiologists’ notion of what 
genes are, and of how they interact with culture. 
   157
 
 
What is a gene? 
 
Wilhelm Johannsen is credited with having coined the word ‘gene’ in 1909:  
The  ‘gene’  is  nothing  but  a  very  applicable  little  word, easily combined with 
others ... As to the nature of the ‘genes,’ it is as yet of no value to propose any 
hypothesis;  but  that  the  notion  of  the  ‘gene’  covers  a  reality  is  evident  in 
Mendelism (Johannsen, quoted in Keller, 2000, p. 2).136  
 
The applicability of  Johannsen’s ‘little word’ is everywhere apparent almost a 
century later when gene-talk permeates our culture, and it carries a heavy load of 
expectation, disputation and ideological baggage (for a discussion of 'gene talk' 
see Keller, 2000, esp. pp. 136-148). While the notion of the gene is an ever-present 
reality, the reality of the notion is considerably more problematic since, despite 
significant advances in genetics, we seem no closer to a definitive and agreed 
upon explanation of what a ‘gene’ actually is, or even if any such discrete entity 
exists (Birke, 2000; Kaplan & Rogers, 2003; Keller, 1993b, 2000; Lewontin, 1993; 
Moore, 2001; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995a).  
 
My purpose here, however, is not to examine arguments about the reality or 
composition of the gene. I am interested rather to uncover the ways in which it is 
deployed within sociobiological theory – as the basic unit of the genotype, as a 
concept, and as a fact – to imply (or indeed assert) its ‘causal’ nature, which is 
then  read  as  in  some  way  generating  an  inevitable  course  of  physical, 
psychological, and social events. So I put those disputes about the reality of the 
gene to one side and accept Dawkins’ definition of a gene as “any portion of 
chromosomal material that  potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a 
                                                 
136   See also Ridley (2004, p. 232)   158
unit  of  natural  selection”  (2006,  p.  28).137  I  choose  this  particular  definition 
because although, as Dawkins notes, there are differences in the ways in which 
the physical properties of the gene are delineated and described in the literature, 
geneticists and sociobiologists alike appear to agree that it is both ‘chromosomal 
material’ and the ‘unit of natural selection’.138  
 
Matt Ridley then identifies seven descriptions of what a gene is: the gene as an 
archive (Mendel); an interchangeable part (de Vries); a disease averter or health 
giver  (Garrod);  a  recipe  (Watson-Crick);  a  switch  (Jacob-Monod);  a  (selfish) 
replicator  (Dawkins),  and  finally,  drawing  from  sociobiology/evolutionary 
psychology, genes are “the mechanisms of experience” (2004, pp. 233-248). This 
final  description,  Ridley  asserts,  “integrates  all  the  other  six  definitions”  and 
further  positions  the  gene  as  “a  device  for  extracting  information  from  the 
environment” (2004, p. 247).  
 
Ridley’s  first  five descriptions of the gene are generally widely accepted: we 
know that genes  copy and store the four bases of DNA (ATCG); that they are 
present in the same form in organisms other than humans, and in this sense are 
interchangeable;139 that they provide the ‘recipe’ or template that results in the 
                                                 
137  Dawkins credits this definition, worded somewhat differently, to George C. Williams, who said: 
“I use the term gene to mean ‘that which segregates and recombines with appreciable frequency.’ 
Such genes are potentially immortal, in the sense of there being no physiological limit to their 
survival, because of their potentially reproducing fast enough to compensate for their destruction 
by external agents” (Williams, 1996, original publication 1966, p. 24). 
138  Theories of group selection have been “controversial from the start” (see Barash, 1982), although 
never completely abandoned, and have been extensively reconsidered in relatively recent times 
(see Sober & Wilson, 1999).  
139  For example, researchers have successfully incorporated a gene from a firefly into the DNA of a 
tobacco plant (Campbell, Reece, & Meyers, 2006, p. 314).   159
production of proteins;140 that they switch on and off in given circumstances and 
in  response  to  the  actions  or  presence  of  other  genes,  and  clearly  genes  can 
promote either health or disease.141 However, Ridley’s final two descriptions of 
genes as ‘selfish replicators’ and as ‘mechanisms of experience’ have attracted 
considerable controversy, since representing the gene in these ways imparts to it 
a capacity for influencing behaviour and culture well beyond that which follows 
necessarily from any individual physical biogram.  
 
Selfish replicators 
 
In The selfish gene, Dawkins starts from a conviction that the gene (rather than the 
individual or the group) is the unit of selection (heredity).142 He then synthesises 
Darwinian  theories  on  aggression,  sex  ratios,  inter-generational  conflict,  sex 
differences  and  reciprocal altruism to support his concept of genes as selfish 
replicators, hitching a ride through the generations safely contained within the 
bodies – the “gigantic lumbering robots” – they have built, and which are their 
“survival machines” (2006, pp. 19-20). Dawkins’ avowed interest, in this and his 
other work, lies in uncovering the means and methods of evolution, and,  in 
particular, in embedding the theory of selection at the level of the gene, as against 
competing theories of selection which place it at the level of the individual or the 
                                                 
140  For a description of the basic process of transcription and translation, see Campbell et al, (2006, 
p. 311 ff). The notion of DNA or the ‘gene’ as an originary code has been the subject of some 
discussion and challenge in the feminist literature (see, for example, Diprose, 1991; Keller, 2000). 
141  And although, in light of the search for ‘disease genes’ in both the pre- and post-genome era, 
they are more usually portrayed today as a cause rather than an averter of disease, Garrod’s 
characterisation of ‘unbroken’ genes as health giving is an important one, reflected in the growing 
literature on the relative merits of the wellness/illness paradigms in health practice. 
142  A notion that is now widely accepted; however, in 1975, when Dawkins first published The 
selfish gene, it was not (see 2006, pp. 10-11). And, as noted earlier, theories of group selection – or 
what is now sometimes called multilevel selection (MLS theory) – are making something of a 
comeback. See Gangestad & Simpson (2007a) for a discussion of the debates surrounding group 
and individual selection.   160
group.  The gene, as the unit of selection in this process, is selfish only insofar as 
its evolutionary interests lie in ensuring its survival; that is, in being selected into 
the next generation over its competing allele.143 Dawkins’ central theory then 
works at the level of the gene, not the individual.  
 
That Dawkins felt his characterisation of genes as selfish replicators in The selfish 
gene had been misconstrued, is clear from the chapter in his next book in which 
he discusses the “comic misunderstanding” of his use of language and metaphor 
as  implying genetic determinism (1999, original publication 1982, pp. 9-29).144 
And despite his careful explanations in a variety of contexts over the intervening 
years,  that  he  feels  it  is  still  misunderstood  is  evident  from  the  following 
statement in his Introduction to the 30th anniversary edition:  
Many  critics,  especially  vociferous  ones  learned  in  philosophy  as  I  have 
discovered,  prefer  to  read  a  book  by title only ...  I can readily see that ‘The 
Selfish Gene’ on its own, without the large footnote of the book itself, might give 
an inadequate impression of its contents (2006, pp. vii-viii). 
 
 
Dawkins is justified in feeling aggrieved by much of the  criticism directed at The 
selfish  gene.  I  pass  over  Mary  Midgley’s  critique  (clearly  the  ‘vociferous 
philosopher’ referred to here), since I believe that her arguments are considerably 
weakened  by her personal attack upon Dawkins and upon his scholarship.145 
                                                 
143  An allele is defined on the NHGRI website as: “One of the variant forms of a gene at a particular 
locus, or location, on a chromosome. Different alleles produce variation in inherited characteristics 
such as hair color or blood type. In an individual, one form of the allele (the dominant one) may be 
expressed more than another form (the recessive one)”.  
See http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=allele.  
144  In Chapter 2: Genetic determinism and gene selectionism.  
145  It is not surprising that Midgley’s patronising (“Up till now, I have not attended to Dawkins, 
thinking it unnecessary to break a butterfly upon a wheel”) and insulting piece (“Dawkins’s crude, 
cheap, blurred genetics is not just an expository device. It is the kingpin of his crude, cheap, blurred 
psychology”) still rankles some nearly 30 years later. In his note to page 55 of the 2006 anniversary 
edition, Dawkins refers to Midgley’s article as “highly intemperate and vicious” (p. 278); Daniel   161
However, other critics have formulated arguments around misreadings and/or 
misquotations of the text:  
Of all the vulgar errors about biology presently circulating, the notion that we are 
“lumbering robots blindly programmed” by our genes which “control us body 
and mind” (Dawkins’ original dictum) is surely the most popular by a long shot 
(Lewontin, 1990, my emphasis). 
 
Dawkins ‘original dictum’ in fact was that our genes “created us, body and mind” 
(2006, p. 20, my emphasis). Remembering his central thesis that the gene is the 
unit  of  selection,  it  is  not  unreasonable  for  him  to  conclude  that  particular 
combinations of genes in individual bodies create us as biological entities. As he 
himself notes, within the framework of his argument, this is a long way from 
asserting that our genes control us.146 Looked at in this way, the slip from the 
suggestion of an originating source to one of control, can only be described as 
regrettably  careless.  Nonetheless,  it  has  become  so  familiar  a  trope  that  it 
continues to be perpetuated in more recent texts. Among feminist commentators, 
for example, the notion that Dawkins, and sociobiologists more generally, asserts 
the all-powerful controlling nature of the gene continues to propagate (and also 
serves to link the sociobiological concept of the gene to the feminist critique of 
the ‘gene as master molecule’ rhetoric within the Human Genome Project). Gisela 
Kaplan and Lesley Rogers, for example, declare that Dawkins refers to “genes as 
‘selfish’  and  as  ‘replicator  units’  that  control  every  aspect  of  our  behaviour” 
(Kaplan & Rogers, 2003, p. 37).  
 
                                                                                                                                      
Dennett refers to it as a “vituperative and uncomprehending dismissal” (1995, p. 362). See also See 
Dawkins’ reply to Midgley in Philosophy, and her further article (Dawkins, 1981; Midgley, 1983).  
146   Dawkins notes that this misquotation can also be found in Not in our genes (Rose, Kamin, & 
Lewontin, 1984) at page 287 (Dawkins, 2006, p. 271).    162
In their defence, the slippage is not solely of the critics’ making. While Dawkins 
and others protest their innocence, they themselves create metaphors, speculate 
about the implications of specific genes, and draw conclusions that slip between 
creation  and  control.    For  example,  Dawkins  nowhere  says  that  we  are 
‘lumbering  robots  blindly  programmed’;  he  does,  however,  call  us  “survival 
machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules 
known as genes” (2006, p. xxi). Later, however, he qualifies ‘blind programming’ 
by asserting that “it is the business of genes to program brains in advance so that 
on average they take decisions that pay off” (2006, p. 55). This programming, as 
he explains it, consists of “general strategies and tricks of the trade”‘, one of 
which is a capacity for learning (2006, pp. 55-57). What the genes ‘control’ in this 
scenario is not individuals or robots, but rather the provision of species-general 
capacities within individual bodies that are then able to be utilised in interactions 
with the environment (learning).  
 
In  The  extended  phenotype,  published  some  six  years  after  The  selfish  gene,  he 
reflects on his choice of the “language of robotics” unaccompanied by sufficient 
explanation of his meaning: 
It was in an attempt to forestall errors like this [attributing foresight to genes] 
that I used the language of automation and robotics, and used the word ‘blindly’ 
in referring to genetic programming. But it is, of course, the genes that are blind, 
not the animals they program (1999, original publication 1982, p. 15), 
 
and expresses his view that the behavioural effects of genes are limited:  
But, however inexorable and undeviating the genes may be as they march down 
the generations, the nature of their phenotypic effects on the bodies they flow 
through is by no means inexorable and undeviating. If I am homozygous for a 
gene G, nothing save mutation can prevent my passing G on to all my children. 
So much is inexorable. But whether or not I, or my children, show the phenotypic   163
effect normally associated with the possession of G may depend very much on 
how we are brought up, what diet or education we experience, and what other 
genes we happen to possess (1999, original publication 1982, p. 14). 
 
 
Other  sociobiologists  also  make  very  clear  statements  on  the  interactive 
relationship between genes and culture: 
Human social evolution is obviously more cultural than genetic. The point is that 
the underlying emotion [altruism], powerfully manifested in virtually all human 
societies, is what is considered to evolve through genes (Wilson, 1978, p. 153). 
 
The  capacity  for  rapid  transmission  and  assimilation  of  new  and  adaptive 
behaviors was almost certainly favored in human evolution … suggesting strong 
selective  pressures  favoring  behavioral  flexibility  and  innovation.  This  notion 
provides an interesting conceptual bridge between biologic and cultural factors 
in the evolution of human social behavior. Social learning and the passage of 
traditions are clearly cultural, whereas the capacity to perform such operations is 
biologic in terms of both the neural competence of individuals and the tendencies 
for social organization that make these operations possible (Barash, 1982, p. 203). 
 
Neither  ‘biology’,  ‘evolution’,  ‘society’,  or  ‘the  environment’  directly  impose 
behavioral outcomes, without an immensely long and intricate intervening chain 
of causation involving interactions with an entire configuration of other causal 
elements.  Each  link  of  such  a  chain  offers  a  possible  point  of  intervention  to 
change the final outcome (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995, p. 39). 
 
Culture is such a powerful set of cranes147 that its effects can swamp many – but 
not all – of the earlier genetic pressures and processes that created it and still 
coexist with it. We often make the mistake of confusing a cultural innovation 
with a genetic innovation. … Anyone who worries about “genetic determinism” 
should  be  reminded  that  virtually  all  the  differences  discernible  between  the 
people of, say, Plato’s day and the people living today … must be due to cultural 
changes … (Dennett, 1995, p. 338). 
 
The ontogenetic question is, Did genes play a role in the development of trait X? 
The answer is always yes, no matter what trait X is – adaptation or pathology, 
idiosyncrasy  or  species-typical  organ  –  since  every  part  of  every  organism 
emerges  only  via  interactions  among  genes,  gene  products,  and  myriad 
environmental phenomena. And because the answer to the ontogenetic question 
is always yes, it is uninformative (Symons, 1995, p. 140). 
 
 
                                                 
147  Dennett contrasts ‘cranes’ – “excellent as lifters, and they have the decided advantage of being 
real” – with ‘skyhooks’ – the OED definition for which he cites as “an imaginary contrivance for 
attachment to the sky; an imagined means of suspension in the sky” – arguing that cranes were the 
instrument used in the ‘lifting’ process of evolution, rather than the “unsupported and 
unsupportable” skyhooks (see Dennett, 1995, pp. 73-84).    164
Anyone who studies behavior quickly realizes that it is impossible to separate the 
environment from the organism experiencing it, so that all traits are necessarily 
the result of an interaction between the animal and its perceived world ... The key 
point is this: only a difference between traits, and not a trait as such, can be said 
to be inherited or learned (Zuk, 2002, p. 50). 
 
Genes  are  not  puppet  masters  or  blueprints.  Nor  are  they  just  the  carriers  of 
heredity.  They  are  active  during  life;  they  switch  each other on and off; they 
respond to the environment. They may direct the construction of the body and 
brain in the womb, but then they set about dismantling and rebuilding what they 
have made almost at once – in response to experience. They are both cause and 
consequence of our actions (Ridley, 2004, p. 6). 
 
…  complex  cultural  traditions  have  been  exerting  coevolutionary  selective 
pressures on human gene pools for about twenty thousand generations … Genes, 
by themselves, can’t readily adapt to rapidly changing environments. Cultural 
variants, by themselves, can’t do anything without brains and bodies. Genes and 
culture are tightly coupled … (Richerson & Boyd, 2006, p. 194). 
 
And Wilson, again, some 21 years after the publication of On Human Nature: 
 
How can anyone presume to speak of a gene that prescribes culture? The answer 
is  that  no  serious  scientist  ever  has  …  All  biologists  speak  of  the  interaction 
between heredity and environment. They do not, except in laboratory shorthand, 
speak of a gene “causing” a particular behavior, and they never mean it literally. 
That would make no more sense than its converse, the idea of behavior arising 
from culture without the intervention of brain activity (1999, pp. 148-149). 
 
The brain is a product of the very highest levels of biological order, which are 
constrained  by  epigenetic  rules  implicit  in  the  organism’s  anatomy  and 
physiology.  Working  in  a  chaotic  flood  of  environmental  stimuli,  it  sees  and 
listens, learns, plans its own future. By that means the brain determines the fate 
of the genes that prescribed it. Across evolutionary time, the aggregate choices of 
many brains determine the Darwinian fate of everything human – the genes, the 
epigenetic rules, the communicating minds, and the culture (1999, p. 179). 
 
... scenarios of the mind are all but infinite in detail, their content evolving in 
accordance with the unique history and physiology of the individual (1999, p. 
131).  
 
These quotations do not support the broad contention that (sociobiologists hold 
the view that) our genes ‘control’ every aspect of our behaviour and, therefore, 
determine our culture/s. There is nothing here that can be interpreted as implying 
a belief in any deterministic inevitability about the action of genes on individual 
behaviour or on human culture. Rather, they speak to an interaction between 
biology and culture that clearly indicates a belief in the mutability of biology. Far   165
from biologically deterministic, these statements speak to an understanding very 
much  in  tune  with  ELSI  research,  and  with  the  position  that  is  taken  by 
sociobiology’s  most  vehement  critics:  that  genes  work  within  a  sea  of  social 
experiences  in  multitudinous  environments,  the  outcomes  from  which  are 
unpredictable and indeterminate. 
 
What, then, is it in Dawkins’ selfish gene theory that betrays a presumption of 
control? What is it that sociobiologists more generally say about gene/culture 
interaction  that  could  lead  one  to  think  they  are  talking  about  genetic 
determinism and inevitability? How is it that, despite their many disavowals and 
clear statements to the contrary, they are read as contributing to the ‘myth’ of the 
super-deterministic gene? The answer is both much, and little – the devil, as they 
say, is in the detail. Leaving aside obvious misreadings and misinterpretations, 
and correcting for the sometimes unconscious effects of ideological difference 
(remembering that my purpose here is neither to accuse or defend), there remain 
sufficient instances of injudicious or inflammatory word choice, expression and 
metaphor,  to  arouse  the  critics’  concern  and  perhaps  confuse  the  average 
intelligent reader:  
Are human beings innately aggressive? This is a favorite question ... and one that 
raises  emotion  in  political  ideologues  of  all  stripes.  The  answer  to  it  is  yes 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 99). 
 
The genes hold culture on a leash. The leash is very long, but inevitably values 
will  be  constrained  in  accordance  with  their  effects  on  the  human  gene  pool 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 167, my emphasis). 
 
With  certain  basic  information  concerning  a  species’  biology,  it  should 
accordingly  be  possible  to  predict behavior patterns based on the assumption 
that  these  patterns  will  be  such  as  to  maximize  the  inclusive  fitness  of  the 
performer (Barash, 1982, p. 43).   166
Human behavior is flexible, of course, but this flexibility is of means, not ends, 
and the basic experiential goals that motivate human behavior are both inflexible 
and specific (Symons, 1995, p. 138). 
 
The First Law [of behaviour genetics]: All human behavioral traits are heritable 
(Pinker, 2003, p. 373). 
 
The spooky truth is dawning on scientists that they can regard behavior as just 
an extreme form of development. The nest of a bird is just as much a product of 
its genes as its wings are (Ridley, 2004, pp 139-140). 
 
Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish (Dawkins, 
2006, p. 3). 
 
Brains may be regarded as analogous in function to computers (Dawkins, 2006, p. 
49). 
 
By  dictating  the  way  survival  machines  and  their  nervous  systems  are  built, 
genes exert ultimate power over behaviour (Dawkins, 2006, p. 60). 
 
 
That critics focus on statements of this kind is unsurprising, given the kinds of 
conclusions  that  can  so  easily  be  drawn  from  them:  our  personal  values  are 
ultimately  controlled  by  our  genes;  aggressive  and  selfish  behaviour  (or 
charitable  behaviour  or,  for  that  matter,  the  ability  to  send  text  messages)  is 
inherited  through  the  genes;  individuals  are  robots  and  computers, 
‘programmed’ and dictated to by our genes; cultures (and therefore social roles) 
are a predictable and direct outcome of our genetic makeup. I would want to 
insist  that  critics  and  popularisers  must  take  responsibility  and  ‘listen’  more 
carefully to what is actually being said.148 At the same time, those writing in 
sociobiology  must  also  bear  some  responsibility  for  the  presentation  of  these 
concepts  to  the  broader  audience  –  that  is,  to  those  who  are  introduced  to 
sociobiological ideas through popular media, or via reviews and critiques, rather 
than through the texts themselves – because it is just these kinds of expressions 
                                                 
148  See, for example, Dawkins’ story of Maynard Smith’s ‘gene for skill in tying shoelaces’ (1999, 
original publication 1982, p. 22).   167
and metaphors, rather than the careful and detailed explanations that surround 
them, that are most often picked up, in the critical literature and in the wider 
social  arena,  as  ‘sound  bites’  representing  sociobiological  thinking.149  And,  of 
course, sociobiologists do mean to say all of these things, but within their specific 
framework of genes as the mechanisms of experience, and not necessarily in the 
‘genes as blueprint’ ways in which they become translated into popular culture.  
 
It is within this notion of genes as mechanisms of experience that we find the 
answer to the questions posed earlier; here is where we can understand what 
Pinker  means  when  he  directly  links  gene  effects  with  individual  traits  and 
outcomes, and here too is where we can reconcile Ridley’s linear progression 
from  gene  to  development  to  behaviour  with  Wilson’s  statement  that 
heritabilities are risky predictors of personal capacity. Each of them is speaking 
within  the  context  of  the  universal  behaviours  contained  within  the  social 
biogram, and each is placing the biogram within the framework of gene-culture 
interaction: 
As psychologist Charles Lumsden and evolutionary biologist E.O. Wilson put it, 
genes have culture on a leash. Culture can wander a bit, but if it threatens to get 
out of hand, its genetic master can bring it to heel  … Culture is on a leash, all 
right, but the dog on the end is big, smart, and independent. On any given walk, 
it is hard to tell who is leading who (Richerson & Boyd, 2006, p. 194). 
 
Despite this contextualisation, it is here, also, that we find the crux of the real 
problem of sociobiology for its critics, because these universal behaviours can all 
carry  inferences  far  beyond  the  nature  of  evolution  or  of  the  entities  called 
‘selfish’ genes and into issues of personal autonomy and cultural flexibility. Thus 
                                                 
149  Dawkins’ ‘robot’ metaphor is a case in point, and one which he has said he would have 
explained more clearly if he had been thinking in terms of the common understanding of  robots as 
‘inflexible idiots’ at the time of writing (1999, original publication 1982, p. 17).   168
we are brought back full circle to arguments about the primacy of biology over 
culture, keeping alive the spectre of genetic determinism. 
 
Mechanisms of experience – human universals  
 
The 1970s do seem to have been, as Dawkins puts it, “one of those mysterious 
periods in which new ideas are hovering in the air” (2006, p. xvii). Although 
recognised as the ‘founder’ of classic sociobiology, E.O. Wilson was neither the 
first nor the only scientist working in this general area of inquiry in the 1970s, 
and applying its principles to humans: John Maynard Smith and George Price’s 
concept  of  the  evolutionarily  stable  strategy  (Maynard  Smith,  1972;  Maynard 
Smith & Price, 1973); Robin Fox’s and Irven DeVore’s work on the evolution of 
the  capacity  for  culture  and  human  society  (DeVore,  1971;  Fox,  1971);  W.D. 
Hamilton’s on altruism and inclusive fitness (1972), and Robert Trivers’ seminal 
papers on reciprocal altruism (1971) and parental investment (1972), all pre-date 
Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975). Even Dawkins’ The selfish gene was begun in 1972 
and was completed in 1975, although it was not published until the following 
year.150 All of these works, in turn, built upon a considerable body of earlier  
research on evolution, in particular that of those most closely associated with the 
modern synthesis151 (see Bowler, c1984; Dobzhansky, 1937; Fisher, 1930; Haldane, 
1932; Huxley, 1942; Mayr, 1942; Wright, 1931), and on work carried out in the 
1960s by George Williams and W.D. Hamilton (Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1996, 
original publication 1966).  
                                                 
150  For a more complete discussion of individual contributions to the ‘birth’ of sociobiology, see 
Segerstråle (2000), chapter 5. 
151  The modern synthesis (also called the new synthesis, the evolutionary synthesis, or neo-
Darwinism), is the unification of Mendelian and population genetics with evolutionary theory (see 
Mayr & Provine, 1980).    169
 
As suggested by Ruth Bleier, however, Wilsonian sociobiology is the logical place 
to  start  when  we  begin  to  look  at  human  universal  behaviours,  because  his 
inclusion of humanity in his sociobiological inquiry sparked the controversy that 
continues today: 
The purpose of sociobiology … is to develop general laws of the evolution and 
biology  of  social  behavior,  which  might  then  be  extended  in  a  disinterested 
manner  to  the  study  of  human  beings  …  we  expect  to  extend  such  general 
principles of sociobiology as can be devised to assist in the explanation of human 
behavior … Homo sapiens shares with other social mammals a tendency toward 
male dominance systems, a sexual division of labor, prolonged maternal care, 
and an extended socialization of the young based in good part on social play 
(Wilson, Foreword, in Barash, 1977, p. xiv). 
 
Wilson’s  Sociobiology  gave  the  field  its  name  and  drew  together  many of the 
earlier theories under its banner. Despite these antecedents – and the fact that 
Wilson’s text was largely concerned with the social behaviours of insects – it is 
the connection between biology and social behaviour, and his explicit extension 
of sociobiological theory to humans in the first and last chapters of the book, that 
generated  furious  debate  from  the  time  of  publication.  The  final  chapter  of 
Sociobiology, in particular, is controversial. Here, Wilson talks about the so-called 
human universals upon which he and others build their case for a human social 
biogram.  
 
Wilson first notes that the evolutionary analysis of human behaviour is difficult 
because the evolutionary history of a species such as ours is “hard to reconstruct” 
and  therefore  “human  qualities  will  be  discussed  insofar  as  they  appear  to  be 
general traits of the species” (1975, p. 272, my emphasis). These general traits of 
the species include: the capacity for culture; barter (including, historically, the   170
use  of  women  as  objects  of  barter);  reciprocal  altruism;  kinship  ties; 
indoctrinability;  aggression,  and  territorialism.  Also  included,  and  most 
controversially in a feminist context, is the predisposition to perform particular 
social  roles  as  an  outcome  of  the  differing  investments  in  reproduction  by 
women and men. Wilson further theorises a genetic basis for homosexuality, a 
contentious idea revived during the 1990s by the high-profile research of Simon 
LeVay, and Dean Hamer and colleagues.152  
 
Each  of  these  hypotheses  is  supported  by  inferred  hunter/gatherer  practices, 
although Wilson concludes that to infer the presence of certain traits in early 
humans from their occurrence in living hunter-gatherer societies is unreliable. In 
this regard, he later commented that: 
Many of the peculiar details of human sexual behavior and domestic life flow 
easily from this basic division of labor [hunting/gathering]. But such details are 
not essential to the autocatalysis model. They are appended to the evolutionary 
story only because they are displayed by virtually all hunter-gatherer societies 
(1978, p. 87). 
 
Thus, ‘unreliable’ traits include: family as the nuclear unit, women gathering 
while  men  hunt,153  near-universal  long  term  sexual  bonding,  and  universal 
exogamy.  Conversely, reliable traits include males being dominant over females; 
game  playing;  prolonged  maternal  care;  and  pronounced  socialisation  of  the 
young (1975, p. 293). Wilson further proposes that human populations, societies 
and individuals are extremely variable and flexible and  hypothesises that genes 
                                                 
152  Discussed in the following chapter (see Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993; Hu et al., 
1994; LeVay, 1991; LeVay & Hamer, 1994). 
153  Wilson noted in 1975 that “there is no compelling reason to conclude that men did the hunting 
while women stayed at home” (1975, p. 292). It is important to note the body of anthropological 
evidence that it was the gatherers  in any event who were of most importance to sustaining the 
family/group. For an overview see Burch & Ellanna (1996).   171
for such flexibility are “strongly selected at the individual level” (1975, p. 273). 
He advises: 
It is vital not to misconstrue the political implications of such generalizations. To 
devise a naturalistic description of human social behavior is to note a set of facts 
for further investigation, not to pass a value judgment or to deny that a great deal 
of  the  behavior  can  be  deliberately  changed  if  individual  societies  so  wish 
(Foreword, in Barash, 1977, p. xiv). 
 
 
The  difficulty,  of  course,  is  that  such  generalisations  are  profoundly  political 
within a social milieu that has historically used exactly these generalisations to 
subordinate and demean women, their capabilities and capacities. So, despite the 
qualifying phrases and the emphasis on flexibility, these claims are, of course, 
deeply problematic for feminists and others, who not unreasonably take the view 
that the status quo is at least being defended, if not actively endorsed.  
 
John  Tooby  and  Leda  Cosmides,  recognised  co-founders  of  the  evolutionary 
psychology strand of sociobiology, and surely with an awareness of the history 
of  negative  responses  to  sociobiological  thought,  take  a  different  approach. 
Where Wilson’s list of human universals is focused on knitting together ultimate 
causes and proximate behaviours into a causal relationship from our genes to our 
everyday behaviours, Tooby & Cosmides recast his specific universals into much 
broader behaviours:   
Anthropological orthodoxy to the contrary, human life is full of structure that 
recurs from culture to culture ... adults have children; humans have a species-
typical body form; humans have characteristic emotions; humans move through 
a life history cued by observable body changes; humans come in two sexes; they 
eat food and are motivated to seek it when they lack it; humans are born and 
eventually die; they are related through sexual reproduction  and through chains 
of  descent;  they  turn  their  eyes  toward  objects  and  events  that  tend  to  be 
informative about adaptively consequential issues; they often compete, contend, 
or fight over limited social or subsistance (sic) resources; they express fear and   172
avoidance  of  dangers;  they  preferentially  associate  with  mates,  children,  and 
other kin; they create and maintain enduring, mutually beneficial individuated 
relationships  with  nonrelatives;  they  speak;  they  create  and  participate  in 
coalitions; they desire, plan, deceive, love, gaze, envy, get ill, have sex, play, can 
be injured, are satiated; and on and on (1995, pp. 88-89). 
 
This  list  is  both  more  general,  and  much  more  precise,  careful,  and  non-
controversial, than is Wilson’s. Tooby & Cosmides simply state commonsense 
understandings of the universal range of human behaviour and interaction that 
most of us will recognise as reflecting, in large part, the course of  our own lives 
and the lives of those around us. So, while we may find Wilson’s list unpalatable, 
these more general (although still universal) attributes, are not so difficult to 
agree to.  Yet, even Tooby & Cosmides then move toward more problematic 
specifics: 
…  humans  have  psychological  adaptations  that  contain  contentful  structure 
specifically  “about”  their  mothers,  “about”  their  children,  “about”  the  sexual 
behavior of their mates, “about” those identified by cues as kin, “about” how 
much  to  care  for  a  sick  child,  and  so  on,  and  these  contents  are  not  derived 
exclusively from either a short list of drives or from culturally variable, socially 
learned “values” (1995, pp. 99-100). 
 
What is interesting about this list of ‘abouts’ is not so much what it contains, but 
what  it  does  not.  Why  contentful  structure  about  these  particular  things  – 
mothers,  children,  sexual  behaviour,  kin?  There  is  a  slippery  slope  here  that 
returns  us,  again,  to  the  politics  of  reproduction.  This  is  what  opens  up 
suspicions about such theories – why these things? Why not other things? Why 
do  the  genes,  as  mechanisms  of  experience  and  as  devices  for  extracting 
information  from  the  environment,  appear,  in  all  of  these  accounts,  to  be  so 
overwhelmingly interested in providing biological structures that so easily relate 
to  the  proximate  social  structures  built  particularly  around  women’s  role  in 
reproduction?    173
 
However  that  may  be,  let  us  for  the  moment  assume  that  each  of  Wilson’s 
universal traits (from which Tooby & Cosmides’ more general list of behaviours 
largely stem) exist as part of our evolved human psychology. The social biogram, 
no matter what it is believed to contain, has been described ‘objectively’ and is 
itself free of morality (though the effects of some of its contents can be construed 
as moral or immoral) and ideology.  
 
Clearly,  humans  have  a  facility  for  language  and  for  learning  generally,  a 
capacity  for  culture,  and  individual  and  social  flexibility.  It  is  difficult,  for 
example, to see how a ‘blank slate’ model can account for the acculturation into 
learning of individuals not already possessing the capacity to learn; but really, 
why should it matter if these qualities are ‘inborn’ or acquired later? Similarly, 
societies,  and  the  individuals  of  which  they  are  composed,  are  territorial, 
sometimes  aggressive,  and  tied  to  each  other  through  kinship.  Humans  do 
universally  perform  reciprocally  altruistic  acts  (you  scratch  my  back  and  I’ll 
scratch yours), and routinely engage in barter.  And, while it may be a worrying 
concept  for  some  because of its pejorative connotations, there can be no real 
challenge to the notion of our receptiveness to indoctrination – it is, after all, just 
another aspect of learning: we are indoctrinated into our cultures, our family 
rituals, our religions, our academic disciplines, our sporting codes, and on and 
on.  But  we  are  equally  capable,  once  more  through  our  capacity  to  learn,  of 
breaking free of indoctrination and choosing another path. So, again, if these 
traits  are  part  of  a  human  social  biogram  that  can  be  either  consolidated  or 
ameliorated by culture – that is, by the sociogram, and by its moral, ethical and   174
ideological values – why do we argue so strenuously about how they came to be? 
Theorising these human qualities as presocial, within a context of gene-culture 
interaction  and  the  mutability  of  biology,  as  sociobiologists  do,  could  be 
relatively unproblematic. So why isn’t it?  
 
Part of the problem, I suggest, lies in the very notion of the social biogram, as 
Steven Pinker observes: 
When it comes to explaining human thought and behavior, the possibility that 
heredity plays any role at all still has the power to shock … Any claim that the 
mind has an innate organization strikes people not as a hypothesis that might be 
incorrect but as a thought it is immoral to think (2003, p. viii). 
 
If it is immoral to think we may have a social biogram, then we are by definition 
imposing morality upon the biogram itself, not just upon its potential (or actual) 
effects. Further, the perception of the biogram as prior to, and therefore inevitably 
dominant over social influences, challenges opposing ideologies and leads to a 
belief that any acceptance of its existence sanctions genetic determinist thinking.  
More directly, it is also because there is a perception, as we have already seen, 
that those who theorise about the contents of the biogram are simply not being 
careful enough, or even disinterested enough, in the assertions about evolved 
(biologically  based)  behaviours  they  extrapolate  from  proximate  (human  and 
non-human) social behaviours. The implied causal relationship from our genes to 
our everyday behaviours – without ever being able to explicate the link that 
allows this to happen, since no-one has yet been able to demonstrate how exactly 
DNA to RNA to protein to behaviour actually works154 – is profoundly unsettling. 
                                                 
154  Although note the brief discussion in Chapter 2 about the ways in which microarray analysis 
might begin to allow scientists to do so. In this regard, see also Parens (2004, pp. S19-S21).   175
These  accounts  step  over  an  unbridged  and  largely  unacknowledged  gap 
between genes and culture. That is, accepting selfish gene theory does not, in 
itself, provide the link between a gene’s need to replicate itself and how that need 
translates into behaviour in any kind of prescriptive way.   
 
And finally, of course, there is the vexed question of the ways in which many of 
the social biogram’s assumed contents so conveniently ‘naturalise’ and thus prop 
up the status quo. While the fact that they may do so is not sufficient reason to 
dismiss the possibility that certain evolutionary traits exist, there are very good 
reasons to be cautious about many of the conclusions drawn from their theorised 
existence. In part, the fact that more sociobiologists do not publicly critique the 
status quo,155 or fail to strongly endorse the views of those who do so, has to raise 
some questions about their politics.156 Unlike the claim that the human social 
biogram can be consolidated by culture, the corresponding claim that it may be 
ameliorated by culture remains abstract. The evidence provided by sociobiologists 
all points one way, and often enthusiastically so. This suggests that indeed, the 
real object of the enterprise is not so much to explore the interplay of biology and 
culture, but to assert the importance of biology to culture. In this regard, some of 
the discussions and conclusions about sex differentiated drives and behaviours 
within evolutionary psychology draw a suspiciously long bow.  
 
                                                 
155  Although many, including Dawkins and E.O. Wilson, make passing critical references to it in 
their works; and it may also be that such comments are made, in forums where only the more 
controversial comments and claims are widely reported. The media must also take responsibility 
for the ways in which reductionist views are conveyed to the wider society. 
156  But it also perhaps says something about the divide between the two ‘sides’ that they are so 
mutually suspicious that, even where their views coincide, they do not publicly support each other.   176
Mechanisms of difference – sex differentiated behaviour  
 
Genes  are  not  only  mechanisms  of  experience,  they  are  also,  by  extension, 
mechanisms of sexually differentiated behaviour. Both classic sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology theorise human mating and child-rearing practices, and 
the social roles traditionally attached to them, as evolutionarily-based outcomes 
of  our  differential  investments  in  and  experience  of  reproductive  process 
(Trivers, 1972). Parental investment theory extends across the biological and into 
the social. Women’s bodies ‘invest’ monthly in a single large gamete which, once 
fertilised, can result in a further investment of nine months gestation, an intense 
and potentially risky birth process, followed by an extended period of lactation 
and care for a dependant infant. Men, on the other hand, produce sperm on a 
continuing basis, and can in theory inseminate numerous women with no further 
involvement in the process of gestation or post-natal child care.   
 
As a result of this greater investment of physical resources in the biology of 
reproduction, sociobiology theorises women will, in general, behave socially in 
particular ways: they will be sexually coy (less promiscuous than men); choosier 
in their choice of partner (looking for a man with resources who will stay around 
to help them provide for offspring); be tied more closely to home and children, 
and be less likely to engage in risky occupations (gatherers, rather than hunters). 
Women whose genes predispose them to engage in these behaviours would be 
more likely to successfully raise their infants to adulthood and, thus, be more 
successful  in  transmitting  their  genes  into  the  next  generation.  What  is  so 
interesting here is that, in line with the silence around male biology, choice,  and 
reproductive and child care behaviours within the modern context (as we saw in   177
the Summers’ controversy), very little is said in the evolutionary context about 
the men who, through engaging in risky occupations and dying young, or in not 
caring for offspring who also then die young, risk failing to transmit their genes.  
 
Leaving that aside, these behaviours, of course, map directly onto the status quo, 
providing both explanation for and justification of sexual inequality in all its 
various guises across cultures. Evolutionary psychologists attempt to make this 
conclusion less threatening and more palatable in both familiar and novel ways. 
Like the classic sociobiologists, some evolutionary psychologists also emphasise 
the mutability of genetic predispositions to sexually differentiated behaviours 
through interaction with culture:  
Unfortunately,  many  laypersons  and  members  of  the  scientific  community 
incorrectly assume that human sex differences that have biological origins are 
unchangeable.  The  belief  that  these  sex  differences  are  immutable  appears  to 
create a psychological resistance to even a thoughtful consideration of biological 
influences … (Geary, 1998, p. 330). 
 
Others stress the need to avoid the naturalistic fallacy in drawing conclusions 
from actual or theorised differences (that is, that is does not imply ought) (for 
example, Buss, 1994, p. 16).  
 
It is quite true that describing what is must not be confused with a prescription 
for what should be (as, I shall argue in the next chapter, vulgar reductionists too 
often  do).  It  is  also  true  that,  read  carefully,  much  of  sociobiological  theory 
cannot  be  said  to  subscribe  to  the  notion  of  an  unchangeable  biology. 
Nevertheless, the presentation of current social arrangements as what is, when 
placed  within  the  context  of  the  certainty  within  which  these  kinds  of  sexed   178
behaviours are presented as outcomes of our evolutionary history, does tend to 
lend colour to the conclusion that, while not fixed, they are, at the very least, 
deeply embedded in our biology and difficult to shift.  
 
Finally, some evolutionary psychologists have a more novel way of sweetening 
their  conclusions  by,  for  instance,  presenting  the  sexually  differentiated 
behaviours as favourable to women (for example, see  Fisher, 1999 below). In 
relation  to  this  manoeuvre,  classic  sociobiologist  Sarah  Blaffer  Hrdy  says, 
“Evolutionary  psychologists  studying  mate  preferences  today  throw  the 
occasional sop to women lest they mind being told they should look like Barbie 
dolls or else despair of becoming successful breeders” (1999, p. 24).  
 
The real problem with each of these strategies is that they leave unconsidered the 
truth and/or adequacy of claims derived from theories about evolved human sex 
differences. That is, such strategies fail to dispel, or inevitably slip into, blatant 
justifications  of  status  quo  differences.  So,  for  example,  anthropologist  Helen 
Fisher claims, with certainty and without qualification, that women are better 
than men at relationship-building (1999, p. 101); women are more passive in the 
bedroom because of a “primal fantasy of surrender” (1999, p. 200); that “men are 
often attracted to women who show signs of youth and beauty, while women 
tend  to  gravitate  to  men  with  status  and  resources”  (1999,  p.  236),  and  that 
“[m]en tend to get more upset when a wife has engaged in a one-night stand” 
whereas “[w]omen become more deeply troubled if a husband has engaged in a 
long, intimate affair” (1999, p. 268). Fisher writes as though these differences are   179
universal, undisputed, and are either neutral or even favourable in their social 
effects for women.  
 
Similarly, in The Evolution of Desire, prominent evolutionary psychologist David 
Buss promises to explain the “baffling contradictions” in mating behaviour by 
gazing “back into our evolutionary past – a past that has grooved and scored our 
minds as much as our bodies, our strategies for mating as much as our strategies 
for survival” (1994, p. 2).  In this and earlier work, Buss makes claims for the 
influence  of  evolutionary  pressures  on  proximate  sex-differentiated  mating 
strategies  based  on  data  drawn  from  a  questionnaire  administered  to  10,047 
people in 37 cultures “drawn from 33 countries located on six continents and five 
islands” (1989, p. 1), and on more than 50 subsequent studies (1994, p. 4).  In 
general, the data support the predictions that women will value earning capacity, 
ambition  and  industriousness  more  than  will  men,  and  that  men  will  value 
youth, physical attractiveness and chastity more than will women. 
 
So, for example, we are told that, in Buss’s study, men were found to prefer 
younger wives – around two-and-a-half years younger, on average. The older 
men get, the younger they prefer their women to be:  
In short, contemporary men prefer young women because they have inherited 
from their male ancestors a preference that focused intently upon this cue to a 
woman’s reproductive value (1994, p. 52). 
 
As further ‘proof’ of this preference, Buss cites the historical evidence of kings 
and emperors ‘securing’ younger brides, and of sultans ‘stocking’ their harems 
with “young, attractive, nubile” women. As contemporary evidence, he notes   180
that ‘aging’ rock and movie stars “frequently select women two or three decades 
younger” (1994, p. 63).  
 
Other  health  cues  used  to  evaluate  a  potential  mate  –  clear  eyes,  symmetry, 
waist/hip ratio, blonde hair – are all applied to women since, according to the 
survey, women are less interested in physical attractiveness, having instead an 
“evolved  preference  for  a  man  with  resources”  (1994,  p.  47).  The  rise  in  the 
numbers of high earning women has apparently not affected this preference, and 
this  fact  is  provided  as  proof  that  it  is  an  evolved  preference.    Further,  by 
extension, in choosing men with resources and high status, women are complicit 
in the spread and dominance of patriarchy: 
Men strive to control resources and to exclude other men from resources to fulfill 
(sic)  women’s  mating  preferences  …  Men’s  larger  bodies  and  more  powerful 
status  drives  are  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  preferences  that  women  have 
expressed over the past few million years (1994, p. 47; see also pp 212-214). 
 
Furthermore,  Buss  asserts  that  as  women  age  and  their  reproductive  value 
declines, men become less interested in ‘guarding’ their mates, less interested in 
sex,  and  more  ‘distressed’  by  the  demands  made  upon  them  for  time  and 
attention  (1994,  p.  206).    Consequently,  more  women  engage  in  extramarital 
affairs as they age, because women “seem to know that their desirability on the 
mating market will be higher if they leave their husbands sooner rather than 
later” (1994, p. 207). Once they are no longer capable of reproducing, however, 
women “shift their effort toward parenting and grandparenting” (1994, p. 207).  
 
Leaving  aside  the  problems  inherent  in  extending  results  from  a  self-report 
questionnaire on proximate behaviours to evolutionarily derived drives, there   181
are glaring flaws in the logic of these stories. The finding that contemporary men 
say they prefer to partner with physically attractive women who are younger 
than themselves in no way proves the contention that they (unconsciously) do so 
because these are cues to reproductive potential. It may be so, of course, but it 
may also be that it is both expected and socially acceptable, across cultures, for 
men to express a desire for young, attractive, symmetrical women and that this 
knowledge  has  biased  their  responses  in  the  questionnaire.  A  diminution  of 
‘mate guarding’ by men as relationships lengthen and their partners age is just as 
likely related to an increase in understanding of and trust in each other as it is to 
lowered reproductive value. The further finding that homosexual men want the 
same  standard  of  youth  and  beauty  in  their  partners  –  indeed,  having 
“indistinguishable mating preferences” from heterosexual men (1994, p. 63) – is 
not satisfactorily explained, and must cast some doubt on the adequacy of Buss’s 
conclusions in this regard. 
 
Similarly, it is unquestionably usually more beneficial for a woman to choose a 
man with resources with whom to raise her children; thus, it is not unexpected 
that (even high-earning) women responding to Buss’s survey would say they 
more highly value earning capacity and ambition than would male respondents. 
Perhaps even more to the point, what men and women like cannot be determined 
outside  of  cultural  expectations.  That  women  ‘like’  what  men  like  about 
themselves  (the  resources  they  achieve)  and  do  not  express  unacceptable 
judgments – that, for example, ugly men and old men are worthless men – can 
explain  the  consistency  of  responses  between  high  and  low  earning  women.   182
Again,  notwithstanding  the  broad  cross-cultural  nature  of  the  survey,  this 
outcome merely confirms what we would expect as a result of social expectations 
and arrangements without recourse to evolutionary explanations. Women, after 
all, still control only a very small proportion of the world’s wealth.  
 
The existence of harems is also not a well considered argument in support of the 
notion  of  women  preferentially  choosing  high  status  well-resourced  men 
(although  it  does  support  the  argument  that  men  prefer  young,  attractive 
women) since, on the whole, men decided the fate of these women. In general, 
women were bartered or chosen for the harem, they did not themselves choose. 
Buss’s language is instructive in this case: he speaks of men who ‘select’ women 
(1994, p. 63) or ‘acquire’ wives (1994, p. 52). Finally, and anecdotally of course, 
women know that women are not immune to male youth and beauty – they are 
simply  more  constrained  by  custom  and  culture  from  acting  upon  or  even 
admitting to such an interest than are men of any age. This, also, may well have 
biased the results of Buss’s questionnaire. 
 
In  sum,  the  problem  is  not  so  much  that  the  data  support  the  predictions 
(although we may ask why these specific predictions?), but rather that in tying 
these proximate results from 37 cultures with such certainty to ultimate causes 
engendered  in  the  environment  of  evolutionary  adaptedness  (EEA),157  Buss 
ignores a range of other available alternate readings. Notwithstanding that self-
report  of  these  behaviours  so  commonly  across  cultures  does  not  in  itself 
                                                 
157  According to evolutionary psychologists, the environment to which humans are adapted is the 
Pleistocene epoch, dated around 1.8 million years to 10,000 years ago.    183
sufficiently establish their genetic bona fides, in this work (and other works of 
this kind), E.O. Wilson’s ‘modest genetic differences’ become transmuted into 
sharply  delineated,  genetically-driven,  evolutionarily-embedded,  sex 
differentiated  social  behaviours.158  Any  notion  that  ‘cultural  sanctions  and 
training’  in  ‘virtually  all  existing  environments’  significantly  intervene  in  the 
psychosocial  development  of  the  sexes  is  elided.  The  possibility  that  Wilson 
proffers,  of  genetic  differences  being  completely  cancelled  by  social  training, 
disappears entirely from this story: the data are read exclusively as evidence of 
biological conformity, not of social or even of bio/social conformity. 
 
Academic sociobiologists often stress the importance of clearly understanding 
the (often unspoken) distinction between the ultimate pressures that underpin 
their theorising, and the proximate human behaviours that we see in ourselves 
and in the wider contemporary society. However, works like these of Buss and 
Fisher blur this distinction so utterly that they provide fertile ground for the easy 
transplantation  of  academic  sociobiology  into  the  kind  of  popular  or  vulgar 
sociobiology that feminists so rightly react against, and to which I turn in the 
next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
… just as specialized, distinctively sexual anatomy exists below the neck, so the 
Darwinist expects it to exist above the neck (Symons, 1995, p. 143). 
 
The  reactionary  and  determinist  vision  of  sex-differentiated  human  nature 
presented by sociobiology has been well-rehearsed in the critical literature. When 
                                                 
158  Among others, Baron-Cohen (2003), Daly & Wilson (1998), Fisher (1999), and Thornhill & 
Palmer (2000).   184
contrasted  with  feminism’s  more  liberal  and  constructionist  views,  it  is 
unsurprising  that  engagement  between  the  two  is  most  often  defensive, 
argumentative, and frequently hostile.   
 
Still, most sociobiologists say they do not intend to endorse the status quo in 
their theorising – anyone who reads widely within the field will soon lose count 
of  these  disclaimers.  While  some  sociobiological  work  is  so  unmistakably 
misogynistic or deeply infected by status quo thinking that any such disclaimer is 
rendered meaningless, my inclination is to believe that, for the most part, these 
are expressions of a genuine intent. I accept that the theories espoused by most 
sociobiologists  are  the  outcome  of  a  deeply  held  conviction  that  their 
methodologies have led them to logical  conclusions that, more likely than not, 
accurately  reflect  the  proximate  effects  of  evolutionary  pressures  on  human 
psychology.  
 
What gets lost in the public understanding of sociobiological thought, however, 
is exactly these disclaimers and the positioning of claims as theories, as distinct 
from certainties, and for this sociobiologists must bear some responsibility. The 
task of explicitly owning the uncertainties that are evident in much academic 
sociobiology, or of foregrounding equally plausible alternative explanations for 
social phenomena, is often left undone.159 At the same time, there is a failure to 
defend the integrity of their work from determinist interpretation, which has the 
                                                 
159  Although at times careful explanation is attempted but not heeded; again, see, for example, 
Dawkins on Maynard Smith and the ‘gene for tying shoelaces’, and texts such as Dawkins’ A 
Devil’s Chaplain (2004).     185
effect of seeming to endorse it for the casual reader. Few academic sociobiologists 
publicly take issue with the kinds of popular representations of their work that 
are  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  for  example,160  and  indeed,  in  some  cases 
appear to approve and compound them.161 Nor, as a rule, do they enter public 
debate  to  critique  or  challenge  the  more  extravagant  claims  of  their  own 
colleagues162 – although, in common with other academic disciplines, they do 
maintain a lively and at times self-critical dialogue amongst themselves, and they 
are quick to defend their theories from the public criticisms of outsiders.163 
 
These  comments,  and  the  cautionary  notes  I  have  sounded  throughout  this 
chapter notwithstanding, I do want to suggest that there are constructive aspects 
to sociobiology that show potential for cross-pollination with feminist discourses 
around determinism and difference.  It seems to me that the social biogram is one 
such critical point where there is room for greater accord. Belief in the flexibility 
of the effects that genes have on our behavioural phenome – now supported 
within genetic research – is a constant feature of the sociobiological literature that 
too often gets lost in its less careful manifestations, and disappears entirely from 
vulgar reductionism. If the more careful explanations about gene/environment 
interaction,  found  in  so  much  sociobiology,  are  foregrounded  alongside  the 
                                                 
160  I note that highly visible popularisers of science such as Dawkins and the late Stephen Jay 
Gould have stated that not engaging with proponents of intelligent design is a deliberate strategy 
(see the essay ‘Unfinished correspondence with a Darwinian heavyweight’ (Dawkins, 2004)). 
However, they make their position on intelligent design publicly very clear in other forums. I can 
find no evidence of a similar level of public disparagement of vulgar reductionism.  
161  Compare, for example, the descriptions of women’s behaviour in the bedroom in the texts 
discussed in the next chapter, which predate those of Fisher above.  
162  Again, not always – see Hrdy’s critique of evolutionary psychology, previously mentioned. 
163  The long-running public debate between evolutionist Gould and sociobiologist Dawkins is a 
case  in  point,  as  well  as  the  Dawkins/Midgley  controversy  previously  discussed;  and  see 
Segerstråle (2000).   186
uncertainties  and  complexities  scientists  are  continuing  to  discover  in  post-
genome research, then the charge of determinism cannot be sustained.  
 
Why then continue to focus on arguing with evolutionary psychologists about 
whether  women  are  more  careful  about  relationships  (at  all,  or  because  of 
evolution, or because of social environments), for example, or with sociobiology 
as a whole about claims at this level? Assertions of this kind, it seems to me, are 
not  capable  of  being  solved  and  they  risk  keeping  the  debate  focused  upon 
unproductive ground. If they can’t be ‘solved’, at least they are capable of being 
rendered trite and meaningless. All it would require is to shift the focus of the 
conversation  from  contesting  these  more  specific  and  status-quo  supporting 
claims, to challenging sociobiologists to be much clearer about what they mean 
when they, on the one hand, speak of flexibility, and on the other appear to 
endorse  predetermination.  What  do  evolutionarily  ‘programmed’  mating 
strategies  mean  when  explicitly  located  within  a  science  of  flexibility  and 
interaction? Do they, in the end, mean anything at all? And where would that 
leave the tacit endorsement of vulgar reductionist portrayals of sociobiological 
thinking by academic sociobiologists?   187
 
 
 
Five 
‘Lunch-chasers and nest-defenders’ : vulgar reductionism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Darwinism] is rapidly emerging as the most powerful secular grand narrative 
available to fin de siecle westerners.  
Deborah Cameron (1997, p. 81) 
 
We  have  to  make  the  advantages  of  this  genetic  revolution  available  for 
biomedical  research  and  yet  still  fight  what  I  think  is  the  danger  of  a  naïve 
biological determinism and the consequences that could have for society. 
Eric Lander (1999, p. 14) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The  resurgence  of  academic  interest  in  human  genetics  and  sex  difference 
research  in  recent  times  is  shared  with  us  all  through  a  media  deluge  of 
information, interpretation and speculation that intrudes into our daily lives, and 
shapes our participation in the re-popularisation of genetic/biological determinist 
discourses.  We  have  become  accustomed  to  seeing  newspaper  or  television 
headlines announcing that scientists have discovered ‘the gene for’ this disease, 
or  ‘the  gene  for’  that  complex  human  trait.  Television  documentaries  are 
reappearing as books, books are discussed on radio and in newspaper columns, 
the  Internet  abounds  with  web  pages  and  discussion  groups,  and  academic 
journals across a broad range of disciplines carry articles that in some way touch 
on genetic, sex difference, or sociobiological research.   188
The texts conveying this research to the public generally fall into one of four 
categories: the scientifically credentialed ‘expert’ text (for example, Baron-Cohen, 
2003; Buss, 1994; Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 1995; Fisher, 1999; Gould, 1996; Hamer 
& Copeland, 2000; Hamer, 2004; LeVay, 1994; Pinker, 2003; Thornhill & Palmer, 
2000); collections of commentary and critique, with contributors from a broad 
spectrum of academic disciplines and public interest groups (see Hindmarsh, 
Lawrence,  &  Norton,  1998;  Hubbard  &  Wald,  1999;  Kevles  &  Hood,  1993b; 
Lewontin, 2000a; Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin, 1984; Rose & Rose, 2000); speculative 
or ‘brave new world’ texts (see Broderick, 1999; Kolata, 1997; Robertson, 1996; 
Silver,  1999;  Watson,  2000;  Wilkie,  1993),  and  finally,  ‘popular  culture’  texts, 
including prescriptive ‘bestseller’ and ‘pop science’ texts (a selection of which are 
Argov, 2002; Duggan, 2004; Farrell, 2005, 1988; Frankel, 2004; Gray, 1992, 2008; 
Harvey, 2009; Legato, 2005; Moir & Jessel, 1998; Moir & Moir, 1998; Nelson & 
Galant, 2004; Pease & Pease, 1999, 2002, 2004; Rhodes & Goldner, 1993). In the 
first three categories are the kinds of texts discussed in previous chapters, some 
of  which  may  reach  non-academic audiences, often because of raised profiles 
incited by media interest or controversy. 164 The fourth category are specifically 
targeted at the wider general public.  
 
In  this  chapter  I  aim  to  demonstrate  the  dangers  that  follow  when  largely 
reductionist scientific theory is written into popular culture texts. What gets lost 
in translation, is the imprecision, the uncertainty, and the fluidity of the science 
that  we  see  in  genetic  and  (most)  academic  sociobiology  and  (some)  sex 
                                                 
164  While the vast majority of texts in the first and second categories, at least, of course do not.   189
difference research. What is at risk, then, if practitioners of these sciences are not 
themselves  much  more  proactive  about  policing  how  their  views  are 
disseminated into popular culture, is that the ‘science’ presented in these pop 
culture texts will become widely accepted as definitive.  
 
To this end, I focus my examination of two texts belonging to this last category: 
Anne & Bill Moir’s Why Men Don’t Iron: The Real Science of Gender Studies (1998),165 
and Allan & Barbara Pease’s Why Men Don’t Listen and Women Can’t Read Maps: 
‘How we’re different and what to do about it’ (1999).  I choose these two texts out of 
the plethora of example texts available both because they are representative of 
the wider field (that is, texts that claim to ‘explain’ the sexes to each other), and 
because they are amongst the earliest of the subset of popular advice texts that 
rely  upon  and  purport  to  translate  the  science  emerging  from  genetic,  sex 
difference and sociobiological research and package it for public consumption. 
Both texts were bestsellers,166 attracting a great deal of media attention. In the 
case of the Moir book, for example, its popularity (or notoriety) was driven by its 
development out of a BBC Channel 4 documentary that was widely screened and 
repeatedly re-run over some years, before being further expanded into a panel 
format program.  
  
                                                 
165  The book has since been retitled and reissued as ‘Why men don’t iron: the fascinating and 
unalterable differences between men and women’ and as ‘Why men don’t iron: the new reality of gender 
differences’. 
166  The Pease International website claims that their book has sold over 12 million copies 
worldwide; figures for the Moir book were not available at the time of writing.   190
I am aware it may be thought this kind of text does not merit serious attention, 
either because the arguments are old ones that have all been met before, or even 
that  recognition  gives  to  their  arguments  a  legitimacy  they  would  not  have 
otherwise.  I think this is a wrong-headed assumption. Certainly, on one level, 
the arguments and images are old, and could be easily dismissed. However, they 
have an extraordinarily long shelf life, and while there is as yet no substantive 
proof  of  many of their assertions, they can now claim authoritative scientific 
support for some psychological sex differences being biologically derived. Again, 
I suggest the danger for feminist theory (and society generally) lies not with this 
possibility  in  itself,  but  with  the  ways  in  which  the  insights  of  reductionist 
research are being disseminated and adopted into popular culture through texts 
such as these.  While they may easily be rejected out-of-hand for lack of academic 
rigour  and  expertise,167  their  appeal  to  ‘commonsense’  beliefs,  their  open 
antagonism  to  political  correctness  and  to  feminism,  and  their  attempts  at 
accessible  (often  humourous  and  simplistic)  non-technical  explanations  of 
complex issues, engage a broad readership.   
 
I will not examine the scientific evidence relied upon in the texts in great detail in 
this  chapter,  having  dealt  with  it  or  similar  evidence  extensively  in  earlier 
chapters.  However,  it  is  important  to  realise  at  the  outset  that  ‘science’  is 
represented  by  these authors in a very particular way.  Both books favour a 
reverent view of science and of those who practise it. That is, they assume science 
                                                 
167  One of the authors of Why Men Don’t Iron, Anne Moir, has scientific expertise (a PhD in 
genetics), and has worked for some years in broadcasting, first with the BBC and then as European 
Editor for Canadian Broadcasting in Britain.  Husband and co-author Bill Moir is also a television 
producer.  Allan Pease has a background in sales and runs his own corporate training company of 
which his wife and co-author, Barbara Pease, is CEO.  She also lectures on deportment and 
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is conducted by women and men who are in but, by virtue of their scientific 
objectivity,  not  of  the  societies  from  which  they  compile  their  data.  They 
therefore present the evidence and knowledge emanating from the sciences as 
untainted by the beliefs, expectations and limitations of those scientists.  Further, 
they suggest that such ‘hard science’ is not open to question (certainly not by 
social  scientists),  and  that  where  it  is  not  yet  conclusive  it  soon  will  be.  No 
allowance is made for the possibility that the science could be partial, discredited 
or  disproved,168  nor  for  the  fact  that  scientific  objectivity,  as  has  been 
convincingly  argued,  is  as  much  a  myth  as  Superman  is  fantasy.169  It  is  also 
noteworthy  that  no  mention  is  made  of  the  various  specialisations  within 
scientific  research  from  which  supporting  data  is  taken  and,  therefore,  the 
assumption  is  that all science is equally valid. Indeed, the impression is that 
‘Science’  –  as  a  single  all-encompassing  enterprise  –  is  uniformly  benign, 
altruistic and ultimately beneficial in all its manifestations.  
 
The basic contention of both books is that: 
…  our  minds  are  configured  like  a  computer  at  around  6-8  weeks  after 
conception … so that when we are born we come pre-packaged … Science also 
shows that the basic operating system and its wiring leave little room for change 
… Nature versus nurture? It’s a done deal. Nature had the headstart from the 
very beginning (Pease & Pease, 1999, pp. 60-61).  
 
A  couple  of  main  themes are developed from this contention:  first, that the 
‘essence’  of  male/female  and  hetero/homosexual  lies  in  brain  differentiation 
determined by genes and/or prenatal hormones acting on the foetus, and, second, 
                                                 
168  To be fair to the scientists conducting the research upon which the assertions made in these texts 
rest, for the most part they do not themselves claim such objectivity or certainty and indeed, some 
plainly declare a personal stake in the outcome of their research. 
169  See, for example, Lynda Birke (2000), Anne Fausto-Sterling (1985), Ruth Bleier (1984) and Ruth 
Hubbard (1990).   192
their biology predisposes men to worldly success (and women’s does not). This 
hardwired pre-packaging manifests itself in ways that determine our sexuality, 
gendered  behaviours,  and  future  prospects.    Clearly,  these  claims  are 
problematic.    In  this  chapter,  I  look  at  the  deployment  of  language  which 
functions  to  construct  a  ‘naturally’  justified  edifice  of  male  superiority,  and 
question  why  these  texts  make  the  often  outrageously  simplistic,  sometimes 
offensive, and now and then entirely laughable claims that they do.  
 
The  two  texts  I  discuss  here  share  a  number  of  other  features.  Firstly,  it  is 
noteworthy  that  the  authors  of  each  of  these  texts  are  a  couple,  and  this  is 
explicitly  used  in  the  texts  to  neutralise  the  gendered  implications  of  the 
arguments.170 Secondly, despite their surface differences, the texts are remarkably 
similar  in  the  topics  they  choose  to  focus  upon.  Both  begin  by  asserting  sex 
‘difference’ and then, although their sequential organisation of material differs, 
they draw on the science discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis in the 
same selective way, and to achieve the same end. Both discuss the genetics that 
make  men  different  from  women  (in  a  reversal  of  the  more  usual  claim  that 
women are different from men – but in common with other projects, here men 
are  not  only  different  from,  but  improved  upon,  women).  Both  use  research 
searching for a ‘gay’ gene to establish a genetic basis for differences between 
homosexual and heterosexual men. Finally, both draw upon research into sex 
                                                 
170  The ‘couple-phenomenon’ also appears in scientific work - in sex difference research, for 
example, Bennett & Sally Shaywitz, Kermit & Katharine Hoyenga; in evolutionary psychology, 
Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, John Tooby & Leda Cosmides.   193
hormones, in particular to discuss (endorse) the effects of testosterone on so-
called ‘masculine’ traits.  
 
For the sake of clarity, I have grouped my discussion of the claims from science 
into sections that loosely equate to the book chapters, and to the three themes I 
identified above.  I then draw all the sections together to show that these are 
profoundly conservative books which, while purportedly basing their arguments 
upon  the  ‘latest’  scientific  research,  really  do  little  more  than  use  broad 
generalisations and facile explanations to support the notions that ‘boys will be 
boys’ and that Western society is disintegrating because women are not content 
to accept their genetic destiny as nest builders.   
 
“It’s a basic model!” 
 
Just about the only thing [men and women] have in common is that they belong 
to the same species (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 3). 
 
The vast majority of us are born either genetically female or genetically male.  
That is, we are born with the reproductive and hormonal makeup of one of these 
two sexes.171 Boys have a penis and testes, and the hormonal configuration which 
will,  at  puberty,  initiate  sperm  production  and  the  development  of  male 
secondary sex characteristics such as a deepening of the voice and beard growth. 
Girls have a labia, vagina, and ovaries, and the hormonal configuration which 
                                                 
171    I  am  not  suggesting  that  we  discount  or  ignore  intersex  individuals,  born  with  physical 
characteristics of both male and female; or individuals born with chromosomal and/or hormonal 
makeup that differs from the norm; but for the purposes of this argument I am confining myself to 
speaking of the majority (for discussions of the 'five sexes' see Fausto-Sterling, 1985, 1993, 2000b, 
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will initiate menstruation and breast growth at puberty.  So much cannot be 
disputed. 
 
There  is,  however,  scientific  research  that  suggests  the  differing  genetic  and 
hormonal compositions of male and female do more than this. It suggests that the 
so-called sex hormones are also responsible, ab initio, for hardwired cognitive 
differences  between  the  sexes.  I  have  dealt  with  this  research  in  another 
chapter,172 and will not repeat myself here, except to say that where it has merit, it 
is still insufficiently conclusive to support the claims derived from it in the texts 
under discussion in this chapter. 
 
Why  Men  Don’t  Iron  states  in  its  introduction,  “men  are  distinct:  they  are 
possessed of the differences that make for a real difference” (Moir & Moir, 1998, 
p. 12). Notice these are differences of which men are possessed because, “the 
female is the basic model and he’s the customized version” (1998, p. 108). The 
authors of both Why Men Don’t Iron  and Why Men Don’t Listen pay lip service to 
the politically correct view that, “Men and women are different. Not better or 
worse but different” (Pease & Pease, 1999, p.3, my emphasis).  Nonetheless, they 
present scientific work in a way that endorses a view of  the male sex as both 
more  complex  than  the  female  (customised/basic),  and  more  dynamic 
(active/passive). Yet their evidence is very selective, for it is neither definitive nor 
unchallenged by other research.173   
                                                 
172  See Chapter 3 on sex difference research.  
173  Moir & Moir attempt to hedge their bets on this point by stating, on page 14, that it is "insulting 
to the reader to qualify everything to death … So when we write ‘Science finds such and such’ it 
plainly means that this is the best bet: no more, no less."  As I make clear throughout this chapter, it 
seems to me to be more insulting to the reader to present these so-called ‘best bets’ as conclusive of 
the kinds of inferences the authors draw from them.   195
Both books, for example, assert that the default destination of all human foetuses 
is female (Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 108; Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 195) and that the 
instructions carried on the ‘Y’ chromosome alter that trajectory and cause the 
foetus to instead become a male.  Sex difference researcher Doreen Kimura puts it 
this way: 
Most of the differences between males and females are secondary consequences 
of  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  Y  chromosome.  The  Y  chromosome,  in  the 
normal course of events, determines that testes (male gonads) rather than ovaries 
(female gonads) will form; the testes, in turn, help determine most of the other 
differences between the sexes ... it appears that no special hormonal milieu is 
needed  to  yield  a  female  ...  We  can  summarize  the  process  of  sexual 
differentiation  by  saying  that  the  “default”  or  “basic”  form  in  mammals  is  a 
female ... (2000, pp. 17-18). 
 
However, within the same passage, Kimura goes on to state that testes formation 
is the “critical first step in the production of the male”, but that the “precise 
location and nature” of the “testis-determining factor” is unknown. At best (at 
that time, in the late 1990s), the SRY gene on the Y chromosome was a “strong 
candidate” (2000, p. 17). We cannot, then, be finally convinced, on the evidence 
that these authors had available to them, that the Y chromosome is the sole source 
of determining factors for the development of testes.  Indeed, in light of more 
recent  research  showing  that  almost  half  of  the  genes  related  to  sperm 
production reside on the X chromosome,174 it would seem prudent to say, rather, 
                                                 
174  The finding was made by a team of researchers led by David Page of the Whitehead Institute for 
Biomedical Research in Massachusetts and Howard Hughes Medical Institute in Maryland (Wang, 
McCarrey, Yang, & Page, 2001). "‘Scientists and non-scientists alike are comfortable thinking about 
the Y chromosome as a specialist in male characteristics,’ Page said in a statement. ‘By default, 
we’ve traditionally thought of the X chromosome as sexually neutral or as a specialist in female 
characteristics. Our findings indicate that the X chromosome has a specialty in sperm production, 
much like the Y chromosome does.’... The researchers found 25 genes, including 19 new ones, that 
were expressed exclusively in mouse sperm stem cells. They found that of these, only 3 were linked 
to the Y chromosome and 10 were linked to the X chromosome.  ‘This was a big surprise because if 
the genes had been distributed randomly in the genome, we would have expected none, or at the 
most a couple, of these sperm-specific genes to be X-linked,’ says Page." (Whitehead Institute for 
Biomedical Research, 2001).   196
that the available evidence points to interactions between both sex chromosomes 
in the production of male characteristics. Further, it is reasonable to speculate 
that,  if  the  X  chromosome  is  actively  engaged  in  the  production  of  male  sex 
characteristics, it may also be active in the formation of female sex characteristics.  
Simone de Beauvoir anticipates this idea in The Second Sex, when she says “we 
can assert that every biological fact implies transcendence, that every function 
involves a project, something to be done” (1988, first published 1949, pp. 41-42).  
In the case of the X chromosome, this appears to be so.175   
 
I am, of course, not disputing the fact that a Y chromosome must be present in 
order to engender a male foetus and, in that sense, that sperm determines the sex 
of the child.  What is clear from the research is that the Y chromosome may not be 
the all-powerful motivating force described here; it seems clear that there are 
other, complicating factors involved. More importantly, development as a female 
has not been proved to be an inactive process, a result of the lack of a Y, as 
opposed  to  the  (active)  presence  of  two  X  chromosomes.    As  Anne  Fausto-
Sterling (2000c) comprehensively demonstrates, that question is far from being 
resolved.176 So what is going on here?   Remembering that ‘men are distinct: they 
are possessed of the differences that make for a real difference’, I turn now to the 
arguments for innate sexual orientation. 
 
                                                 
175  See Capel, 1998; Dohler, 1998; Eicher & Washburn, 1986; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Fitch & 
Denenberg, 1998; Sinclair, 1995, 1998; Wolf, 1995.  
176  See in particular, chapter 8, pp 195-232.    197
 
 
 
The ‘gay gene’ 
 
96-99% of men are heterosexual, and almost certainly exclusively heterosexual ... 
sexual preferences are overwhelmingly one way or the other (Moir & Moir, 1998, 
p. 36).  
 
One thing is overwhelmingly clear from the literature on homosexuality:  science 
has emphatically not proved that it is a genetically predetermined ‘condition’.  
However, it is no surprise to find that the authors of both texts state with some 
finality  that  the  question  of  whether  sexuality  is  a  biologically  fixed  or  an 
environmentally induced process has been answered, and biology wins.  
 
In their first chapter,  ‘He’s not part one, part another’, subtitled ‘the bisexual 
fallacy’, Anne & Bill Moir approach the question of homosexuality from three 
interrelated angles – homosexuality as an exclusive orientation; as genetically 
determined,  and  as  induced  by  prenatal  hormones.    Firstly,  they  argue  that 
heterosexuality  and  homosexuality,  at  least  in  the  vast  majority  of  men,  are 
distinct categories of sexual orientation:  
Very few men are bisexual. The vast majority of men are either gay or straight, 
and most men are straight ... There is no sliding scale, no continuum, no latent 
gayness and no universal bisexuality. There is no scary gay in the straight man’s 
closet (1998, pp. 36-37). 
 
It is clearly important to the authors to establish that the overwhelming majority 
of men are exclusively heterosexual and they do this by quoting figures from 
numerous  surveys  conducted  post-Kinsey,  which  variously  report  an  upper 
figure  of  10%  down  to  a  low  of  2.3%  (1998,  pp.  35-36).    And  while  they  do   198
acknowledge the potential flaws in these surveys,177 they proceed to validate the 
low  figure  of  1-4%  of  men  as  homosexual  (including  bisexual)  by  citing 
unreferenced work conducted by Kurt ‘Freud’.178 In these studies, the researcher 
is  said  to  have  used  a  machine  which  measured  small  changes  in  penile 
engorgement  as  men  were  shown  “lubricious  pictures  of  naked  boys”  and 
“luscious centrefold[s]”.  The findings, according to the Moirs, “demonstrated 
almost  beyond  doubt  that  the  vast  majority  of  men  were  either  exclusively 
heterosexual  or  exclusively  homosexual”  (1998,  p.  37).    Clearly,  problems  of 
unreliability and dishonesty would be minimised by this approach since, as the 
authors note, erections are hard to fake (although we might assume also hard to 
control).  However, because the particular studies are not referenced, we have no 
direct way of determining whether there were other validation problems, such as 
self-selection or a statistically insignificant sample size. 
 
In any event, a major problem with this argument is the large body of evidence 
that  exists  about  the  variety  and  mutability  of  same-sex  desire  and  practise, 
throughout history and across cultures. Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000c, p. 18 ff), for 
example, surveys the research literature on this matter and also takes issue with 
the presentation of human sexuality as a gay/straight dichotomy, saying: 
There are many gradations in sexual orientation. What do you call men who have 
sex  with  their  wives  while  fantasizing  about  men?  Or  guys  who  are  mostly 
straight who pick up male prostitutes, or transsexuals, or serial bisexuals who 
may switch between exclusively gay and exclusively straight relationships? How 
                                                 
177  That is, that they used unreliable samples, or that respondents are dishonest about their sexual 
experiences. 
178  Although the Moirs cite Kurt ‘Freud’ in both text and index, and do not reference the relevant 
studies, we can be reasonably certain they are referring to the work of Czech sexology researcher, 
Dr Kurt Freund, developer of the penile plethysmograph, a device to measure penile blood flow 
(see, for example, Freund, 1991; see also Furr, 1991).    199
do  you  count  sexual  behaviour  that  changes  over  time  in  different 
circumstances? (quoted in Nimmons, 1994, p. 68). 
 
It is necessary for the Moirs to establish exclusivity of sexual orientation in order 
to argue that it is fixed in the womb, by a combination of genes and hormones.  
For this claim they rely in part upon the 1993 research led by Dean Hamer, which 
was reported in Science as the discovery of the ‘gay gene’.179 This gene is first 
acknowledged by the Moirs as controversial, but is then validated as fact: 
Dan  (sic)  Hamer’s  ‘gay’  gene  might  not  cause  gayness  at  all,  but  merely 
predispose its possessor to the real causes of homosexuality. If that is true, then 
for the gay gene to be expressed requires further biological action, and that seems 
most likely because, confusingly, some homosexuals do not possess the so-called 
‘gay’  gene  at  all.  Something  else,  either  an  unidentified  gene  or  a  biological 
process, made them gay (1998, p. 41). 
 
There are a number of claims here: the ‘gay’ gene exists, although it is not always 
expressed;180 those homosexuals who don’t possess the particular gene identified 
by Hamer must have another one; or there is another ‘real’ cause, still a biological 
process, which ‘makes’ them gay.   
 
While the Moirs attempt to cover all possibilities consistent with their argument, 
Allan & Barbara Pease offer no alternatives to the straightforward conclusion 
that:   
Those carrying the ‘gay gene’ as it is now called, have a 40% to 70% chance of 
becoming  gay  ...  the  X928  (sic)181  region  of  the  X  chromosome  ...  has  been 
determined  to  be  the  approximate  location  ...  The  likelihood  of  the  gene 
                                                 
179  See Hamer and colleagues (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993). This research found 
that 33 pairs of gay brothers, out of a sample size of 40 pairs, carried an identical strand of DNA on 
the long arm of the X chromosome, Xq28. 
180  Other researchers have been unable to replicate these studies. George Rice and a team from 
University of Western Ontario conducted a study similar in method to Hamer’s using 52 gay 
brothers, and "found no evidence of linkage of sexual orientation to Xq28" (Rice, Anderson, Risch, 
& Ebers, 1999). Further, an unpublished study from the University of Chicago, studying 54 pairs of 
gay brothers, also failed to find a statistically significant link with Xq28 (discussed in Sardar, 1999). 
Hamer himself has many times denied that there is "a single, all-powerful ‘gay gene’" (Gallagher, 
1998, p. 32). 
181  The region in question is Xq28.   200
becoming  penetrant  appears  to  be  largely  dependent  on  the  presence  of  the 
testosterone hormone six to eight weeks after conception (1999, p. 204). 
 
The hormonal environment within the womb is the other ‘real’ cause identified 
also by the Moirs, and this claim rests on Simon LeVay’s controversial work on 
brain physiology.  
 
Specifically,  LeVay  conducted  a  study  into  a  cell  cluster  known  as  the  third 
interstitial nucleus of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH3).  In the study, LeVay 
autopsied the brains of 19 homosexual men, six women, and 22 heterosexual 
men, and demonstrated that there was a measurable difference in the size of this 
cell cluster between straight and gay men and, further, that the cell clusters in 
gay men were in the same size range as those in the women (1991).182  
 
Le  Vay’s  results  immediately  attracted  criticism,  primarily  that  all  19 
homosexuals included in the study had died from AIDS, as had six of the 22 
heterosexual men, and there was no non-AIDS gay group as a control (see Byne 
& Parsons, 1993).183  The Moirs dismiss this criticism with the news that it ‘lost its 
force’ after LeVay investigated the brains of homosexuals who had not died of 
AIDS, and once again discovered that they presented a “typical female pattern” 
(1998,  p.  45).  They  conclude  that  LeVay’s  findings  not  only  support  their 
construction of gay men as far more like women than like heterosexual men, but 
also their contention that gay men are ‘born that way’. However, LeVay himself 
                                                 
182  Anne Fausto-Sterling also disputes that LeVay found a ‘demonstrable difference’, remarking 
instead that he had found a ‘distributional difference’ (in Nimmons, 1994, p. 68). 
183  See also LeVay & Hamer (1994), Byne (1994), Byne et al (2001) and E.A. Wilson (2000).   201
disagrees with this interpretation of his work.  In an interview reported in 1994, 
he said: 
I did not prove that homosexuality is genetic, or find a genetic cause for being 
gay. I didn’t show that gay men are ‘born that way,’ the most common mistake 
people make in interpreting my work ... Since I looked at adult brains we don’t 
know if the differences I found were there at birth or if they appeared later ... The  
differences I found could have developed after a person was born (in Nimmons, 
1994, p. 66). 
 
Both Why Men Don’t Iron and Why Men Don’t Listen present Hamer’s and LeVay’s 
findings as though they have conclusively proven the fact of genetic/hormonal 
causes of homosexuality, when in fact they have done no such thing. So we are 
left asking: why do they do this and, more importantly, who benefits from such a 
conclusion?  
   
To answer these questions we need to examine the other  conclusions the authors 
draw from this claim of a biological cause for homosexuality. When we do this,  
we find that it works on several levels.  Firstly, while carefully disavowing any 
homophobia – by claiming homosexuality as ‘natural’, for instance – the authors 
are also able to assert that homophobia itself is ‘natural’ in heterosexual readers 
(“‘What I don’t understand,’ Anne asks, ‘is why you men are so rude about gays, 
calling them bloody shirt lifters...’ ‘We can call them much worse than that,’ Bill 
says.” (Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 33)). Thus, they play to the prejudices of the reader 
(if  so  inclined)  and  reassure  them  that  they  are  ‘normal’  to  think  this  way. 
Further, the Moirs advise homosexuals that “the best way to reduce society’s 
antipathy towards homosexuality is ... to practice more restraint”, thus shifting 
the burden for ‘straight’ homophobia to the gay community (1998, p. 33). 
    202
The Pease book goes further than this, recommending that, since it has been 
‘proven’ that stress and illness suppress testosterone production, which in turn 
produces a hormonal environment in the womb which can result in a gay child, 
“if you intend to become pregnant, it’s a good idea to start thinking about having 
a break and to monitor your surroundings for undue stress” (1999, p. 209).184 This 
both  pathologises  homosexuality,  placing  it  firmly  within  the  category  of  a 
congenital defect that all prospective parents should (and would) seek to avoid at 
all costs, and blames women for their failure to do so.  
 
Next, the arguments reassure the heterosexual reader – both male and female – 
that  there  is  no  gay  lurking  in  the  (particularly  male)  subconscious.    A 
heterosexual man is a real man; a homosexual man, somehow, is not.  This leads 
inevitably to the ultimate conclusion that gay men are not really men, but are 
actually more like women.  Gay men have “a female brain structure” (Moir & Moir, 
1998, p. 45) and, “boys will be boys, but not always” (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 
193), the implication being that some boys (gay boys) will be girls. 
 
In terms of the political effect of these books, however, the really important point 
is none of these things. Within a framework of difference, this careful exposition 
on the causes of and reactions to homosexuality is most important because it 
works to strengthen the argument that real men are not like women.   
 
                                                 
184  A claim possibly based upon work such as that by Lee Ellis & M. Ashley Ames (1987), who 
theorise that maternal stress is a factor (but only one among many other possible factors), in 
homosexual orientation.   203
Testosterone rules 
 
“... and it isn’t only his sexual orientation that is customized. Even a man’s level 
of aggression is fixed in the womb. The more testosterone a foetus gets, the more 
aggressive he’ll be as an adult” “A hot rod, eh?” (Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 108). 
 
According to these texts, then, ‘real’ men, that is heterosexual men, aren’t like 
women; they are both more customised, and more dynamic.  The so-called ‘male’ 
hormone,  testosterone,  is  not  only  responsible  for  effecting  (what  might  be 
called)  the  fundamental  differences,  but  is  also  the  primary  ingredient  for  a 
cascade  of  secondary  differences  that  have  wide-ranging  effects  on  our 
behaviours, choices, and possibilities.185  Men are said to have a stronger sex 
drive, to be both more aggressive and more competitive than women, and to 
score higher on tests of spatial and math aptitude.186  It is important to consider 
the significance attached to each of these claims by the authors, because of the 
implied personal and social consequences. 
 
Both texts argue that men have a considerably higher sex drive and are more 
easily  sexually  aroused  than  women.187  I  concern  myself  here  only  with  the 
knock-on effects the authors identify as resulting from the fact that,  “The sexual 
drive in both women and men is fuelled by testosterone and men have 1,000% 
                                                 
185  See Robert Sopolsky’s The trouble with testosterone (1998), and also his ‘Testosterone rules’ (1997), 
the latter essay discovered some years after the title of this section of my chapter had been chosen. 
186  Other hormones have been implicated as well, for example serotonin and dopamine levels in 
risk-taking behaviours; cortisol in competitive behaviours.  However, cortisol – which "provokes 
anxiety and counsels caution" is said to be a disadvantage to competition and is tagged as "much 
more the women’s hormone" (Moir & Moir, 1998, pp. 172-173). 
187  It is useful to note here that a primary source for many of the claims made in the Moir text on T 
effects acknowledges the cultural effects on difference and the change over time given new cultural 
circumstances: “In the past, it was assumed that women had a weaker drive, that women were 
more difficult to sexually arouse ... Some research finds women to be less sexually arousable than 
men, but only because of cultural expectancies and because women have had fewer sexual 
experiences ... Women are culturally expected to be less arousable ... Until the last three decades, 
before marriage, men were more likely to be more sexually experienced than were women. This has 
changed” (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979, pp. 382-383). 
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more”  (Moir  &  Moir,  1998,  p.  221).  There  are  three  main elements: the links 
between high levels of testosterone and sexual aggression, sexual novelty, and 
pornography. Let us look at the last element first and recognise at the outset that 
pornography  is  a  somewhat  vexed  subject,  even  amongst  feminists.    Not  all 
women are opposed to pornography, and nor are all men drawn to it.  That said, 
I suggest that most women, and many men, no matter what their stance is on 
pornography per se, would still be disturbed and insulted by the assertions made 
by these texts in regard to it.  
 
The authors of Why Men Don’t Listen argue that men need their pornography at 
least partly because of their testosterone-induced superior spatial skills.  That is, 
they need to look at visual depictions of curves, lines and shapes; looking at 
centrefolds satisfies their “biological urges” (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 252).  Their 
partners should not feel threatened by this, since “When he looks at a naked 
woman, he doesn’t wonder if she has a nice personality, can cook or play the 
piano... For him, it’s not much different to admiring a leg of ham” (1999, p. 241).  
The Moir book, though, attributes men’s need for pornography to more than the 
satisfaction  of  an  innate  need  for  visual  stimulation.    These  authors  say  that 
pornography  is  not,  as  feminists  and  others  have  argued  (and,  we  might  be 
excused for thinking, the Pease book has just rather convincingly demonstrated), 
an objectification of women, but rather a response to men’s unfulfilled need to be 
objectified as an object of lust by women: 
He worships the woman who sees him as a sex object. It is the male dreamland in 
which he can have all he wants, without jealousy, effort, or risk.  It is a fantasy 
(not  a  fancy)  woman  that  is  the  object  of  his  adoration.  And  that  fantasy  is   205
deliberately fed as much by real women as by their cyber-sisters (1998, pp. 232-
233).  
 
Real women, we are told, feed the fantasy by ‘leading him on’.  They wear tight 
jeans, bikinis, revealing clothes, to provoke and titillate.  Or alternatively, they 
veil themselves, wear the chador, which also “only encourages the male’s fantasy 
life. The intimate is hidden, prompting visions of the unclad houri in Paradise” 
(1998, p. 233). In short, then, men’s need for pornography is hormonally induced, 
and deliberately provoked by women; and, further, it is something for which 
men should bear no responsibility because it is, after all, not a degradation of 
women but is rather men seeking to enjoy “a fantasy of perfection” (1998, p. 239). 
 
Moving on to the second element, sexual novelty, perhaps it is also the quest for 
a fantasy of perfection which leads men to “fool themselves into believing they 
have a harem of different women by dressing their partners in a range of sexy 
clothing and lingerie. It is, in effect, his version of putting a bag over her head to 
provide a variety of different appearances” (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 235).  Both 
texts  state  that  men  have  an  evolution-driven  biological  imperative  to 
impregnate as many women as possible.188  Since this is unacceptable behaviour 
in today’s modern world, civilised men in monogamous relationships subvert 
this urge by pretending variety and creating novelty with their partners.  On the 
other hand, women don’t put bags over their men’s heads because our biological 
imperative is not for variety, but for a male who will stay around long enough to 
help us rear our children.  It is so important to us to have a man to fulfil this role, 
                                                 
188  Again, this is a much simplified version of this concept drawn from evolutionary psychology 
and confuses proximate with ultimate causes. See chapter 4.   206
the authors seem to be suggesting, that we are more than happy to model our 
‘paper  bags’  in  the  bedroom.189  After  all,  in  “denying  himself  sex  outside 
marriage he makes a biological sacrifice comparable to her having the children” 
(Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 230). 
 
Finally, high testosterone levels (T levels) in the male are also said to be closely 
linked to levels of aggression, specifically sexual aggression.  Curiously, despite 
this claim, neither text has much to say on the question of sexual aggression, 
other than to note that most sexual assaults are committed by males between the 
ages of 17-25 years, and that the incidence of them declines with age and lower T 
levels.  Further, the Moir text suggests that while “[v]iolent rape is associated 
with higher T levels ... the non-violent rapist [that is, a rapist who does not beat 
or injure, other than to sexually and emotionally injure by the forced sex act 
itself] generally has an average level” (1998, p. 222).190 
 
More space is devoted to men’s higher levels of non-sexual aggression, which, it 
is  said,  are  implicated  in  their  greater  propensity  for  risk-taking  and 
competitiveness. In turn, this leads to their better positioning for worldly success. 
It certainly seems to be true that men and boys do participate in riskier, more 
dangerous  sports  and  occupations,  and  that  they  are  more  aggressively 
competitive than girls and women.  The texts variously cite drag racing (Pease & 
Pease, 1999, p. 137) and Formula One racing (Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 159), flying 
jumbo jets (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 139) and F14 Tomcats (Moir & Moir, 1998, p. 
                                                 
189  Though figures on marriage, divorce and single motherhood tell a somewhat different story. 
190  In saying this, the Moirs seem to lend some colour to Andrea Dworkin’s claim that all men are 
potential rapists (1988). 
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159),  and  share  trading  and  futures  trading  (1998,  pp.  158,  162),  as  risky 
occupations dominated by men.   
 
In the area of competitive sport, they state that “males have a 10% advantage” 
over women in track and field events, “and nature will keep it that way” (1998, p. 
165).  Men run faster, play harder, and compete always to win.  Women may 
compete  to  win,  but  will  forego  the  podium,  the  big  corporate  deal,  or  the 
important conference, in order to be home for a daughter’s birthday party (1998, 
p. 167).  
 
It is possibly true that the majority of men will continue to have a 10% advantage 
over the majority of women in track and field sports, but this will be purely as a 
function of their average height, weight, and muscle distribution advantage, not 
because of any hormonal differences which give them a biological will to win 
which  women  lack.  Despite  the  arguments  of  these  authors  for  the  male’s 
aggressive ‘edge’, it is not true that females are not aggressive, and there is good 
evidence to suggest that, although the style of aggression may differ, women are 
just as aggressive as men.191 
 
It is by far more likely that all of these differences, from drag racing to winning 
marathons, to not missing children’s birthday parties, are a response to socially 
accepted roles, and socially expected emotions.  Men are expected to take risks, be 
tougher, run harder, and sacrifice family for work commitments; and as Larry 
                                                 
191  The question of male/female differences in aggression is discussed in chapter 3 of the thesis, but 
also see Kaj Bjorkqvist & Pirrko Niemela (1992) for a full discussion on this point, chapters 6 to 8 in 
particular. 
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Summers’ comments quoted in chapter 3 of this thesis made very clear, it is 
expected that women will put family first, and their own ambitions and interests 
second.  Females are not expected, nor is it acceptable, for them to be aggressive.  
However, as the authors of a seminal text on gender differences note, “If we 
change our gender stereotypes, gender-related differences should also change” 
(Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979, p. 3).   
 
This brings us to the last of the claims attributed to testosterone – spatial and 
mathematical aptitude. Moir & Moir state that boys, “are much more likely to 
excel at higher mathematics, at physics and at economic studies, indeed at any 
area  where  mathematical  reasoning  is  needed”.  Males  have  an  “inbuilt 
advantage”, and there are, at the top end of the scale, “thirteen mathematically 
gifted males to every one female” (1998, p. 118). The increasing percentage of 
female  math  teachers  (and  of  females  generally  in  math-related  fields)  is 
explained by Pease & Pease in this way:  
… women are more suited to teaching, interaction and organising groups, and 
are more committed to learning the basics than men.  Because they are teaching 
the same material over and over, they can do an excellent job with teaching most 
subjects,  including  maths.  This  would  also  explain  why  in  the  field  of 
accountancy  there  is  a  general  increase  in  the  number  of  female  accountants 
(1999, p. 136). 
 
However,  boys’  competitive  and  aggressive  ‘natures’  are  identified  as 
shortcomings  in  today’s  ‘feminised’  schooling  systems  in  the  Western  world, 
where boys are placed at a disadvantage by the adoption of cooperative and non-
confrontational teaching methods which favour the naturally preferred learning 
styles of girls.     209
There  have  indeed  been  changes  to  teaching  and  classroom  management 
methods over the past three decades. Some of the changes, of course, have been 
aimed specifically at making the learning environment more girl-friendly; these, 
though,  have  often  been  seen  as  most  necessary  in  those  areas  of  math  and 
science teaching in which the authors of these texts admit boys have historically 
been  advantaged  –  although  they  claim  the  advantage  is  biologically-driven. 
Many of the changes in pedagogical practice have come about, not with a direct 
goal of making classrooms more or less girl- or boy-friendly, but in response to a 
recognition of just the kind of thinking that these authors espouse: children are 
now  credited  with  individual  needs,  prior  experiences,  and  talents.  These 
changes  are  a  rejection  of  what  Paolo  Freire  labelled  the  ‘banking’  style  of 
teaching  and  learning  which  has  dominated  our  classrooms  for  most  of  the 
history of formal education (1993).192 Far from being an attempt to feminise the 
classroom, they are an attempt to cater to the needs and strengths of each child 
(and, of course, different systems, schools, and individual teachers do this more 
or less successfully, but that is another argument, and not relevant here). 
 
Nature versus nurture 
 
Men  and  women  should  be  equal  in  terms  of  their  rights  to opportunities to 
exercise their full potential, but they are definitely not identical in their innate 
abilities (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 7). 
 
“Hard science”, say the Moirs, “demonstrates substantial biological differences 
between  the  sexes;  differences  that  are  not,  and  cannot  be,  culturally 
engendered”  (Moir  &  Moir,  1998,  p.  13).    In  support,  both  the  texts  being 
                                                 
192  See chapter 2. 
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discussed  here  stress  the  point  that  in  three  decades  of  ‘equality’  these 
“fundamental sex differences” have hardly changed. I would argue, rather, that it 
is clearly not biological sex differences but rather culturally engendered values 
and belief systems that these texts are all about defending.  
 
Boys, these authors tell us, are disadvantaged at school and in society in general, 
because their natural tendencies toward competition and aggressiveness aren’t 
catered  for  in  the  ‘feminised’  school  system,  and  furthermore,  that  today’s 
parents are too quick to medicate for “normal boyish behaviour” (1998, p. 141).  
The education system needs to be ‘masculinised’, and teachers need to re-learn 
the  particular  skills  of  teaching  boys:  lots  of  tests  instead  of  continuous 
assessment, competition instead of cooperation, work that allows for a real sense 
of  ‘action’ and for a much shorter attention span.   
 
We are told that, because of their unique genetic and hormonal makeup males 
also have a “near monopoly of the untalented extreme” (1998, p. 179) and, since 
there are so many more males at the lower end of success (women have less 
geniuses,  but  also  less  abject  failures),  the  ‘workplace  revolution’  has  been 
disastrous for men. This is a problem created, maintained and accelerated by 
women, because women will accept less congenial working conditions, make less 
trouble,  and  work  for  lower  pay  than  men.  In  the  professions,  such  as  law, 
women are preferred because they are not as “obsessed as the male with pay and 
status” and work just as long hours and as productively as men but, rightly, are 
not paid as much as a male employee because, in the long run, he is “putting in   211
more effort ... she is much more likely to be doing unprofitable legal aid work 
because it makes her feel useful” (1998, p. 186).  
 
In the boardroom, because of their differing biological equipment, “his chances 
of sitting on a major board are only one in 55,555. Hers are one in a million”. This 
is not a social barrier – “there are no real barriers to a woman’s success”  – but 
simply a reflection that “women are not taking up the challenge because it does 
not  suit  their  biology”  (1998,  pp.  191-192).  Men  are  more  competitive  and 
aggressive and, in consequence, they succeed more often than do women in the 
corporate world, the political world, and the world of highly paid sport. Women, 
who don’t have the biological advantages vouchsafed to men, should accept that 
this is so, and leave the men to it. 
 
On the other hand, we are told that boys and men don’t know what to expect or 
how to behave in today’s world because: 
We move from a time of sharply drawn lines to a time where the line drawn is 
against the drawing of lines.  Fifty years ago a man was expected to play the 
dominant role ... Today the expectation is of a sexual parity at home and at work 
... Lines of demarcation, present for millennia, are being blurred (1998, p. 19).  
 
And, according to the Pease book: 
 
Things were simple: he was the lunch-chaser, she was the nest-defender ... Her self-
worth  came  from  the  man’s  appreciation  of  her  home-making  and  nurturing 
skills (1999, p. 13). 
 
And that’s the argument in a nutshell, despite the politically correct disclaimers 
sprinkled throughout both texts:  women are much happier taking care of others, 
men are much happier when women are busy taking care of them (and keeping 
the children quiet), and society as a whole would be much better off if women   212
would only accept their biological limitations and go back to their kitchens, or 
nurseries, or volunteer caring work. 
 
So in effect, the argument is that there are, and always have been, lines drawn 
between the sexes by biological forces which are as “ineradicable as the leopard’s 
spots”, which are natural, and are therefore not to be meddled with. Nature has so 
organised the sexes that there are “constant masculine values” (Moir & Moir, 
1998, p. 121) which ensure that ‘real’ men will always hold the top jobs, make the 
most money, eat red meat, read maps the ‘right’ way up, largely ignore their 
children’s bodily needs, and never iron a shirt if there’s a woman around to do it 
for them.  
 
It is a demonstrable nonsense to invoke a socially constructed and disseminated 
belief system such as ‘masculine values’ and claim it as a biological given, almost 
as nonsensical as claiming that, “When you learn a new skill, you pass it on 
genetically to your children” (Pease & Pease, 1999, p. 17). Even if we were to 
adopt a generous interpretation of what these authors may have meant here, it is 
a serious misinterpretation of the theory of memes, which broadly suggests a 
means for the transmission of social knowledge (see Dawkins, 2006, p. 192 ff).  
 
In sum, all of these arguments clearly commit the naturalistic fallacy that because 
it  is  natural  (whatever  that  may  mean)  it  is  also  right.  As  I  read  them,  the 
animating purpose of these works is not to interpret science for us but to use 
science to defend the status quo against the criticism of feminists in particular. 
Their message is that the way society has been constructed in the past is ‘natural’,   213
‘right’,  because  it  suits  our  evolutionary  development;  and today’s feminised 
society, today’s feminists, are responsible for all the ills of the Western world 
consequent upon the overturning of this ‘natural’ order. The way it was when it 
benefited men was the way nature intended it to be. It is pure coincidence that 
men’s personal, financial, sexual and political interests all manage to coincide 
with their biological imperatives, while those of women allow for them to again 
be  subsumed  into  personal  compromise  and  domestic  drudgery.  In  effect,  in 
their arguments from difference, these texts do much more than avert necessary 
social change – they actively set out to reverse it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Language is a powerful mediator of belief, and widely held beliefs influence 
social practice. We see the evidence of this on our televisions every day, in the 
preponderance of busty women (most men like big breasts) and blonde women 
(blondes  have  more  fun)  on  our  screens;193  in  the  thinness  of  women  on  the 
catwalks (fat is ugly); and in images of men as stronger, more protective, tougher 
than women (boys don’t cry). While none of these issues is trivial, we can see the 
more serious effects of the kind of thinking exemplified by these texts in, for 
example, the high incidence of eating disorders, such as anorexia and bulimia, 
primarily in young women in western countries;194 or when we think of certain 
sex-biased  cultural  preferences  and  practices  in  some  non-western  countries,  
                                                 
193  Or, in evolutionary psychology, blonde hair signals youth and fecundity. 
194 Although clearly cultural emphasis on body image is not the only cause of eating disorders. One 
Victorian study found that nearly 9% of female adolescents suffered from an eating disorder (see 
http://www.eatingdisorders.org.au/media/key-statistics.html).   214
periodically revisited in the western media and to some extent now part of the 
western literature around damaging sexed practices and beliefs.   
 
Each of the books discussed in this chapter, though perhaps the Moir book more 
explicitly, sets itself up as a corrective to address the supposed imbalance and 
inequity experienced by men because of the so-called feminisation of Western 
society.  The  pendulum  of  inequality,  they  assert,  has  been  set  swinging  by 
feminism  and  has  swung  too  far  the  other  way;  men  and  boys  are  now  the 
disadvantaged sex.  If this were true, and if the purpose of these authors was to 
achieve a state of true equality between the sexes, that would be a laudable aim – 
one  with  which  many  feminists  could  perhaps  find  common  ground.  But  I 
believe that equality for women and men is not what they seek, and that despite 
the rhetoric, these books are not even-handed in their evaluation of the sexes. The 
balance and harmony they profess to seek is based upon an interpretation of an 
essential  male  and  female  difference,  if  there  be  any,  which  is  profoundly 
disadvantageous  for  and  contemptuous  of  women.  The  true  subject  of  these 
books is ‘man’, their purpose to return him to his ‘rightful’ place, and their titles 
are only the first indication that these books play dirty – men don’t, women can’t.  
This is a very convenient position from which to ensure that men retain choice 
and agency, whilst women do not. 
 
Texts of this kind feed off and feed into the desire for easy answers to difficult 
questions in an increasingly complicated world. They fit neatly into the ongoing   215
conservative  backlash  against  feminism195  and  the  increasing  interest  in 
‘masculinity’ studies, by presenting a popular oversimplification of the messages 
of the new genetics and sociobiological theory, effectively propping up so-called 
‘commonsense’  assumptions  about  the  essential  ‘nature’  of  femaleness  and 
maleness, masculinity and femininity, in order to reinforce the status quo.  The 
late  Stephen  Jay  Gould  was  not  speaking  of  these  books  when  he  said  that 
theories are most successful when they let us believe that our “social prejudices 
are scientific facts after all” (paraphrased in Baxter, 1994),  but he could well have 
been.  Nature  versus  nurture  may  well  be  a  ‘done  deal’,  but  contrary  to  the 
arguments put forward in these and other texts like them – and for which some 
of the reductionist science discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis must bear 
some responsibility – we are not yet able to say with any degree of certainty what 
that deal might be.   
 
I believe these books are dangerous in their use of broad generalisations and 
facile  explanations  of  complex  theoretical  concepts,  patronising  in  tone  and 
patriarchal  in  intent,  and  offensive  to  both  sexes.  Their  conservative  and 
prescriptive character enhances the possibilities for a regressive realignment of 
opportunities  and  societal  expectations  based  on  perceptions  about  gendered 
abilities  and  behaviour.  Given  their  penetration  into  popular  culture  and 
everyday belief systems, neither feminist theorists nor the scientists upon whose 
work many of these claims are based can afford to dismiss these books as mere 
                                                 
195  For a thorough examination of the backlash against feminism in Western cultures, see Susan 
Faludi (1992).    216
‘pop culture’. Nor can feminists hope to overcome their broad appeal by taking 
issue with them on the basis of their oppressive effect upon women.  
 
Both sides of the campus must come together to disrupt the effects of vulgar 
reductionism by holding it to account to fairly represent the uncertain and fluid 
nature  of  much  of  the  research  upon  which  it  relies.  It  is  perhaps  wishful 
thinking that the media would also play their part by foregoing sensationalism in 
the  interests  of  accuracy;  but  at  the  very  least  they  must  be  encouraged  to 
provide greater opportunities for scientists and others to inform, educate, debate, 
and to correct public misinterpretations of their findings. At the end of the day, 
the status of science being what it is, scientists themselves must take the lead in 
averting  the  threat  to  the  position  of  women  in  society  by  paying  sufficient 
attention  to  the  wider  social  effects  of  their  theories,  and  more  vigorously 
policing and disputing the interpretations placed upon their ‘truth’ claims by 
whatever means possible. That they don’t do so, and do so vigorously, makes 
them vulnerable to/opens them up to the suspicions/recriminations discussed in 
previous  chapters.  For  undeniably,  where  science  is  not  careful  or  vigilant 
enough, vulgar reductionism is what we are left with.   217
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part three : “The organism is predecessor to our theories about it” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We have to be more careful not only with our own theorising but also with what we 
think to be true, since we can theorise without giving our theories the truth status. 
Catherine Stimpson (quoted in Bacchi, 1990, p. 228)  
 
 
[M]odern conceptions of scientific truths can be seen as lying on a continuum ranging 
from claims that “all human knowledge is relative” to the positivists’ claims that “science 
can produce solid truths about the real world if coupled with logic and reason” … both of 
these  oppugnant  positions  are  problematic.  It  is,  however,  a  tricky  task  to  locate  an 
intellectually defensible position on the slippery continuum between these antipodes of 
“no truth” and “absolute truth”.  
John D. Baldwin (2008, p. 1)  
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Six 
Intersections : feminism and reductionist theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because gender is premised on the expulsion of biology, and because gender has 
indeed  become  feminism’s  “central  explanatory  and organizing category”, the 
possibility  of  thinking  biology  as  other  than  an  excluded,  distant,  and 
foundational  ruse  has  been  foreclosed  in  the  majority  of  feminist  projects. 
Feminist critiques of the stomach or hormonal structure are not merely unlikely 
in  this  critical  environment;  they  have  been  rendered  unthinkable  …  biology 
becomes the excluded, unthought, simple ground from which feminist analysis is 
fashioned. 
Elizabeth Wilson (1998, p. 55) 
 
Rejecting the biological explanations merely because they are biological is to give 
them more power than they deserve. 
Marlene Zuk (2002, p. 190)  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Almost  fifteen  years  ago,  Patricia  Gowaty  organised  an  ‘Ev  and  Fem’ 
symposium, with the intention of facilitating a “new dialogue at the frontiers 
created by the interfaces of feminisms and evolutionary biology”.196 The role she 
found herself undertaking, instead, was “as interpreter and apologist for both at 
the  contested,  old  boundaries  between  them”  (1997b,  p.  1).  The  preceding 
chapters in this thesis demonstrate that the old boundaries continue to exist. But 
so,  albeit  in  a  still  limited  and  under-utilised  way,  do  the  frontiers  and new 
                                                 
196  Evolutionary biology, in this context, encompassing both classic sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology. The symposium, the Society for the Study of Evolution – University of Georgia State of 
the  Art  Symposium  on  Evolutionary  Biology  and  Feminism,  was  held  at  the  University  of 
Georgia’s Institute of Ecology on 13-14 June, 1994.   219
dialogue  for  which  Gowaty  was  hoping.  This  chapter  is  concerned  with  the 
interesting dialectic relationship between critique and construct in the highly 
political,  and  politicised,  environment  of  mutual  suspicion  and 
misunderstanding within which we habitually debate the biology/culture split. 
 
A number of feminists, writing from within their diverse disciplinary homes in 
psychology,  philosophy,  corporeal  theory,  and  the  natural  sciences,  have 
attempted to work within this inhospitable environment in an attempt to draw 
together  feminist  and  reductionist  approaches  to  (socio)biology.  While  all  of 
these works share a common interest in bridging the gulf between these two 
endeavours, and in this sense are to be celebrated, they differ in approach and in 
what they are hoping to achieve. That is to say, there are distinctions to be made 
in the animating logic of these works and, as a result, they are more or less 
successful in advancing a feminist agenda.  
 
The critical dialectic 
 
The empirical research undertaken by the sociobiological feminists informs the 
critical reinterpretation of existing theory, acting to promote the inclusion of a 
female  perspective  within  sociobiological  models  and  reductionist  discourse. 
Sarah Hrdy ascribes the particular insights of this research in part to feminism, 
but largely to the fact that she, and other women fieldworkers, were more likely 
than their male counterparts to pay attention to the ‘unexpected’ behaviour of the 
(non-human)  females  within  the  groups  they  were  observing  (1999,  original   220
publication 1981, p. xviii).197 These ‘unexpected behaviours’, that had in the past 
been  dismissed  as  merely  atypical,  form  the  centrepiece  of  much  feminist 
sociobiological work, and the basis for extending their theories into the sphere of 
human female behaviour. Hrdy’s fieldwork with langur monkeys in the 1970s 
led her to theorise that the female promiscuity she  observed was at least in part 
an evolved strategy to counter infanticide – that is, males who had mated with an 
individual female were less likely to kill offspring they had potentially sired – as 
well as to provide extra assistance through the creation of ‘alloparents’ (1977).198 
Hrdy  expands  on  this  insight  by  observing  that  similar  strategies  have  been 
found among women in a number of traditional societies, and uses it to sound a 
cautionary note for modern societies: 
Forget  the  image  of  promiscuous  women  having  “fun.”  At  stake  is  a  serious 
endeavor:  mothers  making  do  under  difficult  circumstances.  Mother-centered 
models force us to rethink long-held assumptions about the nuclear family. Not 
long ago, a Wall Street Journal editorial entitled “Feminism isn’t anti-sex: It’s only 
anti-family”  complained  that  feminism  and  especially  birth  control  are 
responsible for the contemporary breakdown of families in America, with special 
reference  to  what  is  going  on  in  America’s  inner  cities.  But  given  that 
polyandrous mothers probably predate by thousands of years that most modern 
of postindustrial luxuries known as “feminism,” we would do better to focus 
instead  on demographic and economic realities constraining maternal choices: 
high rates of male mortality, imprisonment, and defection and job prospects that 
translate into poor “hunting” prospects, making it impractical for a mother to 
rely on one man (2001, p. 93). 
 
In other work, she convincingly dispels the idea that dominance and competition 
are male-only traits, demonstrates that in many primate societies multiple sexual 
partners and same-sex sexual encounters are common (1999, original publication 
1981), and takes on the ‘myth of the coy female’ (1986; see also Wayne, 2000). 
                                                 
197  ‘More likely’ but not exclusively - Meredith Small, for example, notes the insights and 
contributions of male sociobiologists – in particular John Maynard Smith and Robert Trivers – to 
theories of evolution driven by female-choice (1993, see chapter 4). 
198    ‘Allo’  from  the  Greek  for  ‘other’;  any  person  other  than  a  biological  parent  who  acts  as  a 
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Returning  to  this  latter  theme  again  a  decade  later,  Hrdy  (1997)  specifically 
locates the origins of patriarchy within male control of the resources required by 
females, as a mechanism for the restraint of female sexuality. Hypothesising from 
the premise that females have an evolved adaptive predisposition to mate with 
multiple partners, for reasons ranging from sexual pleasure, to genetic quality, to 
the creation of paternity confusion, Hrdy proposes that the problem for men then 
becomes one of how to restrain women from acting on this predisposition in 
order to ensure certainty of paternity (1997).  
 
Most recently, Hrdy has continued her analysis of the selection pressures on 
mothers, arguing against any straightforward notion of a ‘maternal instinct’ or of 
maternal  exclusivity  in  child  care,  but  concluding,  rather,  that  humans  have 
evolved to be cooperative breeders (Hrdy, 1999, 2001, 2009): 
Whether living in the Pleistocene, in eighteenth-century Europe, or in the United 
States right now, mothers have sought help rearing their children from fathers, 
other  males,  female  relatives,  or  anyone  else  they  could  rely  upon.  As  a 
consequence of this dependency, the emergence of maternal commitment, always 
a  complicated  process  in  mammals,  is  unusually  contingent  on  social 
circumstance (2001, p. 82).  
 
Others  have  similarly  expanded  upon  or  contradicted  conventional  theories 
about ‘human’ nature, by paying greater attention to the selection traits operating 
upon the behaviours of non-human females. Barbara Smuts, for example, has 
built upon her work with baboons to elaborate on the effects of male aggression 
and coercion on female behaviour (1992; Smuts & Smuts, 1993) and, like Hrdy, 
has placed the evolutionary origins of patriarchy within men’s need to control 
women’s  sexuality  (Smuts,  1995).  Meredith  Small  has also studied the sexual   222
behaviour,  mating,  and  reproductive  strategies  of  female  primates  (1993). 
Beginning from Darwin’s ‘misogynist’ theory of female mating strategies, Small 
reviews the research on primate mating strategies, and her own observations of 
the mating behaviours of Barbary macaque females, and extends her findings to 
theorise about these same behaviours in humans. She concludes that “selection 
for female sexual assertiveness, sexual pleasure, orgasms, and the clitoris as an 
organ of pleasure occurred parallel to, not as a by-product of, selection for male 
sexuality” (1993, p. 148). Moving away from primate studies, Patricia Gowaty has 
studied  ‘apparent’  monogamy  and  breeding  season  aggression  in  female 
bluebirds  (Gowaty,  1981a,  1981b,  1985;  Gowaty  &  Wagner,  1988),  the  latter 
research  apparently  attracting  considerable  media  attention.  Marlene  Zuk 
presumes this was because it confounded stereotypes: “Killer bluebirds are bad 
enough, but female killer bluebirds seemed to be the stuff of nightmares” (2002, p. 
38, my emphasis). 
 
The  particular  interests  and  individual  foci  of  these  and  other  feminist 
sociobiologists/evolutionary  feminists  have  made  a  substantial  contribution 
towards positioning sociobiology as a less male-biased discipline. Their work 
operates at the level of critique of malestream sociobiological theory to correct 
bias, but also argues with it in a positive way to actively amend and extend it. 
Whether we agree with their conclusions or not, their theories have undoubtedly 
made  significant  inroads  into  upsetting  stale  perceptions  about  biologically 
determined  gender  roles  and  restrictions.  In  the  process,  both  feminism  and   223
sociobiology  have  benefited  from  this  important  crossing  and  shifting  of  the 
boundaries between the two disciplines. As Sarah Hrdy notes:  
By  the  last  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century  ethologists  (scientists  who  study 
animals in their natural habitats) and sociobiologists (who seek to understand the 
biological basis for social behaviors and rely on comparison across species to help 
them do so) were moving away from moralistic projections toward systematic 
study of what animals in the natural world were doing. In particular, females 
were being studied as individuals, leading to a new awareness of the extent to 
which one female differed from another. A female of the same species, even the 
same  individual  at  different  times  in  her  life,  might  behave  very  differently 
according to her circumstances … Unnoticed by social constructionists, there had 
been a sea change in how females were conceptualized by sociobiologists (2001, 
p. 65). 
 
In  short,  although female agency is not completely overlooked by traditional 
(malestream)  Darwinian  and  sociobiological  theory,  feminist-informed 
sociobiology  has  been  able  to  propose  and  promote  an  evidence-based 
evolutionary view of females as active agents whose interests and desires have 
shaped  –  rather  than  merely  being  the  passive  recipients  of  –  evolutionary 
history.  Thus,  the  knitting  together  of  a  feminist  agenda  and  sociobiological 
theories of biology has been most successfully accomplished within this work.  
Despite  the  doubts  expressed  by  some  of  their  feminist  sisters  about  their 
situation  within  (and  possible  seduction  by)  the  sociobiological  model,  its 
conventional views about female social and sexual behaviour have been revisited 
and revised over the last three decades in large part because of the insights of this 
relatively small group of researchers.  
 
The work of the sociobiologist feminists speaks to us all. Unlike many of their 
feminist  colleagues,  though,  they  are  not  endeavouring  to  question  the  very 
existence  of  a  rich  and  complex  social  biogram  which  is  the  fundamental   224
assumption of the field they share with their sociobiologist colleagues, who are 
their  primary  audience.  Their  work  is  still  largely  a  story  about  the 
(re)interpretation of evidence and the acknowledgement and correction of bias 
and, in this sense, sits squarely within the realm of a critical dialectic. 
 
Feminist sociobiologist Marlene Zuk is no exception, but in her work, she does 
something slightly different in explicitly setting out to examine and critique bias 
in  scientific  questions  and  answers,  and  anthropomorphic  bias  in  our 
understandings of animal behaviour. Side by side with the scientific publications 
that emerge from her field and laboratory work (primarily with crickets and red 
jungle fowl), Zuk takes on debates within sociobiology around whether specific 
human functions and behaviours – in particular, homosexuality, female orgasm, 
spatial  ability  and  menstruation  -  are  by-products199  or  adaptations  (2002). 
Female orgasm, for example, is variously hypothesised, by sociobiologists and 
others,  as  an  artefact  or  as  an  adaptation.  As  an  artefact,  it  is  merely 
consequential, and often understood from a male-centric bias. Zuk notes that 
Stephen  Jay  Gould,  for  example,  proposes  that  the  female  orgasm  “is  a  by-
product of the clitoris developing from the same embryonic tissue as the penis” 
and, thus, “females have orgasms because males do” (Zuk, 2002, p. 142); and 
anthropologist Donald Symons agrees that, “orgasm may be possible for female 
mammals because it is adaptive for males” and, further, the “ability of females to 
                                                 
199  Or, in Stephen Jay Gould’s term, ‘spandrels’ – that is, something that occurs as a by-product of a 
selected trait, but which did not itself arise from natural selection. The term was borrowed from the 
architectural spandrel, generally the spaces between two arches. See Gould & Richard Lewontin’s 
classic paper, ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the 
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experience  multiple  orgasms  may  be  an  incidental  effect  of  their  inability  to 
ejaculate”  (quoted  in  Zuk,  2002,  p.  144).  As  an  adaptation,  more  positive 
theorisations  propose  that  it  is  a  mechanism  to  predispose  females  to  seek 
multiple partners and copulations, as a device to upset paternity certainty, or for 
pleasure (Hrdy, 1999, original publication 1981; Small, 1993), or as a device for 
testing consideration in lovers as a measure of the likelihood that they are good 
long  term  prospects  (Alcock,  1987;  cited  in  Zuk,  2002,  pp.  143-144).  Less 
positively, other theorists, also acting on  the assumption that female orgasm is 
adaptive, variously hypothesise that this is so because it promotes conception – 
either because of the ‘poleax’ effect which keeps females lying down postcoitally 
(a distinctly silly notion when placed in the wider context of sex in other species, 
let alone the universalising assumptions it makes about human females), or via 
the ‘upsuck’ effect, where orgasm assists with the movement of semen up the 
reproductive tract. Still others hypothesise that female orgasm is more likely to 
occur  with  more  symmetrical  males  who,  in  turn,  are  assumed  to  be  more 
genetically  fit  (Zuk,  2002,  pp.  146-148).  With  the  exception  of  the  adaptation 
scenario proposed by Hrdy, what is notable about each of these suggestions, 
according to Zuk, is “the focus on Where’s the Penis. What females experience is 
still seen as secondary to what happens during intercourse” (2002, p. 148).  
 
In fact, what Zuk makes very clear is that the majority of these premises, whether 
they support artefact or adaptation, account for a female’s ability to experience 
orgasm by reference to male sexual behaviour. In reviewing the artefact position,  
she asks:   226
Why is it less “efficient” for women to have orgasms before, after, and not always 
during intercourse? Why do they have to have one (or more) every single time a 
man does? … A problem with viewing female orgasm as a trait that arose only 
through selection on males is the same one I discussed earlier, that our biases 
sometimes cause us to assume that males are normal, and females are variants. 
What is so perfectly efficient about male orgasm, after all? (2002, pp. 144-145). 
 
And,  in  concluding  that  human  female  orgasm  “is  at  least  as  much  of  an 
adaptation as male orgasm” she writes:  
The point is that it is foolish to puzzle over why women can conceive without 
orgasm, over what possible function this trait should serve in females, when we 
do not wonder why males evolved the same trait … the assumption that the male 
way is the only way has kept us from asking some obvious questions … All of us, 
however, would benefit by abandoning the male model; female orgasms can be 
adaptive without being exactly like male orgasms (2002, p. 152).200 
 
Whilst  maintaining  that  “biology  can  extend  the  boundaries  of  our  thinking 
about gender as it can for so many other ideas”, in stepping back to analyse and 
examine these and other examples of bias, Marlene Zuk supports her contention 
that “feminism has more to say to biology than biology does to feminism” (2002, 
p. 17). If we now shift our gaze away from science, though, it is clear that bias 
complicates the issue on both sides of the campus.  
 
My discovery of philosopher Griet Vandermassen’s text (2005) left me downcast 
for some weeks, thinking from its title (Who’s afraid of Charles Darwin? Debating 
feminism and evolutionary theory) and accompanying promotional material that, 
because of unplanned breaks leading to an overly long gestation, my thesis had 
in  the  end  been  written  by  someone  else.  Vandermassen  also  sets  out  to 
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demonstrate  that  there  are  missed  opportunities  for  conversation  between 
feminism  and  sociobiology;  in  her  case,  specifically  with  evolutionary 
psychology. Her book does traverse some similar ground to this thesis, and we 
agree that an evolutionary paradigm has already been shown to be useful for 
feminism in the work of the sociobiological feminists, and has potential for much 
greater exploitation by feminist body theorists. But I finished the book feeling 
unsettled by the extent of her investments in evolutionary psychology and her 
treatment of feminism’s reservations, despite herself being a feminist. 
  
Vandermassen sets out to explore the relationship of feminism with science, and 
with sociobiological science in particular. In the process, she takes on board and 
endorses many of the theories that are espoused by ‘classic’ sociobiologists and 
by evolutionary psychologists. For example, she explains and approves William 
Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness (2005, pp. 76-77), Robert Trivers’ theory of 
parental investment (2005, p. 81 ff), and Sarah Hrdy’s challenge to notions of the 
‘coy’ female (2005, p. 125 ff). She commends Richard Dawkins’ careful separation 
of values from facts in his works, commenting that “most sociobiologists” do so 
(and noting that E.O. Wilson does not) (2005, p. 124).  She clarifies the different 
approaches  to  sociobiology  taken  by  various  theorists,  and  carefully 
distinguishes proximate from ultimate causation arguments. Yet, despite being 
made  by  a  feminist,  and  thus  perhaps  less  likely  to raise suspicion from the 
outset, some of the arguments she makes are not so different from the arguments 
made by the sociobiologists themselves. Thus, while her explicit commitment to 
feminism can work to disarm our reflexive suspicion long enough for us to more   228
clearly  see  the  strengths  of  those  sociobiological  theories  which  are  already 
strong, by itself it cannot work to improve the weaker of the theories that she also 
approves.  For  example,  notwithstanding  her  careful  attempts  to  qualify  and 
temper evolutionary psychologist David Buss’s research on mating strategies, the 
concerns  expressed  earlier  in  this  thesis  about  work  of  this  kind  remain. 
Vandermassen seems to accept, in a relatively uncomplicated way, claims for 
such things as an evolved male preference for youth and beauty as an indicator 
of  fecundity;  a  female  preference  for  high-earning  males;  differing  sexual 
strategies as an evolutionary outcome of unequal investments in the processes of 
reproduction; the complicity of women in the perpetuation of patriarchy, and the 
‘unique vulnerability’ of women as an evolutionary certainty.201 It seems to me 
that while these things may be true, alternative explanations and inquiry into the 
robustness and politics of this research cannot be easily dismissed as reflexive 
feminist biophobia.  
 
In counterpoint to the feminist sociobiologists’ empirical work that underlines 
malestream  bias  in  sociobiological  thought,  within  her  explication  of 
sociobiological  theory,  Vandermassen  devotes  considerable  space  to 
interrogating feminist responses to it, and to detailing the ‘female bias’ inherent in 
this body of critique. She identifies the major issues – the nature/nurture debate, 
genetic determinism, the naturalistic fallacy – where feminism and sociobiology 
are at odds, and convincingly re/presents the counter arguments to them. As 
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well,  she  identifies  a  number  of  misreadings  and  misrepresentations  of 
sociobiological work in feminist critiques. For all of this, I have some sympathy, 
and while she may be correct in saying that criticism of feminism “is not a risk-
free activity” (2005, p. 85) (is criticising any discipline risk-free?), if there is valid 
criticism to be made, it should be made. Defensiveness is to be expected, but so 
also is robustness.  In my view, her text makes an important contribution to the 
conversation that must be had between feminism and sociobiology. 
 
That said, a major limitation of Vandermassen’s own story lies in how she casts 
the terms of that conversation. Her thesis is that there are problems on both sides 
– with feminism’s ‘biophobia’ and evolutionary psychology’s ‘youth’ – but that 
“feminism and evolutionary psychology need each other” (2005, p. 195). That she 
believes feminism’s need is greater is apparent in her claim that evolutionary 
psychology can provide the ‘unifying framework’ that feminism is lacking, and 
her  emphasis  on  the  need  for  feminists  to  accommodate  (socio)biological 
narratives.  While  my  own  conviction  of  the  need  to  be  more  open  to  the 
possibilities for feminism within such accounts was a motivating factor in this 
research  project,  clearly  there  must  be  a  corresponding  openness  in  the 
sociobiologists’ accounts to take seriously and accommodate the valid concerns 
of feminists. Vandermassen is both more forgiving, and more optimistic about 
the legitimacy and usefulness of some theories from evolutionary psychology for 
feminism, than I am. Importantly, I think, in explicitly recognising the problems 
inherent in critique undertaken from a political or ideological stance, she appears 
to  forget  that  this  difficulty  cuts  both  ways.  In  characterising  feminism  as   230
‘phobic’  and  evolutionary  psychology  as  merely  ‘young’  (still  to  mature), 
Vandermassen is in danger of forgetting that feminism does have valid concerns. 
In shifting the critical gaze to feminism, she risks being too much of an apologist 
for some of the less useful and more dubious evolutionary psychology projects 
and,  in  so  doing,  demonstrates  exactly  the  problem  of  standpoint  bias  that 
Marlene Zuk has observed.  
 
A more successful attempt to traverse the same difficult terrain can be found in 
the work of Janet Radcliffe Richards. In philosophical works published more than 
two decades apart, Richards demonstrates a longstanding interest in identifying 
the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  profitable  interaction  between  feminism  and 
reductionist theory. In her earlier work, The sceptical feminist (1982), Richards’ 
critical focus was on feminism – which she defined as the belief that “women 
suffer  from  systematic  social  injustice  because  of  their  sex”  (1982,  pp.  13-14). 
Endorsing the feminist position that women have historically been subject to 
such injustice (justified by their ‘difference’ from men), in her early work she 
exposed the flaws in ‘traditionalist’ arguments that purport to know the nature of 
women. Taking her reader through a discussion that ranges across issues such as 
work,  fertility,  mothering,  social  justice,  and  the  ‘proper  place  of  nature’,202 
Richards is very clear that feminism has cause for concern. 
 
At the same time, she was critical of those feminists whose arguments exclude 
any evidence which does not fit within their own social theories. In adopting a 
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position which says that we “need to know about the nature of the world we are 
dealing with, to as great an extent as possible”, she noted that ”the knowledge 
we have of the natures of things in no way dictates what use should be made of the 
raw material” (1982, pp. 84-85). Put another way, knowing the nature and extent 
of  any  difference  between  men  and  women  in  no  way  carries  with  it  an 
obligation to make no effort to change it: 
Even  though  the  two  camps  [traditionalists  and  feminists]  reach  different 
conclusions, both are making the fundamental mistake of thinking that if you 
know the nature of something (what it is like) you ipso facto know what is natural 
for it (what it ought to be like, how it should develop). This is false … If we know 
that men and women are different at birth that does not show that they should be 
kept different; if they are more or less the same that is not enough to show that 
they  should  be  kept  the  same.  Why  should  we  not  increase  or  decrease  the 
differences? (1982, p. 82).  
 
As the earlier chapters in this thesis make clear, the dangers of the naturalistic 
fallacy  are  by  now  well-rehearsed  on  both  sides  of  the  feminist/reductionist 
divide. In company with much of the rhetoric around the necessarily entwined 
qualities of nature/nurture, this response to the  difference/sameness problem 
still  tends  to  evoke  a  ‘yes,  but’  argument.  It  is  very  easy  to  begin  with  the 
rhetorical gesture – just  because (even if) it is this way, that doesn’t mean it has 
to remain this way – but it is commonly followed with an argument in defence of  
establishing our own particular concerns and investments. Typically, this defence 
is advanced by one of two routes: to either disprove that it is this way in any 
event; or, to more firmly establish that it most certainly is this way, and, that 
although change is possible, for one reason or another it is not at all probable. 
Richards foresaw this kind of difficulty:  
While it would be ideal if everyone could just assess each controversial problem 
on its own merits as it arose, what actually happens is that people usually start 
by  deciding  whose  side  they  are  on,  and  from  then  onwards  tend  to  see 
everything that is said or done in the light of that alliance (1982, p. 15).   232
 
In  this  early  work,  then,  Richards  explicitly  addresses  the  problem  of  bias 
identified  by  Marlene  Zuk:  the  sheer  difficulty  within  a  polarised  critical 
environment of not taking up a position at the outset and prejudging the result. 
 
Returning to more recent times, in her latest work (2004), Richards’ critical focus 
is more evenly divided between the content and effect of neo-Darwinian theories, 
and  the coherence and strength of feminist, among other, criticisms of them. 
Richards  follows  Daniel  Dennett  in  characterising  Darwinism  as  a  ‘universal 
acid’  that  threatens  to  ‘leak  out’,  spreading  “all  the  way  up,  dissolving  the 
illusion  of  our  own  authorship,  our  own  divine  spark  of  creativity  and 
understanding”(Dennett,  1995,  p.  63).  Her  main  aim  in  this  work, then, is to 
examine “the extent to which these threats are all that they seem” (Richards, 
2004, p. 23). To achieve this, she interrogates those elements of sociobiological 
theory that are identified as problematic by feminists and other critics - questions 
of free will and individual responsibility; altruism and selfishness; ethics and 
morality;  and  the  very  application  of  such  theories  to  human nature – using 
philosophical techniques. These generally take the form of logically considering 
certain  conditional  statements  and  their  implications  (‘If  current  theories  of 
evolutionary psychology are right’ these things will follow).  
 
Richards utilises widely criticised texts from sociobiologists Robert Wright and 
Richard  Dawkins,  to  determine  whether  notions  of  ‘biology  as  destiny’, 
‘blameless  puppets’,  and  the  (im)morality  of  selfish  genes  can  be  logically   233
deduced from their evidence, and to reflect on whether the implications inherent 
in  what  she  calls  the  ‘blank  paper’  view  of  human  nature  are  any  more 
comforting.  She  decides,  in  the  first  case,  that  none  of  these  conclusions  of 
determinism  can  hold  under  logical  scrutiny;  and,  in  the  second,  that  when 
subjected to a comparable series of philosophical techniques, the ramifications of 
the blank paper view may well be similarly unwelcome (2004, in particular pp. 
118-125). Neither set of arguments escapes problematic nuance or repercussion. 
She claims, in the end, that “the different depths of Darwinism have in themselves 
no implications for most ideas about ourselves and our situation” (2004, p. 270, 
my  emphasis).  It  is,  again,  the  assumptions  underlying  our  different 
preconceptions and positions – in effect, which ‘side’ we are on before we begin to 
consider the arguments  – that  require the most rigorous unpicking.   
  
Richards, like Vandermassen, is intent on explaining evolutionary psychology to 
feminism and, to some extent, on rescuing it from its determinist implications. 
Both attempt to make evolutionary psychology more ‘user-friendly’ for feminists. 
Despite  sharing  with  Vandermassen  an  evident  sympathy  for  evolutionary 
approaches to human nature, Richards is more successful in doing this for two 
reasons. Firstly, in reaching her conclusions, she does not forget, regardless of the 
contingent  nature  of  sociobiological  theories,  that  feminists  have  legitimate 
concerns about their real world applications. Importantly, in positioning herself 
as interrogating philosophically the logic of the arguments from both sides, and 
despite in the end dismantling the logic of some specific feminist concerns, she 
does  not  fall  into  the  error  of  dismissing  feminist  fears  as  irrational.  And   234
secondly,  while,  like  all  of  us,  Richards  begins  her  journey  from  her  own 
individual location, she is consistent in foregrounding her recognition of this, and 
of the influence of standpoint bias on the outcome of critique. 
 
What is very clear from all of this is that critique is always already locked into an 
oppositional strategy. No matter what kind of critique we set out to encompass – 
whether  it  be  the  unqualified  rebuttal  critique  of  outsiders  (such  as  were 
discussed  in  chapter  one);  the  insider’s  qualified  critique  that  offers  counter-
examples  and  alternate  explanations  (such  as  the  challenges  to  malestream 
theory by the sociobiological feminists discussed earlier in this chapter), or the 
kind of critical endeavour that seeks to explain opposing positions to each other 
with the intention of dispelling suspicion and misunderstanding (Vandermassen 
and Richards) – our politics intervene. There is no innocent place to stand. While 
each critical approach has its place in shifting the conversation forward, we do 
not seem to shift very far by continuing to debate what the science shows us. 
Implicit in the critical debate, however, is the construct that can emerge from it; 
those moments where we shake free of the limited options available to us and 
attempt to reshape how we think about what the science says about our bodies. So, if 
we consider the move from critique to construct, and look for instances where 
feminists on either side of the campus try to talk about how bodies work in a way 
that gives biology legitimacy without making it over-determining, how do we 
fare?   235
 
 
 
The construct dialectic 
Much of the work that is being done by the sociobiologist feminists is confined to 
observing  and  reporting  on  the  exception  to  the  rule,  and  in  this  way  poses 
alternatives to existing theory about behaviour. The nature of the science they are 
doing stops short of pursuing a new way of thinking about bodies, since this is 
not their primary concern. Nor, perhaps, do they feel an urgent need to do so, 
having already married the social and the biological to their own satisfaction 
within  the  sociobiological  paradigm  (while,  as  with  all  successful  marriages, 
remaining open to continuing compromise and adaptation).  
 
Nevertheless, we have seen that, within the sociobiological model, their work has 
added to an accretion of knowledge that has, piece by piece, acted to nudge their 
male colleagues out of their comfortable, largely unexamined and unreflexive 
beliefs about female natures. This work, without explicitly setting out to do so, 
has in places moved from a reformulation of existing theory to a retheorisation of 
the representations of women within sociobiology. Sarah Hrdy, in particular, out 
of her observations, and her consequent critique of notions of mothering over 
three  decades,  constructs  new  theory  that  has  both  positively  impacted 
sociobiological thought, and confounded status quo thinking about biologically 
determined social roles.  
 
If theory emanating from within sociobiology is accused of being too focused on 
what is believed to be under the surface – on the behavioural biology contained   236
within the social biogram – feminist body theory has been accused of too often 
stopping at the surface. Feminists on both sides of the campus have noted that the 
renewed feminist focus on the body does not encompass an interrogation of the 
body’s interior. Biologist Lynda Birke records her “frustration at the gap between 
feminist cultural analysis and [her] own background as a biologist” (2000, p. 3), 
and, as I mentioned in chapter one, psychologist Elizabeth Wilson is forthright in 
confronting what she calls ‘feminism’s antibiologism’, observing that “[d]espite 
an avowed interest in the body, there is a persistent distaste for biological detail” 
(1998, p. 15). Both attempt to remedy this situation in works that explore the 
inner processes of our physiology, with the explicit intention of fashioning new 
ways of thinking about the biological body for feminism. 
 
In Feminism and the biological body (2000), Birke again takes up her earlier concern 
with thinking about non-reductionist approaches to biology and the gendered 
construction of bodies. She is intent on exposing what she calls the ‘black boxes 
and tedious universals’,203 particularly in feminist conceptualisations of the body 
where the “anatomical, internal, body … seems to disappear, except as a set of 
signifiers” (2000, p. 27). As well, Birke draws together illustrative themes from 
representations of the body to show how understandings of our  physiological 
processes are immersed in, and interpreted through, the language of science. As 
one might expect, she brings her training as a biologist to a feminist examination 
of scientific readings of the body. Thus, she delves into the meanings that are 
read  onto  bodies  through  the  medium  of  technological  visualisations  of  our 
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internal anatomies and processes, through classificatory and other systems, and 
through  metaphor.  For  example,  she  discusses  and  likewise  rejects  Donna 
Haraway’s reading of the organism as  an information system, as techno-cultural 
cyborg, arguing that its “potential to damage through fragmentation” (2000, p. 
155) conceals a slippery slope to genetic reductionism.  
 
Birke notes that while reductionism is a useful scientific method, “much has been 
lost in the stories that we might tell of how our biology works” (2000, p. 140). The 
reductionist view, she argues, leads to a perception of bodies as fragmented, an 
assembly  of  parts  without  intrinsic  value  (2000,  p.  170).  In  place  of  these 
understandings of the body, Birke proposes instead a vision of: 
the  body  becoming,  as  transformative.  I  want  to  question  the  notion  of  the 
biological  body  as  bedrock.  I  do  so  partly  because  I  consider  that  it  gives  a 
limited  understanding  of  our  biological  bodies,  and  partly  for  more  political 
reasons, because such a view of biology leads to determinism (2000, p. 136).  
 
In pursuit of a theory of ‘the body becoming’, Birke constructs an alternate story 
of “organismic agency and transformation” which both works against notions of 
fixity  and  reductionism,  and  allows  us  to  conceptualise  the  body  as  fluid, 
dynamic,  and  changeable.  In  so  doing,  she  writes  approvingly  of  Elizabeth 
Grosz’s use of the Mobius strip motif, and proposes that we need: 
… an understanding of the biological body that links inner and outer, rather than 
presupposing a singularity to the body. We need, moreover a biology that is not 
determinist, nor is seen as foundational or presocial (2000, p. 174). 
 
In sum, Birke refuses fixity and instead insists that feminism should struggle to 
“rename  nature  through  complexity  and  transformation”  as  a  strategy  to 
challenge  “persistent  dualisms”  (2000,  p.  155).  However,  Birke  seems  not  to   238
notice that she herself, in proposing a theory that ‘links’ inner and outer, is both 
thinking and proposing a model of the body that risks rehearsing such dualisms. 
As  well,  the  positive  connections  that  could  be  drawn  with  genome  and 
sociobiological themes of the mutability of biology and its inextricable link to 
environment  are  evident  here,  but  Birke  does  not  draw  them.  Instead,  she 
challenges  those  scientists  who  “too  glibly”  trot  out  their  belief  in 
gene/environment interaction (2000, p. 139). Recognising that this, in some cases, 
is a more than fair accusation, it also falls back into old critical habits and misses 
an opportunity to imagine or outline a new project that rethinks feminist and 
evolutionary/genetic theory.   
 
Elizabeth  Wilson  also  attempts  to  disrupt  feminism’s  ‘compulsive 
antiessentialism’  in  two  full-length  works,  theorising  the  body  through  its 
various biological processes and, in this way, opening feminist body theory to 
the  notion  of  a  bio/social  body.  In  the  first  (1998),  she  undertakes  a  critical 
reading of the relationship of feminist studies of science to the fields of neurology 
and psychology, and, secondly and more recently, she examines the detail of the 
neurological body (2004).   
 
In  her  earlier  work,  Wilson  explicitly  objects  to  the  ‘critical  habits’  of  an 
exclusionary feminist psychology that, as a result of its political commitments 
and  epistemological  practices,  neglects  to  examine  (among  other  areas) 
evolutionary psychology. This exclusion, she says, is ‘enforced’ by the operation 
of  a  series  of  familiar  dualisms  –  among  them,  human/animal,   239
psychology/biology,  nature/environment,  fact/politics  (1998,  pp.  205-207).  To 
overcome  these  entrenched  critical  habits,  Wilson  pursues  what  she  calls  an 
“analytics of breaching” (1998, p. 207), with the purpose of disturbing reliance 
upon  ‘location,  presence  and  origin’  in  understandings  of 
biological/psychological function. 
 
Also  in  this  earlier  work,  Wilson  counters  the  prevailing  acceptance  of 
neuropsychology as an “antidualist account of the mind” (1998, p. 121), claiming 
that it does not, in fact, resolve the Cartesian dualism. She explicitly deals with 
the  tripartite  distinction  between  mind,  brain  and  body,  and  identifies  as  a 
“brain-body reductionism” (1998, p. 123), the ‘decapitation’ of the neuroscientific 
brain from the body. She says: 
Through this decapitation, the disembodied brain (and often the head in general) 
becomes the seat of the intellect, and the headless body becomes the home of 
sensation and the guardian of the passions … traditional mind-body dualism has 
been  displaced  and  disguised  through  embodiment  …  Contemporary 
neuropsychology  dissolves  a  superficial  mind-body  opposition  via  the 
materiality of the brain but redeploys its cognate couplings (intellect-sensation, 
reason-emotion) in the division of brain and body (1998, pp. 124-125). 
 
Wilson evaluates this notion of decapitation in conversation with Simon LeVay’s 
work on the neurological/genetic basis for homosexuality.204 In doing so, unlike 
other corporeal theorists, she steps across the campus to directly engage with an 
example  of  scientific  reductionism;  she  challenges  the  utility  of  the  dualistic 
thinking inherent in LeVay’s approach, arguing it ‘quarantines’ the body and its 
organs from the sexuality he locates within the biology of the brain (1998, pp. 
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125-126).205  Wilson  theorises  that  the  “materiality  of  neurocognition”  is  not 
locatable within an “inert and originary location”, arguing instead for what she 
calls  “neurocognitive  mobility”  (1998,  p.  203),  which  potentially  disrupts  the 
brain/body dualism, and forces a reassessment of our critical habits.  
 
In  her  second  work,  Wilson  takes  up  Vicki  Kirby’s  challenge  that  feminist 
theories about biology should include “the peristaltic movements of the viscera, 
the mitosis of cells, the electrical activity that plays across a synapse”, to theorise 
about a body “whose tissue includes all the oozings and pulsings that literally 
and  figuratively  make  up  the  differential  stuff  of  the  body’s  extra-ordinary 
circuitry” (Kirby, 1997, p. 76). In Psychosomatic (2004), Wilson argues, again, that 
neurological theory is useful to feminist body theory, returning to notions of 
“connectivity/connectionism”. She examines this ‘entanglement’ of nature and 
nurture through a series of examples. She again discusses Simon LeVay’s work 
on  sexual  orientation,  and  also  examines  a    Darwinian  account  of  the 
phenomenon  of  blushing,  which  she  concludes  is  an  outcome  of  a  ‘material 
entwinement’ of the biogenetic and the psychocultural (2004, pp. 75-77). In a 
move that appears to breach the boundaries between evolutionary psychology’s 
theory of the modularity of mind and feminist body theory, Wilson approves 
ideas about  neurological modularity, of “emotional and cognitive worlds as a 
series of interfacing systems” (2004, p. 94). Wilson thus expands and extends 
Kirby’s program, providing a model for the sort of interactionist work that opens 
feminist body theory to new understandings of biology. 
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Wilson and Birke share a vision (along with many reductionist scientists in all 
three enterprises discussed in this thesis) of the body’s biology and the social 
environment as interactive, interconnected and mutually constitutive. Both are 
very  clear  about  the  need  to  fill  the  gap  within  feminist  theory  of  the  body 
between the social body and the material body, the ‘flesh’ beneath/including the 
skin. Both are doing good things in the attempt to define or recreate feminist 
body  theory.  I  would  argue  however,  that  of  the  two,  Wilson  more  clearly 
addresses the question of how do we achieve that? Partly, this is because Wilson 
more directly sets out to construct new theory, while Birke’s theory still largely 
emerges from a critique of existing theory. Partly too, it is because, within their 
readings  of  the  interactionist  nature  of  biology  and  society,  Wilson  is  less 
committed to arguing for the pre-eminence of one or other than is Birke – Birke’s 
work, in other words, still invokes, for me, a ‘yes, but’ response in favour of 
culture, in answering the question of which of the two is the  more important.  
This is, of course, my individual response and here I admit the possibility that 
my own bias against political positioning plays a part in my conclusion. If I am to 
maintain my role as an interested observer (although clearly not an impartial 
one, despite my best intentions), I must confess that my concern about Birke’s 
framing  of  her  opposition  to  the  body  as  ‘bedrock’  as  partially  politically 
motivated, is itself partially ‘politically’ motivated. As I have said in relation to a 
number of themes throughout this thesis, I strongly believe that simply because 
something may be politically unpalatable is no reason to reject it as a possibility, 
or even as a probability.    242
 
Given  Birke’s  dismissal  of  a  “biological  bedrock  onto  which  experience  and 
environments write” (2000, p. 29), it is not surprising that her work does not 
converse with, for example, that of Sarah Hrdy. Wilson, on the other hand, with 
her  focus  on  the  neurobiological  body,  might  be  expected  to  have  opened  a 
dialogue with Hrdy’s and other feminist sociobiological readings of behavioural 
biology.  That  she  has  not,  indicates  that  underneath  the  schism  between 
feminism and science, lies a still deeper schism between scientific/sociobiological 
and philosophical ways of thinking about the body, and this continues to prevent 
alliance, even between otherwise like-minded feminists, across this boundary.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To end where I began, Patricia Gowaty notes that the first Darwinian Feminists 
meeting,  in  1993,  consisted  of  just  thirteen  women  (1997a,  p.  xv).  In  the 
intervening years, greater attention has begun to be paid to the possible value for 
feminism of insights from the evolutionary sciences, and, conversely, the benefits 
that accrue from applying a feminist viewpoint to these disciplines. There are 
also now many more feminists convinced of the need to in some way encompass 
the insights of biology into a more coherent theory of the body. The examples I 
have drawn from the literature in this chapter expose a range of approaches to 
encompassing  (socio)biology  from  within  feminism  on  both  sides  of  the 
academy.  Still,  where  feminists  position  themselves  along  the  nature/nurture 
divide dictates their starting point and, in many ways, also their ending point. 
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On the nature side of the boundary, the sociobiological feminists, in a sense, add 
or apply their feminism to a view of biology that proceeds from an acceptance of a 
complex  social  biogram.  As  a  result  of  the  evolutionary  predispositions 
contained within that biogram (which may or may not be related to biological 
sex), individuals certainly have the capacity and the flexibility to alter both their 
behaviour and their proximate environment, but this capacity for change is not 
without biological limits. Both critique and construct are thus constrained by 
working within a framework of ultimate causation, where culture is recursive – 
both the outcome of adaptation, and what is being adapted to. Whatever occurs 
within  this  paradigm,  and  in  the  great  deal  of  exciting  feminist  work  being 
undertaken within it, it begins and ends with that bedrock of biology. 
 
On the nurture side of the boundary, the social biogram is a vigorously contested 
site. Our evolutionary predispositions, such as they are, are limited to sex-neutral 
generalities  like  eating,  excreting  and  sleeping206.  Despite  the  growing 
recognition of the need to encompass biology, and the innovative ways in which 
new theory is being framed, for feminists on this side of the boundary, it still 
begins and ends with culture. Biology, as materiality, as the “differential stuff of 
the  body’s  extra-ordinary  circuity”  (Kirby,  1997,  p.  76),  is  now  theorised  as 
mobile, fluid, and agentic – all of which are consonant, as we have seen, with 
scientific  understandings  of  biology.  However,  the  agency  of  a  behavioural 
biology remains largely unconsidered here and, apart from obvious limitations 
imposed  by  our  specifically  human  physicality  –  such  as  flying  or  breathing 
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under  water  –  it  is  not  biology  but  proximate  culture  which  constrains 
behavioural change.  
 
For one side, then, it is very clear that biology is important, and that it somehow 
or other shapes culture; for the other, it is very clear that culture is important, 
and  biology  is  not  at  all  over-determining  of  behaviour  within  culture.  And 
tentatively attempting to balance at the boundary, but not wholly successfully, 
are a few feminists, who primarily seek to put biology into feminist body theory, 
largely by re-interpreting and making more palatable theories of biology drawn 
from the social biogram.  
 
In fact, it seems to me that the two sides are not really all that far apart on the 
details. But, caught within the oppositional trap of being either too suspicious, or 
not suspicious enough, it is the promise of a new theory of the bio/social body 
that suffers. And in our struggle to convince each other to cross the boundary 
that divides us, what we all risk forgetting is that “the organism is predecessor to 
our  theories  about  it”  (Henry,  2001,  p.  91).  If  we  could  somehow  explicitly 
recognise and put aside the tension between proximate and ultimate causes, and 
truly suspend this pointless debate about which of nature or nurture is dominant, 
we may be able to shift the conversation from the level of disagreement about 
our  individual  starting  points,  or  about  the  evidence,  and  ask  instead:  as 
feminists, what is our collective objective in asking these questions? What are the 
questions we really want to ask about how our bodies intersect with the cultures 
in which we live?  And how can we utilise what is being done across the board to   245
reframe  the  agenda?  The  condition  for  a  way  forward  is  a  more  self-critical 
approach  to  our  own  disciplinary  commitments;  a  more  interdisciplinary 
approach; and a more self-conscious (real) commitment to the project of how the 
biology and society complex actually works.   246
   247
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enough! A century of misunderstanding, the drawn-out Verdun and Somme of Western 
intellectual history, has run its exhausting course, and the culture wars are an old game 
turned stale. It is time to call a truce and forge an alliance. Within the broad middle 
ground between the strong versions of the Standard Social Science Model and genetic 
determinism, the social sciences are intrinsically compatible with the natural sciences.  
Edward O. Wilson (1999, p. 205)  
 
 
The self is a byzantine bureaucracy, and no gene can push the buttons of behavior by 
itself.  You  can  attribute  the  ability  to  defy  our  genotypes  to  free  will,  whatever  that 
means, but you can also attribute it to the fact that in a hundred-trillion-synapse human 
brain, any single influence can be outweighed by the product of all of the others. 
Steven Pinker (2009, p. 8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   248
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
   
 
 
The  conundrum  is  still  one  about  how  human  beings  take  their  biological 
endowments and turn them into scripts for social roles. It is still important to 
disentangle the biological imperative from the social mandate, and still essential 
to observe at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of all such discussions 
that description and prescription are not the same thing. 
Ann Oakley (1985, Foreword, p. 2)  
 
[T]he  whole  incoherent  opposition  between  socially  determined  (or  culturally 
determined) phenomena and biologically determined (or genetically determined) 
phenomena should be consigned to the dustbin of history. 
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides (1995, p. 46) 
 
 
 
 
The past two decades have seen an explosion of information about the ‘biological 
imperative’, emanating from a range of sources. In particular, the undertaking of 
the Human Genome Project, with its grand vision of capturing and deciphering 
our  genetic  code,  has  placed  biology  firmly  back  on  the  agenda,  and 
reinvigorated open debate around questions of nature and nurture within the 
academy and the wider society. The 21st century is indeed shaping up to be the 
‘century of the gene’; we live in an era where the ceaseless pronouncements of 
reductionist science are assiduously studied, broadly disseminated, and routinely 
embraced. No matter where we stand in relation to this new knowledge, and the   249
extensive  theorising  that  it  engenders,  we  cannot  escape  its  implications,  its 
possibilities, and its dangers.  
 
In  this  context,  my  motivating concern in this work has been the risk to the 
relevance of feminist body theory if our projects on ‘the body’ continue to ‘think’ 
dualistically in pursuit of a social body that is not also a biological body, rather 
than to think of and theorise about the body as bio/social.  Accordingly, I have 
adopted Marlene Zuk’s premise that to view science as a “tool for ideology” or as 
a  “weapon  in  the  gender  wars”  (2002,  p.  160)  is  unhelpful.    Instead,  I  have 
attempted to work through the concerns that feminists have expressed about 
reductionist stories of human nature by taking a walk through the three inter-
related  and  highly  visible  scientific  endeavours  of  the  genome  project  itself, 
sociobiology, and sex difference research. I then paused and directed my gaze 
away from the academy to the world outside, where this research is re-presented 
and  mass-marketed  in  texts  which,  no  matter  what  disavowals  the  scientists 
might  make,  are  the  popular  face  of  their  research  efforts.  In  all  but  the  last 
case,207 I positioned myself as a women’s studies scholar intent on understanding 
and finding the positive aspects of these reductionist enterprises, rather than on 
traversing critical ground already well represented in the feminist literature. In 
general, I have not been interested to pursue the validity or otherwise of this 
research  or  of  its  critique,  but  have  instead  been concerned to follow a path 
through the history, hypotheses, arguments and outcomes of each that would 
disclose the general shape and purpose of the enterprise in order to understand how 
                                                 
207  Where, of course, there being no usefully positive aspects to this work, I was justified in 
approaching the material much more critically from the outset.    250
concerned, and how interested, feminism should/could be. The methodology I 
have  followed  to  guide  my  walk  through  these  unfamiliar  byways  has  been 
dictated in large part by the sheer mass of available research within and about 
them. Inevitably, much has been overlooked or mentioned only in passing that 
could,  with  a  more  detailed  focus  on  each  individual  discipline,  be  usefully 
discussed. Nevertheless, I believe that the drawing together of these disciplines 
in such a way that the links between them are made more visible is an important 
task. It is also necessary for my broader enterprise of interrogating how we are 
placed  to  bring  culture  and  biology,  feminist  body  theory  and  sociobiology 
together. 
 
In Part  One of the thesis, I laid the groundwork for my overarching concern with 
the  problem  of  dualistic  thought,  and  the  trend  within  feminist  theory  to 
reflexively distance itself from biological explanations for human nature. Chapter 
One  is  a  brief  excursion  through  the  various  ways  in  which  feminists  have 
attempted to deal with the seemingly intractable problem of sex difference, in 
conversation with each other and with reductionist science. Utilising the device 
of  a  loose  taxonomy  of  the  positions  taken  by  feminists  on  these  issues,  I 
discussed five different  modes of approach to biology that are variously situated 
around  the  essentialist/social  constructionist,  sex/gender,  sameness/difference 
and nature/nurture splits. I concluded that, while each approach is a necessary 
and  valuable  addition  to  the  feminist  toolbox,  none  manages  to  solve  the 
dualisms, or to itself escape the trap of dualistic thinking, because each, in its 
own way, resolves by returning to an investment in one side of the binary.    251
 
In Part Two, I crossed the campus to walk through the unfamiliar territory of 
those reductionist sciences that have, individually, been the focus of so much 
feminist critique and which I believe, collectively, have the most to say, to us and 
to each other, on questions of biological sex difference. In Chapter Two, I focused 
my attention on the Human Genome Project, situating it first within the rhetoric 
of control that is clearly expressed by the choice of metaphors used to promote 
and  describe  it.  I  then  outlined  its  history  and  antecedents,  its  objectives,  its 
outcomes and real and expected benefits, before moving to a discussion of the 
controversies that surrounded the project itself, and the anxieties that still exist 
about the post-genomic research resulting from it.  
 
I concluded that both the claims made for, and the fears expressed about this 
endeavour have been tempered in its realisation. The early promise of control has 
unravelled in the face of the limitations imposed by genetic complexity, while 
concerns are partially met by the investment in interdisciplinary research around 
various ethical, social and legal issues. It does seem likely that we will see a 
gradual  increase  in  health  benefits  through  the  alleviation  of  disease.  It  also 
seems  to  me  likely  that  a  continuing investment in behavioural genetics will 
eventually  succeed  in  establishing  a  more  robust  link  between  genes  and 
behaviour than has thus far been the case.  That being so, feminist theorists can 
take heart from the recognition of the contingent, flexible and fluid character of 
‘nature’ that is a visible outcome of genome and post-genome research.  
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In Chapter Three, I moved on from the science of human nature to the science of 
sex difference research. I first placed the roots of this research enterprise within 
an  Aristotelian  intellectual  tradition  that  constructs  women’s  reproductive 
capacities as the essential feature of ‘woman’, and as the key factor in female 
cognitive process and ability. Following the debates around sexual dimorphism 
in the brain from ancient times through the Victorian era to modern times, I 
exposed  the  continuity  of    habits  of  thought  and  approach  that  link  current 
research to past endeavours. I demonstrated that within sex difference research, 
‘woman’ is still confronted by the false question of her difference from ‘man’, 
while men continue to escape the practical consequences of biological constraints. 
While  there  are  encouraging  indications  of  more  moderate  voices  within  the 
discipline to challenge the worst of the presuppositions and implications being 
drawn  out  of  this  research,  I  found  that  sex  difference  research  is  still  often 
reactionary,  with  many  of  its  pursuits  deeply  embedded  within  outmoded 
notions of ‘science’ and of the natures of women and men. In sum, I concluded 
that, of the three areas of academic research I walk through in this thesis, sex 
difference research is the least useful for feminists wanting to utilise reductionist 
science towards a more positive theorisation of biology’s role in the construction 
of sexed bodies. 
 
Chapter Four of the thesis explored issues within sociobiological theory of an 
evolved human nature and of sex-differentiated behaviours. In asserting that the 
conversation  between  feminist  theory  and  sociobiology  had  become 
unproductive,  I  located  my  interest  in  this  research  around  a  belief  that   253
sociobiology may have more to offer to (and in common with) feminism than our 
separate ideologies and mutual suspicion allow us to recognise. Accordingly, 
noting  but  not  dwelling  on  the  problem  for  sociobiology  of  the  misogynistic 
claims made by some of its practitioners, I began my inquiry by explaining the 
differences between diverse endeavours that I then, for the sake of convenience, 
largely drew back under the umbrella term of ‘sociobiology’.  
 
Having first accepted, for the purposes of argument, the fact of a social biogram, 
the elements of sociobiology that I identified as most central to feminist concerns 
are those of ‘genetic determinism’, and human and sex-differentiated behaviours. 
I investigated notions of genetic determinism by reviewing discussions around 
genotype/phenotype interactions in a selection of works, and by describing the 
various meanings given to the gene within sociobiology, focusing in particular on 
the  confusion  around  the  determinist  implications  of  labelling  the  gene  as 
‘selfish’. I concluded that in the main those writers I survey clearly express a 
belief in the uncertainty and unpredictability of gene/culture interactions that is 
fully consonant with the information arising from the post-genome work, but 
that there are also places in their work where inferences of inevitability can be 
drawn. Finally, I returned to the difficulties inherent in the very notion of a social 
biogram, evidenced through the sociobiological literature on human universals, 
and sex differentiated behaviours. I argued that while the behaviours that are 
alleged to be contained within the social biogram carry some baggage that will 
inevitably raise questions about the care with which such arguments are framed, 
and  the  politics  of  those  who  espouse  them,  the  fact  that  many  of  these   254
behaviours tend to prop up the status quo is not a sufficient reason to dismiss 
them.  In  relation  to  sex  differentiated  behaviours,  however,  I  concluded  that 
certain researchers in this area of evolutionary psychology, by expressing their 
readings  of  the  data  with  such  certainty  and  ignoring  alternative  available 
interpretations, blur the boundaries of the naturalistic fallacy to the point where 
determinism becomes an almost inescapable inference. 
 
In Chapter Five, I took a short walk away from campus to look at what happens 
to the research in these academic fields when it is translated into popular culture. 
On the basis of their popularity, longevity, and the pattern they have provided 
for later texts, I compared two of the earlier examples of this kind of work across 
the major features that they have in common. I claimed that it is important to 
undertake analyses of these kinds of texts because they draw on the authority of 
‘Science’  to  establish  the  authenticity  of  their  conclusions,  and  because  they 
present these conclusions as the ‘accepted’ science in these matters to a broad 
readership. 
 
I argued that the two texts I analysed in this chapter follow a distinctive pattern 
of, first, establishing that not only do men and women differ from the beginning, 
but that men possess a superior difference; second, pathologising homosexuality, 
and constructing arguments that lead to a conclusion that gay males are more 
like women than they are like straight men; third, utilising hormone research to 
confirm  men’s  natural  predisposition  to  occupy  positions  of  authority  and 
women’s natural role as society’s caretakers. I concluded that these texts, and   255
texts  of  this  kind  in  general,  are  dangerous  in  their  facile  explanations  for 
complex biological and social issues. I suggested that feminists, the media, and 
most particularly the scientists upon whose work they draw to support their claims, must 
police, dispute and disrupt the easy slide into vulgar reductionism that these 
texts represent.  
 
In Part Three of the thesis, I returned from my observations of the ‘other side’ to 
look  briefly  at  some  of  the  ways  in  which  feminists,  from  both  sides  of  the 
campus, have begun the work of positive intervention in, and interaction with, 
reductionist science. In Chapter Six, I noted that the earliest and most successful 
of these contributions, in my view, have come from feminists situated within 
sociobiology  itself.  More  recently,  Darwinian  feminist  philosophers  have 
attempted to explain arguments from evolutionary psychology in a sympathetic 
light,  with  limited  success.  And  finally,  some  feminist  body  theorists  have 
attempted to deflect feminism’s reflexive distancing of biology, by constructing 
theories of the body through examination of various biological processes, but 
still, I have suggested, largely without engaging directly with the reductionist 
notion of a complex social biogram.  
 
This thesis had its beginnings in Elizabeth Grosz’s ‘throwaway’ line, and the 
renewed  flowering  of  genetic  and  sociobiological  research  in  the  1990s.  The 
conjunction of these two things caused me to more carefully consider the content 
and tenor of feminist work on the body, and set me on a long path through the 
unfamiliar, sometimes difficult, and often seductive territory of the ‘other side’ of   256
campus. My fundamental presumption was that biology cannot be left out of any 
account  of  the  body,  and  my  approach  encompassed  a  desire  to  accept  that 
(most)  scientists  act  in  good  faith,  and  that  reductionist  science  has  valuable 
things to say to feminist theories of the body.  
 
I remain convinced that it is a nonsense to deny the body’s biology. I remain 
optimistic that proponents on both sides of the nature/nurture divide in general 
act in good faith and that there is more in common philosophically between them 
than either often admits or, indeed, seems to recognise. I believe that we need not 
and should not be so nervous about much of the research that is going on in these 
reductionist sciences; nor should we be too quick to make assumptions that it is 
biologically  or  genetically  determinist  in  intent,  even  if  it  is  in  effect.  I  am 
strengthened  in  my  belief  that  feminist  body  theory  can  no  longer  skirt  the 
question of difference; we must deal with it directly, and not as an outcome of 
some quantifiable choice between biology and society. As a feminist, I remain 
equally  convinced  that  feminism  has  valuable  things  to  say  to  reductionist 
science about the way out of determinism. I suggest we set aside Ann Oakley’s 
‘enduring questions’, since there are clearly grounds for imagining that neither 
one of nature or nurture is more important. Instead, reductionists and feminists 
alike, we should all be – some already are – theorising a bio/social body, the entire 
package, rather than arguing over or attempting to tease out the bits that might 
be nature, and the bits that might be nurture.  
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So, in endorsing the importance of the corporeal project, I conclude that one 
useful way forward towards overcoming the problem of dualisms and dualistic 
thinking is to adopt an explicit agenda that acknowledges the complex social 
biogram. I believe that the notion of an evolved social biogram that treats body 
and mind (and in some ways society itself) as an indissoluble whole sits well 
with  the  feminist  project  of  overcoming  the  dualistic  Cartesian  model  of 
body/mind and thus is potentially very useful for feminist body theorists. That 
being so, instead of investing in a notion of irreconcilable differences, it may be 
useful to adopt a more open, less confrontational approach which says, “Well, 
this might be true – we may not at this point concede it one way or the other – 
but what if it is? So what? What does this knowledge really mean for how we 
might think about our bodies? Where might this productively lead us in our 
theorising (of the body/of individual and social relations)?”  
 
At  the  same  time,  in  engaging  with  reductionist  theory,  we  must  not  be 
apologetic or defend them. There is still ample evidence of sloppy thinking, gross 
oversimplification, and lack of rigour in the ways some scientific findings are 
being interpreted and in the conclusions being drawn from them, and so we must 
remain vigilant in holding individual practitioners to account for what they say. 
We  must  still  insist  on  precision  in  ensuring  that  the  claims  they  make  are 
hedged about with the requisite levels of uncertainty and caution that are evident 
within much of their own work, but which too often gets lost in translation into 
the public arena. More broadly, we must continue to challenge the enterprise   258
itself to be more intellectually and socially responsible – to be more rigorous and 
far less speculative when it engages with the complexities of human social life. 
 
Although, because of my focus on the ways in which feminism tends to deal with 
biology  and  ‘read’  reductionist  discourse,  this  thesis  has  primarily  been 
addressed to other feminists, of course the conversation needs to be progressed 
from both directions to be productive. This requires a commitment on the part of 
the scientists who work in these fields to more explicitly acknowledge that the 
context within which they work is never scientifically neutral, but is politically, 
philosophically,  socially  and,  increasingly,  economically  bound  up  with 
particular  systems  that  come  with  their  own  expectations  and  demands  of 
science. There are hopeful signs that this is occurring already, most notably in the 
interdisciplinary focus of much of the work in behavioural genetics.  But it also 
requires a commitment on the part of feminist body theorists to abandon the 
attempt to make biology comprehensible in our terms, and to instead undertake 
the difficult task of making our terms meaningful in light of biology. Again, there 
are encouraging moves in this direction. For my part, it was well worth the walk. 
We can engage more positively with reductionist science. I would like to invite 
‘them’ to walk across the campus and join ‘us’ in that project.  
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